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Foreword
For more than 25 years, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) has been working to make our nation’s underserved neigh-
borhoods better and stronger. In 2005, LISC marked its 25th anniversary as a community development intermediary with a renewed 
commitment to investment in housing and real estate in low-income neighborhoods, along with increased attention to family income 
and wealth, stimulating economic development, expanding access to quality education, and encouraging healthy lifestyles and 
environments. For 15 of its 25 years, LISC has drawn both inspiration and practical lessons from the experience of the Comprehensive 
Community Revitalization Program (CCRP) in the South Bronx. In the early 1990’s, CCRP took aim at improving the social, economic and 
human service infrastructure of some of our nation’s most impoverished neighborhoods. What it achieved were real outcomes that 
changed neighborhoods and the lives of people who live in them. In addition, it helped to reshape the entire field of community devel-
opment by showing how community-based organizations could, with the right support, broaden their focus from bricks and mortar 
revitalization projects toward much more comprehensive approaches to improving the quality of their neighborhoods.
CCRP is now widely recognized as a path-breaking community building program. Its design and operation have inspired other 
national funder initiatives and countless neighborhood rebuilding efforts in communities across the country. Within LISC, CCRP has 
repeatedly served as a point of reference for local and national programs intended to reinforce LISC’s core strengths as a real estate 
investor in neighborhood revitalization efforts. LISC’s National Community Building Initiative during the mid-1990’s and Chicago 
LISC’s later New Communities Initiative (NCI) and New Communities Program (NCP) are just three of many examples that drew 
directly upon the CCRP experience.
As LISC moves forward with a new strategic plan that includes more emphasis than ever before on holistic community revitalization, 
the principles gleaned from the CCRP approach will continue to provide guidance to LISC staff and to the many collaborators with 
whom LISC works. Among these are the ideas that communities can be improved only by starting at the ground level with local people 
making important decisions that matter for their families and their neighborhoods, working with and through capable resident-led 
organizations, and proceeding incrementally toward comprehensive results that address both physical improvements and improve-
ments in the economic and social well-being of the neighborhood.
Despite the widespread attention that CCRP has received within and beyond LISC, the pragmatic aspects of the initiative – the impor-
tant nuances involved in designing and managing a program on the ground – have yet to be shared broadly with practitioners in the 
community development field. This handbook is intended to fill these gaps by systematically unpacking the key elements of CCRP’s 
design and the operating principles that guided how the program worked – how it approached neighborhood planning and visioning, 
managed and leveraged resources, connected residents to the economic life of the city, exerted and developed leadership, and built 
the network of working relationships needed to ensure its effectiveness. The chapters that follow bring the initiative to life with unusual 
candor and an engaging story-telling style that offers management insights, practical tools, and durable lessons gleaned from the pro-
cess of implementing the initiative over several years.
Anita Miller, CCRP’s Program Director and its designer, was a seasoned program officer, first at the Ford Foundation and then subse-
quently at LISC. She tells the CCRP story from a distinctive hands-on perspective that people on the ground will find particularly refresh-
ing; Tom Burns, who collaborated with Miller on this book, is a national community development consultant with a deep knowledge of 
CCRP gained during his tenure as Director of the OMG Center for Collaborative Learning at the time that OMG carried out a formative 
assessment of the program. Working collaboratively, Miller and Burns have woven together insights that can only be gathered through 
direct involvement in CCRP’s implementation with a broader, more contextual understanding of CCRP’s contribution to community 
development practice.
This is a unique book whose lessons for LISC have already been significant. For others in the field, the time spent in reading the story of 
how this important initiative actually worked will be both entertaining and rewarding.
Michael Rubinger
President
Local Initiatives Support Corporation
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Preface
There is no single, can’t-miss way to revitalize America’s struggling urban neighborhoods. No two 
neighborhoods – or cities – are exactly alike. Each has its own complex set of assets and chal-
lenges, each its own demographic mix and political context. And to that we must surely cheer 
“Vive le difference!”
This book is an attempt, however, to distill and explain a powerful yet still-evolving approach to 
neighborhood redevelopment, an approach that is not only producing here-and-now results but is 
revolutionizing the way urban practitioners think about the future of cities and their neighborhoods.
Much of our account – our grassroots guide, if you will – traces the story of the Comprehensive 
Community Revitalization Program, or CCRP, the novel approach to neighborhood renewal behind 
America’s most remarkable urban turnaround, that of New York’s once-stricken South Bronx.
To some our story may seem familiar. Academics, researchers, lecturers, journalists, doctoral stu-
dents, evaluators, foundations and community development organizations all have examined the 
Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program in the South Bronx. Many also have recognized 
its core thesis: To succeed and to endure, redevelopment must start at the ground level with local 
people making the decisions that matter for their families and their neighborhoods. They recog-
nized, too, that community development corporations (CDCs) are uniquely positioned to actually 
deliver the critical programs and projects that people want, and more lastingly, to begin the difficult, 
but essential, process of rebuilding the social fabric of their neighborhoods.
But this is no outside analysis. This book captures the inside perspective of two practitioners steeped 
in the subject of rebuilding from the ground up in the South Bronx. As the individual at the hub of 
the CCRP demonstration, I have often been written about, mostly accurately and well. But never 
before have I told the CCRP tale as I experienced it. I do so now at the urging of many people in our 
field with the hope of providing inspiration and guidance to others engaged in the difficult work of 
turning around troubled neighborhoods.
Tom Burns, who is my partner in this endeavor, was a member of the Organization and 
Management Group team that assessed CCRP over a period of six years. An astute observer of 
every nuance of our initiative, he continued to work with the CCRP family even after the initial 
program concluded in 1998.
CCRP was an ambitious endeavor whose participants tackled many critical issues simultaneously. Its 
scale was large and its pace rapid. Nonetheless, the methods we used and the lessons we learned 
have direct application to neighborhoods of any size, working at any pace. It has been my recent 
delight, for instance, to advise the startup in Chicago of the New Communities Program, an effort by 
the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) there to apply best practices in the revitalization of 
14 neighborhoods. The challenges and opportunities in Chicago, indeed, in every city where neigh-
borhoods have fallen away from the economic mainstream, will surely be similar to those we faced 
in the South Bronx.
Some consider New York an exception to most rules. But our experience there should not prevent 
others from viewing CCRP as a source of inspiration and of lessons. This city is not the large amor-
phous mass that some perceive it to be. Like other cities, it is a patchwork of many neighborhoods, 
each with its own identity and rhythm. CCRP started in six such neighborhoods and concluded in 
four. Dropouts, it turns out, can be the most instructive lessons of all.
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It is the CDCs that stayed the course, however, that proved the worth of our approach and gave us 
the remarkable success story we tell herewith. They are extraordinary organizations led by remark-
able people. They represent the best of what community development corporations can achieve. All 
four organizations exhibited enormous energy and a will to succeed, not only for the sake of their 
neighborhoods, but also for the sake of CCRP. They seized the opportunity to show a positive side of 
the South Bronx and to serve as a laboratory for the nation.
The generosity of the 21 funders who supported CCRP speaks for itself – $9.5 million invested over 
a seven-year period. Edward Skloot and the Surdna Foundation’s board of directors deserve special 
thanks. Were it not for them, CCRP would not have come to pass in the South Bronx. Nor would it 
have spawned so many similar initiatives in other places. Their initial support for my design of the 
program and the $3 million grant that followed was the largest program investment Surdna had ever 
made in a single project, and a magnificent vote of confidence in a new and pioneering venture.
The Surdna, Annie E. Casey, and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundations have supported 
the writing of this book. They have our sincere appreciation. We are also fortunate to have had the 
editorial assistance of Margaret Berkey, formerly with OMG Center, whose skill and unfailing patience 
contributed enormously to our work.
I also want to acknowledge the kindness of two special people. One, of course, is Edward Skloot of 
Surdna who gave me his trust and let CCRP soar. Not only was he the person who envisioned the 
program way back in 1991, he also served as chair of its funders advisory committee and through-
out remained CCRP’s ever constant intellectual and personal champion. The other is Jeanette 
Puryear, the executive director of the Mid Bronx Senior Citizens Council, upon whom I leaned those 
few times when the going got rough and lonely. Jeanette, always discreet, provided singular wis-
dom and perspective that I could get nowhere else.
In the pages that follow we speak to the many queries we have received over the years relating to 
the philosophy of the initiative that was first spelled out in the initial CCRP Program Paper and the 
operating principles that evolved as the program unfolded. We also discuss the numerous lessons 
we learned, including those that emanated from very painful events. These, we hope, will be infor-
mative. They are here for the taking.
I speak for everyone involved in saying that we are truly gratified that CCRP has had a role in help-
ing to advance community rebuilding as an idea whose time has come. For me personally, CCRP 
– daunting as it was – has been the zenith of a most rewarding career. Serving as its program 
director was a unique privilege. All across the country funders and neighborhood-based organiza-
tions are creating programs that incorporate CCRP-like elements within their particular environ-
ments. This is the most edifying of all. As a demonstration, we had always hoped our work in the 
South Bronx would become an enduring contribution to our field. Perhaps like you, we are con-
vinced there is no more important work than strengthening our neighborhoods, and in so doing, 
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A Community Rebuilding Experiment
– Tom Burns
When CCRP was launched in 1992, it set out to assist a 
group of established CDCs, or non-profit community 
development corporations, to do something essentially 
new. Each of these organizations had already proved its 
ability to take on physical revitalization projects in their 
neighborhoods. CCRP was about helping them take on 
a new role as “neighborhood intermediaries,” coordinat-
ing the planning, resource development and program 
implementation that would begin addressing the eco-
nomic and social ills contributing to poverty in their com-
munities. Six CDCs in the South Bronx were selected to 
participate initially, though ultimately just four made it to 
the end. With an early commitment of $3 million from the 
Surdna Foundation, CCRP successfully put together addi-
tional resources from 20 more funders bringing the total 
to $9.4 million. By program’s end, this in turn leveraged 
$44 million in local and federal funds and assisted the 
CDCs in learning how to leverage their grants still further.
Much has been accomplished since the inception 
of CCRP. But CCRP had another goal as well – to dem-
onstrate to the wider community development field 
that experienced CDCs could move into broader com-
munity leadership roles. In particular, it sought to explore 
how these organizations could mobilize new kinds of 
resources and better coordinate the efforts of other 
neighborhood organizations, businesses, and residents 
so that together they would plan and execute projects 
yielding comprehensive and lasting results. So, from 
the beginning, CCRP was both a strategy for targeting 
resources to neighborhoods in a new way, and a strategy 
for learning through a demonstration model.
In this introductory chapter we offer some context 
and background on CCRP’s setting, the participating 
CDCs, what the demonstration aimed to accomplish and 
what it achieved during its six and a half years. Rather 
than telling the whole story, this chapter sets the stage 
for the more detailed “how it all worked” chapters that 
come later.
The South Bronx and Its CDCs
In the early decades of the 20th century, the South Bronx 
was one of the most livable sections of New York City’s 
most livable borough. It was filled with stable middle and 
working class neighborhoods, thriving businesses, good 
schools, and strong community institutions. The story of 
its decline is all too familiar. By the 1960s and 1970s, the 
South Bronx had been weakened by a vast out-migration 
of residents and jobs to the suburbs and beyond, and 
many of its buildings were being destroyed by owner 
neglect, arson and vandalism. Many service agencies had 
exited or closed their doors. When President Jimmy Carter 
first came to the South Bronx in 1977, and later Ronald 
Reagan in 1980, a national spotlight illuminated how vast 
and hopeless the situation had become.
With the help of the Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation, the Enterprise Foundation, Federal tax credit 
programs and the New York Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development, a group of CDCs in the 
South Bronx emerged during the 1980s intent on physi-
cally rebuilding their communities. By the mid 1990s, 
these CDCs had produced some 22,000 units of affordable 
housing. Much of it was supported by the Koch admin-
istration’s Affordable Housing Program, which had com-
mitted $5 billion in 1986 to create 84,000 housing units 
over a ten-year period. This boom in affordable housing 
was largely responsible for bringing new residents, many 
formerly homeless, back into the hundreds of six-story 
apartment buildings that had been largely abandoned in 
neighborhoods throughout the South Bronx.
By the early 1990s, however, despite the impressive 
physical redevelopment efforts underway, it was clear 
CDCs that have implemented large-scale housing pro-
grams appear best suited to weaving together the many 
separate programmatic strands essential to a cohesive 
revitalization strategy. They are genuinely community-
based, with community-wide improvement as their 
mission. Their capabilities, their leadership and their 
credibility are well established. In contrast to other 
organizations, they have responsibility for the long-
term viability of many millions of dollars of real estate 
which they likely manage, and perhaps own. As a result, 
they interact daily with hundreds, or even thousands of 
community residents. And, having built a basic organi-
zational infrastructure, they now have the potential to 
spearhead wider efforts aimed at improving the quality 
of community life.
- From the 1991 CCRP Program Paper 
prepared by Anita Miller
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that much was still missing. New investments were 
needed to rebuild services and infrastructure essential to 
full community life – health care, parks and playgrounds, 
neighborhood shopping, child care, literacy and linkages 
to employment. Creating this range of services and ame-
nities – the keys to improving the quality of life for the 
nearly half million residents who were then living in the 
South Bronx – became the next imperative.
This was the setting and the challenge for CCRP. The 
situation demanded a new approach to community-
building in the severely deteriorated neighborhoods of 
the South Bronx. That approach would bring together 
well-established and entrepreneurial CDCs, groups with 
proven track records in physical development but also 
groups which promised the capacity to address the other 
pieces needed to build a healthy community.
Six CDCs were originally selected to participate in 
CCRP:
• Banana Kelly Community Improvement Association, a 
CDC that had already developed 1,629 units of rental 
housing in its neighborhood and was seeking to 
move into economic development;
• Mid Bronx Desperadoes Community Housing 
Corporation, an organization created in the mid-1970s 
to advocate for a more proactive City role in protect-
ing neighborhood tenements from arson and which 
subsequently evolved into a large-scale housing 
developer;
• Mid Bronx Senior Citizens Council, Inc., an organization 
that began as an alliance of agencies providing ser-
vices to seniors. During the ’80s it had acquired and 
renovated 15 buildings comprising 1,112 units for the 
elderly and families;
• Mount Hope Housing Corporation, Inc., created by the 
Mount Hope Community Organization, a resident 
group which rallied tenants in scores of buildings to 
stem the tide of neighborhood destruction;
• Phipps Community Development Corporation (West 
Farms), the CDC subsidiary of Phipps Housing, a non-
profit citywide housing developer responsible for pro-
ducing some 1,000 units of affordable housing in the 
South Bronx;
• Promesa Housing Development Fund Corporation, a 
subsidiary of Promesa, Inc., an established drug coun-
seling agency serving thousands of families in the 
South Bronx and one of the state’s largest neighbor-
hood-based Latino social service organizations.
MBD Housing Corporation
Located in the Crotona Park East area of the South Bronx, MBD was organized in the mid-1970s by neighborhood 
residents in response to widespread arson and abandonment. Roughly 15,000 housing units were lost to fires and 
neglect and the neighborhood’s population declined by about 75%. By the close of CCRP, MBD employed a staff of 72 
people and was playing a central role in revitalizing a neighborhood of about 17,000 residents. MBD had sponsored 
the construction or rehabilitation of over 2,300 housing units costing approximately $246 million, including the 89 
single-family ranch houses of Charlotte Gardens which opened in the mid-80’s and helped trigger the production of 
affordable housing for home buyers across the entire country.
A South Bronx demonstration would respond to a vari-
ety of foundation goals. For foundations focused on 
New York, it would provide resources: (1) to enhance 
CDC capacity to manage increased housing development 
management and human service workloads for the most 
vulnerable populations; (2) to mount consequential, 
integrated, local revitalization strategies; and (3) to 
design and test empowerment approaches that incor-
porate community organizing know-how as a way to 
decrease dependency....
For foundations whose interest would also include the 
national demonstration aspects of the program, a South 
Bronx demonstration would: (1) focus on issues that are 
common to distressed communities across the country; 
(2) provide potentially adaptable models of community-
based empowerment techniques; (3) involve a critical 
mass of mature CDCs working collectively to influence 
public sector behavior and policies; and (4) benefit from 
having local organizations engaged in parallel efforts to 
support and critique one another.
 - From the 1991 CCRP Program Paper
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Two of the original six CDCs did not complete 
the demonstration. Banana Kelly was discontinued in 
December 1994. By then it was evident that the organiza-
tion was not giving CCRP the attention and focus previ-
ously committed. Promesa was discontinued in December 
1996 after a leadership change that brought with it a shift 
in priorities away from community building. The other four 
CDCs remained CCRP participants until the conclusion of 
the demonstration phase in 1998. (Later they remained 
together as part of a new entity, CCRP, Inc., which for five 
years carried on work begun in earlier years.)
These four organizations were distinctly different in 
their backgrounds, the types of programs they operated 
and the neighborhoods in which they worked. All were 
well-regarded both within and beyond their communi-
ties when the program began. At the start they had com-
bined budgets of $3.7 million and staff of approximately 
225 people. Some had already taken steps to expand ser-
vices to better serve the needs of residents in the housing 
units they managed. Nonetheless, by mid 1998 when the 
demonstration phase ended, their combined budgets 
had grown to over $10 million and their combined staffs 
numbered nearly 500. Each of the organizations also had 
expanded programmatically, so that together they pro-
vided a rich array of improvements that were unthinkable 
ten years before.
The chapters that follow describe many of these 
new initiatives. Included were workforce and child 
care programs, economic development ventures, 
open space projects, primary health care practices, 
expanded assistance for homeowners and an array of 
new community-building activities. In addition to their 
impressive CCRP accomplishments, all four CDCs con-
tinued to expand their substantial housing programs. 
During the years of the demonstration, they also built, 
rehabilitated or took over management of nearly 2,800 
more units of affordable housing.
Demonstration Strategy and 
Organization
The idea of a foundation-supported experiment in com-
prehensive community revitalization began to take shape 
within the New York-based Surdna Foundation in the 
spring of 1991. Edward Skloot, Surdna’s President, had 
been impressed by the growing accomplishments of 
CDCs in the South Bronx, but was also concerned about 
the limits of housing revitalization in meeting the needs 
of residents to prepare for and enter the mainstream 
economy. Ed Skloot wanted to explore the feasibility of 
helping a number of successful CDCs build upon what 
they had achieved in housing production and property 
management in the South Bronx. More specifically, he 
wanted to provide those CDCs with an opportunity to 
build their capacities and broaden their roles to encom-
pass programs that addressed the economic and social 
needs of their neighborhoods; those needs were becom-
ing all the more urgent as a result of the decision to 
re-house thousands of families, many formerly homeless, 
in the South Bronx under the mayor’s multi-billion dollar 
housing program.
Knowing that a project like this would require careful 
planning and extraordinary leadership, Ed Skloot sought 
the advice of Mitchell Sviridoff, the former head of 
domestic programs at the Ford Foundation, a founder of 
the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and one 
of the country’s staunchest community development 
advocates. Mike Sviridoff urged Ed Skloot to approach 
Anita Miller, a former senior program officer at Ford. She 
was among the first to be recruited by Sviridoff to LISC 
in the early 1980s to shape its South Bronx program. 
Miller then had over 20 years of experience in com-
munity development and knew the South Bronx and 
its CDCs intimately. While at LISC she had a major hand 
in funding their physical revitalization activities. Skloot 
Mid Bronx Senior Citizens Council, Inc.
MBSCC was founded in the late 1970s to serve elderly residents stranded in poor housing with few services. Since 
then MBSCC has transformed itself from an elderly service organization to a powerful voice for the diverse residents 
and small businesses in its neighborhood. By the end of CCRP, the organization employed some 240 people and 
managed approximately 1200 housing units. It serves seniors and families with its housing, social service and 
economic development programs. Located in the heart of the Bronx’s civic center, MBSCC’s neighborhood escaped 
the large-scale abandonment that characterizes much of the South Bronx. But much of the area is in poor repair and 
needs commercial services and more amenities. Within the MBSCC neighborhood are numerous assets including many 
other private and public institutions, Yankee Stadium and the Bronx Court House.
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took his advice and invited Miller to analyze the feasibil-
ity of an initiative that could be supported by Surdna 
and other foundations, and to produce a program paper 
for the Foundation’s board of directors and for other 
potential funders.1
CCRP’s distinctive approach began to take shape soon 
after the demonstration was launched. One aspect cen-
tered on how it deployed the dollars it had amassed, not 
earmarking them all at once to the participating CDCs but 
instead using them to respond flexibly to each CDC’s par-
ticular strategy. Often the dollars that CCRP invested were 
the critical “first-in” funding for new staff and programs 
that helped leverage vastly more financing as the initiative 
matured. The confidence that CCRP’s funders had in Miller’s 
savvy as a program developer and grantmaker made it 
possible for her to exercise considerable discretion in how 
she deployed the dollars available through the initiative.
Other aspects of CCRP’s distinctive approach center on 
how its director related to the CDCs and neighborhoods 
in developing and implementing a variety of programs. 
Drawing advice from many directions – the participating 
CDCs, the evaluation team, and other seasoned funders 
and program managers – Miller gradually evolved several 
interrelated strategies that defined how CCRP was actu-
ally implemented. Some surfaced early on and became 
part of the initial guiding principles. Others emerged later 
through a combination 
of trial and error. As the 
initiative unfolded, Miller, 
working with the CDCs and 
numerous other individu-
als or organizations that 
were drawn in to provide 
technical support, evolved 
a distinctive approach to 
neighborhood planning 
and visioning that has 
since been transported to 
numerous other locales. 
Similarly, the initiative’s 
approach to partnering with other nonprofit or govern-
mental organizations able to commit additional resources 
of their own to CCRP-initiated projects and activities 
provided a powerful tool for resource leveraging that 
drew widespread attention in the field. Finally, one of 
the initiative’s lasting contributions to the field has been 
Miller’s own discovery of how to use her role as Program 
Director to bring dynamic leadership to the effort, and 
her willingness to talk candidly about the pivotal chal-
lenges she faced in that role.
CCRP’s Impacts on the  
Target Communities
The four neighborhoods involved in CCRP emerged from 
the initiative vastly enriched and energized. They ben-
CCRP has unapologetically favored product over process, starting the wheels 
turning for health centers, a joint venture with Pathmark early on, and then 
following with an extended community planning process (for which it won an 
award by the American Planning Association). “I’ve seen so many initiatives 
get bogged down in endless planning processes that create nothing and leave 
residents frustrated,” Miller says. “The field needs to be about planning-while-
doing, working on the things the community desperately needs while developing 
community input and oversight as you go along.”
– Joan Walsh, 
Stories of Renewal: Community Building and the Future of Urban America, 1996
Mount Hope Housing Corporation
Growing out of the Mount Hope Organization, MHHC was founded in the mid-1980s by residents and churches to 
combat their neighborhood’s deterioration with housing strategies. It has since become one of the most effective 
CDCs in the Bronx. By the end of CCRP, MHHC had sponsored over 1300 units of affordable housing and employed 
over 60 people. The MHHC neighborhood is well-organized and has a strong sense of identity. Its Job Resource 
Center, one of four mounted by CCRP, placed 558 people in its first five years. Some 35,000 people live in Mount 
Hope and about 1/10 of them live in MHHC’s housing. A large percentage of these people are formerly homeless and 
many are children.
1 See Comprehensive Community Revitalization: A Demonstration Program in the South Bronx, by Anita Miller and Edward Skloot, November 25, 1991.
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efited from new amenities and services – many large in 
scale – as well as a new sense of community and pride 
among many neighborhood residents and organizations.
When CCRP began, the participating CDCs were 
already starting to respond to the needs of tenants moving 
into the new housing that they and others were creating. 
They began by offering such programs as youth outreach 
and counseling, case management and adult basic educa-
tion. Soon, however, they recognized that what they were 
doing, while useful, did not fully respond to the enormity 
of the challenges their residents faced. As a result, access 
to jobs and new economic development moved quickly to 
the top of CDC agendas for the South Bronx.
Thus when CCRP was being formulated the CDCs 
sensed what their residents needed. Yet they had neither 
the capacity nor the relationships that it would take to 
mount an effective response to the challenges they saw. 
Each CDC was seeking and pursuing opportunities on an 
ad hoc basis, but without a comprehensive strategy and 
without a broad base of community support to help in 
garnering new resources.
CCRP brought to the table the idea of an action- 
oriented community-wide planning process and backed it 
up with practical support that enabled people who lived 
and worked in each CDC neighborhood to forge their own 
collective “blueprint” for the future. These plans formed an 
action agenda and at the same time broadened the CDCs’ 
networks of agencies, businesses, funders and residents. 
As CCRP unfolded and the community plans took shape, 
Miller played a critical new role in assisting and advocating 
for the CDCs. She connected the groups with high level 
local, state and national public and private organizations 
in a position to help the CDCs accomplish their objectives. 
As a result, the CDCs were able to implement an impres-
sive array of community programs and activities. CCRP’s 
achievements were most notable in four key program 
areas: health care, economic development, employment, 
and quality of life improvements.
Health care. With primary health care a critical need 
in all the neighborhoods, CCRP set out early to help the 
CDCs establish partnerships with quality stable, well 
regarded providers who were seeking to open non-profit 
primary health care practices in the South Bronx. CCRP 
assisted the CDCs in partnering with these larger health 
providers by helping to fund capital improvements for 
their properties. With grant dollars totaling $300,000 
CCRP triggered an additional $3.8 million for this purpose. 
By the end of the demonstration nearly 35,000 patient 
visits were being made annually at the CDC-sponsored 
health care facilities.
Economic development. CCRP played a catalytic 
role in several CDC-sponsored economic development 
projects – Mid Bronx’s catering and childcare enterprises; 
Mount Hope’s Individual Development Account (IDA) 
program and the Bethex Micro Loan program; and MBD 
Housing’s $50 million shopping center which started con-
struction in 2001. CCRP generally supplied first-in money, 
technical assistance, staff support to advance the projects 
– and lots of advice.
Employment. Creating jobs and improving access to 
employment were among the CDCs’ toughest challenges, 
since some 40% of their tenants were on public assis-
tance. CCRP and the CDCs addressed these issues early by 
choosing to elevate the CCRP employment program to a 
centerpiece “demonstration-within-the-demonstration.” 
They adopted a neighborhood-based approach that took 
advantage of the CDCs’ strong relationships with local 
residents. Working with FEGS, a well-regarded agency 
specializing in employment, CCRP’s Program Director and 
Phipps Community Development Corporation - West Farms
Phipps Houses, founded in 1905, is a citywide developer and sponsor of affordable housing and has been in the West 
Farms neighborhood for some 30 years. It opened the 731-unit Lambert Houses in 1972 and thereafter built and 
rehabilitated a number of additional multifamily properties. It has also been the local sponsor of NYC Partnership 
homeowner housing. By the end of CCRP, Phipps owned and managed 969 units in West Farms (plus another 608 
units elsewhere in the Bronx). Phipps CDC was created in 1972 to provide social services where Phipps Housing owns 
housing. By CCRP’s conclusion, the CDC had a staff in West Farms of about 160 people, including its Beacon School. 
West Farms suffered considerable abandonment in the 1970s. Currently comprised of some 14,000 residents, the 
community’s central priority has been the development of more parks and recreation space, as well as new housing. 
With local unemployment levels approaching 50%, Phipps CDC has placed high priority on education, training and 
employment, and childcare.
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the CDCs launched an early pilot program, the New Bronx 
Employment Service, which later became a catalyst and 
model for place-based employment programs elsewhere 
in the country. By the time CCRP ended in 1998, three 
of the CDCs had screened and placed their first 365 resi-
dents. By the end of 2001, the New Bronx Employment 
Service was operating as a partnership of all four CCRP 
CDCs and had served 2,000 clients.
Quality of life improvements. Neighborhood qual-
ity of life issues, particularly safety and open space, were 
high on resident agendas throughout CCRP. Credit for 
the effectiveness of the CDCs’ neighborhood safety initia-
tives belongs to the working relationships that were built 
between a CCRP-funded consultant, program staff, ten-
ants of CDC buildings, and local precincts. Together they 
achieved early victories in organizing residents to reduce 
crime in key neighborhood locations. Significant open 
space improvements took place in all of the neighbor-
hoods as well. During the demonstration, investments of 
over $6 million were made in nine new and refurbished 
community parks and playgrounds. First envisioned in 
CDC Quality of Life Plans, many of these open space 
projects came alive through the teamwork and determi-
nation of residents working with CDC program managers 
and CCRP-funded consultants. Residents worked closely 
with landscape designers and personnel from city and 
federal agencies to overcome impediments in the system. 
Agency staff not only valued the community’s contribu-
tion to each project but also understood the centrality of 
their community partners to maintaining these projects 
after completion.
As the CDCs were accomplishing these results in pro-
gram areas that were essentially new for them, they also 
continued to be producers and managers of affordable 
housing in their neighborhoods. In fact, two of the CDCs 
– Mount Hope and Mid-Bronx Senior Citizens Housing 
– each grew their housing inventories dramatically. Their 
successes in housing production helped generate new 
demands on the CDCs’ property management divisions 
even as they were creating more consumers for a broad-
ening array of services and amenities.
None of these new initiatives were undertaken by the 
CDCs alone. Each success drew on a variety of partners 
with new expertise to supplement that already in place. 
MBD worked with LISC on its shopping center. Several 
CDCs worked with the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
on three urban parks. MHHC teamed up with the Bethex 
Credit Union on micro-loan and Individual Development 
Account programs. In every case the CCRP Program 
Director played a critical brokering role that enabled the 
CDCs, working individually and often together, to take on 
new challenges. Anita Miller found accomplished orga-
nizations like Child Care, Inc. to conduct research, and 
she helped bring in the Institute for Urban and Family 
Health, as well as LISC, FEGS, and the Trust for Public 
Land, as experts or equity partners. She advocated for 
the CDCs’ projects with the Department of Agriculture, 
Neighborhood Housing Services and the Corporation 
for Supportive Housing. As she helped with contacts, 
she also worked consistently as a venture capitalist to 
promote the CDCs’ agendas and leverage new streams of 
short- and long-term public and private resources. Many 
of the projects undertaken by the CDCs did not fit easily 
or well with what these agencies had done previously, so 
that in making these connections, she was also helping the 
external partners break new ground and change their own 
ways of doing things in partnership with communities.
CCRP’s Approach – A Health Care Example
In the health care area we have a classic example of 
CCRP’s “planning-while-doing” philosophy. Our work in 
this area began even before the United Hospital Fund 
published its study of health care deficiencies in South 
Bronx neighborhoods and well before the CDCs’ Quality 
of Life Plans for their neighborhoods had been final-
ized. The demand for primary health care and the logic 
of striking partnership deals with local hospital provid-
ers were both self-evident. I also knew that bringing 
new primary health care practices to CDC neighborhoods 
would help demonstrate to both the CDCs and their com-
munities that CCRP was serious about results and that it 
was prepared to break new ground getting them to hap-
pen. Also, it was a win-win opportunity.
Health care providers, previously unable to find office 
space, would now be able to house their practices in 
CDC buildings; each would be accountable to the CDC 
that became its community sponsor; and each practice 
would have a CDC-created advisory committee to help 
it understand what services the community needed. 
For foundations and corporations loath to fund capital 
improvements, CCRP showed the value of using matching 
grants to build out medical offices so that the govern-
ment funds used to actually provide medical care could 
flow into poor communities. And with HUD officials in 
New York and Washington, DC, CCRP made the case that 
when the only space available for a medical practice in 
an underserved neighborhood with millions of dollars of 
HUD-subsidized housing was in a senior citizens build-
ing, they needed to waive their regulations restricting 
the use of building facilities to senior residents alone.
- Anita Miller
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CCRP’s Impacts on the  
Participating CDCs
Not surprisingly, CCRP presented all sorts of new organiza-
tional challenges for the CDCs. As they began broadening 
their community agendas and taking on new community-
building roles, they bumped up against their own limita-
tions – in internal staff skills, organizational and manage-
ment structures, financial resources and the political and 
cultural contexts in which they operated. Across the board, 
the CDCs struggled with these challenges and in doing so 
were changed, sometimes in fundamental ways.
With CCRP funding, technical assistance, and help in 
linking with new partners, the CDC programs became 
much more diverse. As the CDCs expanded the program 
areas in which they worked, they were compelled to aug-
ment staff expertise in new technical areas. The CDC exec-
utive directors, CCRP managers and other program-related 
staff sometimes enhanced their skills by working alongside 
CCRP staff, consultants and staff from partner organizations 
on CCRP-supported projects. However, in CCRP, as in other 
community-building efforts, the CDCs struggled with iden-
tifying qualified new staff to take on new programs.
Equally important, the CCRP demonstration required 
creating and sustaining a new kind of leadership team 
within each organization. These were usually comprised 
of the executive director, the CCRP manager and an out-
reach worker. Success hinged on the leadership provided 
by the executive director coupled with the strength and 
skills of the CCRP managers in carrying out the agenda.
The CCRP managers’ roles evolved over the course of 
the demonstration, and by the time it concluded these 
new positions had become an integral part of each 
CDC’s staff. The outreach activities launched during CCRP, 
although sometimes more difficult to support, have 
continued in one form or another in all four organizations 
since the initiative’s conclusion.
Another enduring impact of CCRP was the role it 
played in helping the CDCs rediscover the value of 
engaging with neighborhood residents and other inter-
ests in community-wide planning. All the CDCs worked 
initially with their communities to develop comprehen-
sive blueprints, called Quality of Life Physical Plans, which 
helped them move beyond ad hoc decision making to a 
more strategic way of operating. These initial blueprints, 
each with its own strategic action plan, helped the CDCs 
create compelling fundraising tools that supported future 
development. CCRP made available to the CDCs and their 
communities a team of professionals that included John 
Shapiro (of the planning firm of Phillips Preiss Shapiro 
Associates) and Xavier de Souza Briggs, then a consultant 
to CCRP and now an Associate Professor of Community 
Development and Public Policy at MIT. This team helped 
with planning and with producing a visually compel-
ling and easily accessible graphic representation of each 
neighborhood. All included housing, parks and play-
grounds, medical facilities, security and retail businesses. 
The plans provided powerful images and guidelines to 
direct future services and 
amenities infrastructure in 
each community. Notably, 
this CCRP-supported 
planning process won 




ence in managing these 
wider planning efforts, the 
CDCs all became not only 
better fundraisers, but also 
more skillful conveners and 
facilitators with other com-
munity based organizations, residents, businesses and 
public agencies. These planning initiatives led to many 
of the new partnerships that now exist to operate ongo-
ing programs. Also, the CDCs have developed additional 
partnerships with other neighborhood-based organiza-
tions or outside public and private organizations that 
work with them to deliver services. A number of the col-
laborative programs and initiatives launched as a result 
of CCRP have continued to the present. Finally, CCRP’s 
structure and philosophy encouraged the CDCs to work 
together as a team, resulting in excellent relationships 
and loyalties. These remain today and promise to endure 
in the years ahead.
It should be clear from the last 30 years of urban reform efforts that innovative 
three-to-five year foundation initiatives and federal demonstration projects, 
however inspired, will not solve the long-term problems of low-income 
neighborhoods. What is missing in most communities is a mechanism for 
continued investment in savvy, long-lasting institutions to attack these 
problems themselves ...CCRP will clearly leave the CDCs stronger than it found 
them, in staff capacity, management information systems, and expanded 
program expertise, and a talent for the collaborative relationships they have 
developed with one another.
 – Joan Walsh, 





The remarkable proliferation of CDCs and the steady 
expansion of the physical side of community develop-
ment eventually led to a widespread sense of frustration. 
The bricks and mortar investments being made largely 
in inner city communities – while an important part of 
what was needed to restore health to devastated neigh-
borhoods – was in itself not enough. “Old timers” in the 
movement remembered when community development 
was intended to be broader in scope, encompassing a 
whole range of activities and projects that would take 
aim at rebuilding localized economies and restoring high 
quality public services. With so many urban neighbor-
hoods being left out of the globalizing economy, there 
was a crying need for residents of disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods to be reconnected to the broader life of their 
cities and regions. Community development had arrived 
in terms of deals and dollars, but it had become some-
thing narrower than intended.
How did this happen? Many CDCs, seeking to fill the 
void left by government inaction and to prove their value 
to their communities and funders alike, had set out to 
restore the vitality of their neighborhoods. More often than 
not, their focus became housing, something that met a 
very real need and was easier to achieve than the more 
difficult economic and human development activities that 
had been tried, without much success, during the ’70s 
and early ’80s. The introduction of the federal Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit gave CDCs an opportunity to tap into 
the capital they needed to attack housing deterioration 
and abandonment – many used federal tax credits to 
assemble the financing needed to build larger-scale afford-
able rental housing developments in their communities.
This narrower focus on housing was to some degree 
encouraged by the national intermediaries LISC and 
Enterprise. Each had established their own subsidiaries 
to distribute tax credits and assemble large amounts of 
equity financing for affordable housing production across 
the country. Even CDCs that remembered their missions 
were broader, and that the problems they were trying to 
address were highly complex, found little opportunity to 
work outside the housing box – especially once govern-
ment support diminished for the more holistic programs 
launched during and after the War on Poverty.
At the beginning of the 1990s when CCRP was first con-
ceived, there was little experience with what we now think 
of as comprehensive community development. Only a few 
foundations had begun to consider how to broaden the 
community development agenda to include more than 
physical improvements. There were certainly no debates 
on which approach was most effective for organizing a 
comprehensive community initiative – or CCI – as many of 
these later efforts came to be called. There were no orga-
nized meetings of funders or governmental bodies where 
experiences could be compared – no Aspen Institute 
Roundtable on Comprehensive Community Initiatives and 
no Council on Foundations events where those interested 
in supporting a more holistic and participatory community 
revitalization approach could turn for guidance. But the 
community development industry was growing and an 
increasing number of mature CDCs faced tough neighbor-
hood revitalization challenges that did not lend themselves 
to single-solution approaches.
CDCs Come of Age
During the ’80s the community development movement 
flourished in many US cities. Its growth was aided by a new 
type of national intermediary, especially the Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise Foundation. 
Established in 1980, the purpose of LISC was to solicit and 
distribute corporate and foundation dollars so as to enable 
capable CDCs to mount large-scale housing and economic 
development projects, thereby creating a nationwide com-
munity development industry up to the task of rebuilding 
deteriorated neighborhoods. The mission of Enterprise was 
related but somewhat different: it sought to assist various 
types of nonprofit organizations to produce housing for 
low- and moderate-income Americans. These housing 
and community development efforts were given a dra-
matic boost when Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. The Act provided a Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
that created a powerful incentive for private investment 
in affordable housing in poor neighborhoods across the 
country. By the middle of the ’90s the National Congress for 
Community Economic Development, the CDCs’ national 
trade organization, estimated there were some 2,000 CDCs 
nationwide that together had produced over 320,000 units 
of affordable housing.
Going	Comprehensive:	Anatomy	of	an	Initiative	that	Worked	 
The very success of the physical revitalization activi-
ties of CDCs, particularly in the late ’80s, contributed to a 
growing discomfort – not just among community devel-
opment practitioners, but also among experienced grant-
makers. They saw the need to increase support for more 
than just housing, particularly in dealing directly with 
employment and economic development needs at the 
neighborhood level. There was also concern that many 
CDCs, striving to become effective developers of housing 
and real estate, were losing touch with the communities 
they served and the organizational goals upon which 
they were formed. Most funders were not comfortable 
supporting community organizers, yet there was grow-
ing interest among CDCs in using organizers to engage 
residents directly in program development and service 
delivery through approaches that later came to be called 
community building.
At the same time, outside the community develop-
ment field, in the social services delivery field in particular, 
there was increasing attention placed on bottom-up 
rather than top-down methodologies. There was a grow-
ing recognition of the value of active involvement by 
neighborhood residents and service recipients in identify-
ing, deciding on and participating in how services were 
delivered. Meanwhile, among those concerned with the 
flows of government and foundation funding, there was 
a new recognition that categorical dollars and single-pro-
gram efforts, which tended to emphasize just one aspect 
of well-being, did a poor job of responding to what com-
munities really needed.
As the ’80s gave way to the ’90s, talk spread within 
the community development and human services fields 
about the need to rethink how communities could 
be supported. By the end of the ’80s, the climate was 
right for a variety of new experiments, including one 
that would open the way for CDCs and other commu-
nity-based organizations (CBOs) to obtain support that 
enabled them to deliver a wider range of programs.
A New Focus on Comprehensiveness
It was against this backdrop of ideas and concerns that an 
initial wave of experiments was launched. Together they 
came to be seen as comprehensive community build-
ing, or comprehensive community revitalization. One of 
these, the Community Building Partnership in a single 
Baltimore neighborhood, Sandtown-Winchester, began 
in 1991. It amounted to a joint venture between the 
city’s mayor and Jim Rouse, the commercial developer 
and founder of the Enterprise Foundation. Another, the 
Ford Foundation’s Neighborhood and Family Initiative, 
was started in 1990. It targeted four neighborhoods 
across the country, where local community foundations 
would administer Ford funds for programs that brought 
individuals together to work on how best to improve 
their communities. Finally, the Atlanta Project, founded 
by former President Jimmy Carter in the fall of 1991, was 
envisioned as a means of bridging the gulf between the 
“two Atlantas,” affluent and poor, by focusing resources 
on twenty “cluster communities” with high rates of pov-
erty and single-parent families.
As these new efforts were getting underway, there 
was also new thinking within the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation about how to work differently, “from the 
neighborhoods up.” The idea was to lend support 
to local efforts to reform the public systems serving 
children and families. This new thinking was largely 
the result of lessons learned within the Foundation’s 
earliest community-based service delivery reform 
effort, the New Futures initiative, which began in 1987 
in five medium-sized cities – Boston, Denver, Detroit, 
Philadelphia and Washington, DC. In contrast to the 
Foundation’s previous state-level, “top-down” systems 
reform efforts, New Futures granted some $10 million 
In the past several years, a new and more sophisti-
cated theme has begun to surface, perhaps signaling an 
emerging new synthesis. Clear-eyed funders, community 
activists, researchers, policy analysts, and legislators 
are beginning to see that no single strand of interven-
tion can be counted on to produce significant results for 
populations in high-risk circumstances. They have seen 
that narrowly defined interventions can’t triumph over 
the forces of destruction.
The new synthesis rejects addressing poverty, welfare, 
employment, education, child development, housing and 
crime one at a time. It endorses the idea that the mul-
tiple and interrelated problems of poor neighborhoods 
require multiple and interrelated solutions. The new 
synthesizers are determined to reverse “the economic, 
social, and political marginalization that has turned the 
urban poor into an ‘underclass’ and their neighborhoods 
into battle zones.” They refuse to “choose between 
addressing the structural and behavioral causes of neigh-
borhood dysfunction, or between equipping the poor to 
leave unsupportive neighborhoods or making them bet-
ter places to live.” They insist on combining physical 
and economic development with service and education 
reform, and all of these with a commitment to building 
community institutions and social networks.
- Lisbeth B. Schorr,
Common Purpose, 1997
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over five years to each of the five cities to fund public/
private efforts in target communities.
It was during this period of expanding thinking that 
the Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program 
(CCRP) was born.
CCRP’s Place in an Expanding Field
CCRP’s decision to try a new approach to community-
building in the severely deteriorated neighborhoods of 
the South Bronx, and its decision to do this together with 
well-established, entrepreneurial CDCs who could be the 
drivers of this new approach, gave CCRP its unique focus.
CCRP’s interest was not in bricks and mortar, since 
the CDCs had already demonstrated their abilities to 
accomplish physical revitalization in their neighborhoods. 
Instead, its challenge was to help the Bronx-based CDCs 
broaden their reach and confront more directly some of 
the economic and social 
factors contributing to pov-
erty in their communities. 
Because of their standing 
in their neighborhoods 
and their track records, 
the CDCs were seen as the 
most promising vehicles 
for stimulating new invest-
ment in the local services 
and infrastructure that are 
essential to full community life – health care, neighbor-
hood shopping, child care, literacy and employment skills.
In the years following CCRP’s launch, another genera-
tion of similar initiatives was funded. These included the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Rebuilding Communities 
Initiative, one of the largest experiments in comprehen-
sive community development ever, launched in 1993 in 
five neighborhoods in five different cities; LISC’s National 
Community Building Initiative (1993); the Cleveland 
Comprehensive Community Building Initiative (1993); the 
New York Community Trust’s effort in three New York City 
neighborhoods (1994); the Los Angeles Urban Funders’ 
initiative, which targeted resources of some 27 funders 
on employment and jobs in three neighborhoods in 
the Los Angeles area (1995); the Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation’s Neighborhood Partners Initiative in five New 
York City communities (1996); the Pew Charitable Trusts’ 
Targeted Neighborhood Initiative (1996); and Chicago 
LISC’s New Communities Initiative in three Chicago 
neighborhoods (1998). In still other cities (Indianapolis, 
Cincinnati, San Jose and Pittsburgh are four we know of ), 
additional comprehensive community-building initiatives 
of varying scale were launched. All these efforts included 
broad community revitalization goals, and all stretched 
the traditional roles and activities of community-based 
organizations to enable them to respond more compre-
hensively to community needs. Looking back, the ’90s 
were indeed a hotbed of experimentation whose legacy 
can now be felt throughout the community develop-
ment field.
Almost from its inception, CCRP attracted broad-
based interest among community development funders 
and practitioners. Many of the second generation initia-
tives noted above drew to varying degrees on the CCRP 
experience in creating their approaches. Designers of the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Rebuilding Communities 
Initiative clearly acknowledged the role that CCRP played 
in shaping the Initiative. LISC’s Community Building 
Initiative launched at the same time drew heavily on les-
sons from CCRP. Slightly later, the precursor to Chicago’s 
current New Communities program was from the start 
intended to be a direct replication of the CCRP dem-
onstration. In Philadelphia, the Pew Charitable Trusts’ 
Targeted Neighborhood Initiative in three Philadelphia 
neighborhoods also borrowed several key ideas from 
CCRP. Designers of more limited community-building 
experiments in Camden, NJ and Pittsburgh, and the 
Indianapolis Neighborhood Housing Partnership’s Special 
Impact Program all consulted with CCRP as they gave 
shape to their programs.
While each of these various comprehensive initiatives 
had distinct features, they shared some common tenets. 
Among them was the idea that stabilizing and transform-
ing communities can be achieved through a coordinated, 
“place-based” approach. Some of the programs included 
physical development activities, while others placed 
greater emphasis on improving how services are coor-
dinated and how they affect the well-being of residents, 
especially children and families. Most sought to pursue a 
large range of activities simultaneously. And, all chose to 
“To tell the story of CCRP, you also have to tell about the flight, the running 
away, the people coming in, the racism and the bigotry, the destruction of the 
community, the dumping of homeless families into a community that was fragile 
to begin with. This is something that we are still struggling with. But the first step 
that CCRP took was to bring people together who have been disenfranchised and 
really had no voice. That was the beginning of it.”
 – Zenon Arribalza, Mid Bronx Senior Citizens Council
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rely on a community-based organization to take the lead 
on a variety of fronts: neighborhood organizing; strength-
ening local collaborations and linkages; improving access 
to skills training, jobs and education; improving social and 
other services; boosting economic development; and 
addressing environmental concerns. Like CCRP, most of 
these initiatives aimed for mutually reinforcing change at 
multiple levels: neighborhoods, families, individuals. And 
some, notably the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s RCI, also 
explicitly tried to encourage reforms in the larger public 
systems serving residents of neighborhoods.
In addition to these efforts, most of which were the 
result of foundation leadership, there were other shifts 
that further reinforced the trend toward comprehensive-
ness. Ideas from CCRP and other similar initiatives were 
incorporated into the lexicon of professional planners, 
and new lessons from these efforts were woven into gov-
ernmental policies and regulations guiding how planning 
and investments would be made in communities. On the 
research front, there was expanding interest in describing 
and documenting the development of comprehensive 
revitalization approaches, and in measuring their effects 
in the places where they were targeted. Some of this 
research took the form of assessments of individual ini-
tiatives.2 A few studies wove together experiences from 
several different initiatives and discussed in some detail 
how these initiatives were designed and actually oper-
ated.3 As you might imagine, the complexity of these 
initiatives has presented these and other researchers with 
daunting challenges.
Many of the studies undertaken during the 1990’s that 
tried to measure results fell short of initial expectations. 
This was mainly because many of the comprehensive 
initiatives were still relatively new, making it difficult to 
point to meaningful community results. Skeptics who 
look back on the voluminous body of published reports 
produced will have a field day – discovering there was 
never any broad consensus on the right questions to ask, 
or the right combination of methods to use, or the right 
timeframe in which to expect to see convincing results. 
As with any new field, there was healthy controversy and 
no end of meetings at which the pros and cons of dif-
ferent study approaches were worked over – with sides 
being taken among participants who ran the gamut from 
“pure” researchers to hard-as-nails practitioners to quite a 
few (such as these authors) who tried to stake out posi-
tions somewhere in the middle. What did emerge from all 
the talk was a more broadly shared sense that the work of 
comprehensive community building is extraordinarily dif-
ficult and requires taking the long view. This means being 
content with identifying and measuring intermediate 
results that give confidence that progress is being made 
toward important longer-term outcomes. Perhaps it now 
seems more obvious that only by constant measuring 
can we ever be confident that the communities on which 
we focus are returning to good health.
This more pragmatic approach was well understood 
by the late Mitchell Sviridoff, former director of national 
programs at the Ford Foundation and the first president 
of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation. Sviridoff’s 
1996 review of CCRP, prepared with William Ryan, cap-
tured the right questions that demonstrations such as 
CCRP should be helping to answer (see box next page).4
Much of the information available [about CCIs] does not 
reflect a sufficiently deep mining of the nuts and bolts 
operational issues that often make or break these ini-
tiatives. Though most think a tremendous amount has 
been learned about the tough operational choices con-
fronted in this work, that wisdom never sees print. “More 
is known than shows up in these reports,” said many. 
Respondents were anxious to push beyond the stage 
of naming and framing issues to move beyond general 
statements about the field’s complexity, the patience 
required, and the importance of leadership. They wanted 
blunt, candid, hard-edged and timely guidance derived 
from experience about what to do. A subtle qualification 
was reflected in some comments: these respondents were 
not looking for the “one right way,” rather they yearned 
to understand the many different ways that had been 
tried, and the trade-offs inherent in each, so they could 
make informed choices.
- From an assessment of the state of the field 
produced by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, January 
2000, authored by Miriam Shark and Ralph Hamilton 
2 Examples of these are Robert J. Chaskin’s Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the Neighborhood and Family Initiative: A Summary of Findings, 
Chapin Hall Center for Children, University of Chicago, December 2000; and Ira Cutler’s Learning Together: Reflections on the Atlanta Project; The Carter 
Center, 1997.
3 See, for example, Joan Walsh, Stories of Renewal; Community Building and the Future of Urban America, New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1996 and 
Lisbeth B. Schorr, Common Purpose: Strengthening Families and Neighborhoods to Rebuild America. New York: Anchor, 1997.
4  Sviridoff, Mitchell and William Ryan, Investing in Community: Lessons and Implications of the Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program. Case Study 
paper, 1996. Available from the Civic Practices Network at http://www.cpn.org/topics/community/bronx2.html#investing.
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In part as a response to the proliferation of these 
experiments and the need for answers as to which of 
these new approaches to problems of neighborhood 
decline were proving the most promising, the Roundtable 
on Comprehensive Community Initiatives was formed 
in 1992 and made part of the Aspen Institute in 1994. 
Headquartered in New York, the Roundtable has since 
its inception become a clearinghouse for information on 
the variety of experiments underway and has produced 
a range of publications on the subject.5 To this day, the 
Roundtable continues to serve as a meeting place for 
researchers and others interested in the field of compre-
hensive community building and neighborhood change.
Some of the most profound insights from that 
time were captured in a document prepared by staff 
at the Annie E. Casey Foundation and probably never 
intended for wider circulation. In that document, a 
report on conversations undertaken by Foundation 
staff for the Roundtable to assess the state of the field 
and the Roundtable’s future agenda, were strong and 
consistent themes:
• Those interviewed expressed great optimism about 
the prospects for continued support for “place-based 
We propose to examine CCRP’s blend of human service and community development strategies, particularly in terms of three 
questions that are central to any comprehensive revitalization strategy:
• How does an initiative invest in community capacity? The human service approach focuses on developing and coordinat-
ing programs. The community development approach has favored developing strong community-based organizations. In 
combining the two, CCRP uses a special investment strategy that builds strong organizations and links them with the most 
promising programs and expertise available.
• How does an initiative make the concepts of “coordination” and “comprehensiveness” operational? The human 
service tendency is to build a new structure for the centralized coordination of multiple service providers. The community 
development approach focuses more on creating resources – housing, jobs, businesses, parks, etc. CCRP combines both 
approaches but it is its support of entrepreneurial collaboration among a set of strong, self-directed organizations that 
gives it special advantage.
• What role should residents play in the revitalization of their neighborhoods? The human service tendency has been 
to work with residents as clients/consumers or as advisors to new coordinated service systems that in turn view residents 
as clients or consumers. The community development tradition favors the civic engagement of residents in managing and 
developing a range of community institutions. CCRP is fundamentally rooted in this approach, though it has woven into its 
operations the client-service provider model as well.
…The story of CCRP is not about a contest of approaches but rather their combination as part of a new approach.
- From Sviridoff and Ryan
Investing in Community, 1996
5 Perhaps the Roundtable’s most significant accomplishment was the formation of a Steering Committee on Evaluation, which led to the publication of 
two volumes on New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives, in 1995 and 1998, and two compendiums of ideas that came from professionals 
directly involved in the work – the first, Voices from the Field: Learning from the Early Work of Comprehensive Community Initiatives, in 1997; and the 
second, Voices from the Field II: Reflections on Comprehensive Community Change, in 2002. 
poverty alleviation approaches characterized by a 
comprehensive framework, multiple targets of inter-
vention and deep community engagement.”
• There was a clear sense that the field was growing and 
becoming more complex, with a variety of new com-
munity-building efforts taking shape, some building 
on existing community initiatives and others designed 
as new, larger-scale comprehensive initiatives.
• Despite their general optimism, many of those inter-
viewed still felt the field needed more useable evi-
dence of results and more hard-edged answers about 
what works and why.
Many respondents also saw that as the comprehen-
sive field grew it would need to adjust to accommodate 
the growing emphasis on the interconnections between 
neighborhood health and the health of larger regional 
economies. Now, many years after that report was com-
pleted, we believe the proliferation of the comprehensive 
approach has indeed continued unabated, and the inter-
connections between healthy neighborhoods and healthy 
urban regions are now much more widely understood.
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 6 As evidence of this, we note that working comprehensively is now a central tenet of LISC’s most recent national strategic planning framework, adopted 
by its board in September 2005.
It is plain that since the start of CCRP the field of 
comprehensive community revitalization has itself 
matured – we have now moved well beyond the notion 
of generations of experiments. The idea has in many 
respects become common practice within the commu-
nity development industry.6 Along with its widespread 
incorporation into everyday practice, comprehensive 
community development has continued to attract 
research interest. There is a new emphasis on the rigor-
ous measurement of community change, and with it 
much better and more accessible indicators of overall 
neighborhood health. And there continue to be forums 
where proponents and skeptics can compare what has 
been accomplished, and what is being learned.
CCRP as a Model
Despite the incredible growth in support for comprehen-
siveness as an approach, there is as yet no clear agree-
ment on what makes for success, or what the attributes 
are of an effective comprehensive community revital-
ization strategy. It is in this context, and with a hope of 
providing the kind of practical knowledge that is being 
called for, that we have approached the task of extract-
ing from CCRP some useful lessons for this new school of 
community development.
But why look to CCRP for guidance? Yes, it is true that 
CCRP was launched rather a long time ago. It is also true 
that CCRP is unique because of the particular context 
of the South Bronx – with its vast multifamily housing 
stock, the massive abandonment the community expe-
rienced, and the uniquely tough challenges that New 
York City presents for doing community development. 
One obvious reason that CCRP remains relevant to the 
field is because of its recognized accomplishments, 
many of which persist years after the program was con-
cluded, and some of which have only recently been fully 
realized even though plans for them were laid ten or 
more years ago. But another equally important reason 
that CCRP remains relevant has to do with how it did 
what it was able to do – its highly pragmatic strategy for 
moving to a comprehensive community development 
approach; its reliance on well-established and entre-
preneurial CDCs with proven track records in physical 
development; its relatively modest scale of funding 
compared to other CCIs; its approach to directing and 
managing the demonstration; and its emphasis on com-
munity-based interaction rather than a newly created 
neighborhood governance structure.
For the designers and managers of today’s compre-
hensive community initiatives, CCRP continues to offer 
many practical lessons on the nuts and bolts aspects of 
actually setting up and operating a comprehensive com-
munity initiative. Over the seven years that the demon-
stration operated, much was learned about structuring 
and staffing the program, getting it off the ground, and 
managing CCRP’s day-to-day working relationships with 
its funders and the participating CDCs. Equally important 
was CCRP’s experience with funding and its uses – from 
raising and collecting philanthropic dollars and report-
ing back to funders, to ways of spending it flexibly and 
judiciously on CDC staffing and programs – ways that 
leverage more dollars from new sources, especially gov-
ernment. All these lessons continue to have relevance. 
Finally, perhaps more than the others, CCRP’s lessons 
endure – the difference made by skills like leadership, 
communications and problem-solving in achieving com-
munity revitalization goals.
Then and now, practical factors like these make the 
difference between success and failure. By making the 
right choices early on and as the initiative unfolds those 
responsible for implementing comprehensive commu-
nity development programs can contribute mightily to 
whether or not their initiative gets off to the right start, 
and how well it progresses toward the goals it sets. At the 
macro level, many community revitalization programs 
sound marvelous, but it is only at the micro level that one 
can see these programs succeed or fail. The CCRP story 
told here is a micro-level tale of practical thinking on the 
ground. Its lessons have enduring value – for individuals 
and organizations struggling to make comprehensive 
development work in neighborhoods across the country, 
and for the funders, researchers and evaluators who sup-
port their efforts.
The idea of mounting a comprehensive revitalization 
initiative in New York City’s devastated South Bronx 
started in the early ’90s with Edward Skloot, president of 
the Surdna Foundation. From the outset he had in mind 
going beyond the massive redevelopment of housing 
that was at last occurring in the nine-square-mile area. 
He knew that what the South Bronx also needed was a 
highly strategic effort that would take aim at converting 
it from a social and economic wasteland into a function-
ing community. To his way of thinking such an initiative, 
to be successful, would have to be large scale, bottom-
up and driven by nonprofit community development 
corporations (CDCs). Already they were producing their 
neighborhoods’ new and rehabilitated dwelling units. It 
was time for them to reestablish the other ingredients of 
healthy community life.
What It Would Take
To justify mounting such a program, Surdna would have 
to be assured that there were CDCs in the South Bronx 
prepared to lead the comprehensive renewal effort that 
Ed Skloot envisioned. Further, the Foundation needed to 
know that the individuals and agencies whose support 
would be essential also agreed that the time had come to 
focus on the rebuilding of whole communities there – not 
just housing.
Obtaining the answers to these questions and gaug-
ing the feasibility of the entire venture was my first task 
for Surdna. The second, which began only after we had 
clear grounds for proceeding, was to actually design 
a comprehensive program that assumed a $3 million 
Surdna Foundation grant.
This was not a task for the feint of heart. Moving from 
the general idea of a comprehensive initiative to the actual 
nuts and bolts of a specific program required fundamen-
tal judgments that could come back to haunt us if not 
handled well. Adding to the difficulty of my assignment 
was our inability to clearly define either the scope of the 
challenge or the outcomes to be pursued, even though we 
knew early on both our physical locale and programmatic 
focus. This was because CCRP was to be a bottom-up pro-
gram. Until its participants completed a community-wide 
planning process, we would not know the specific priori-
ties of each neighborhood. These decisions, once made, 
would take us beyond vague notions of “improving the 
quality of life in distressed South Bronx neighborhoods” to 
the outcomes we would seek and the criteria by which the 
success or failure of CCRP could be measured.
Meanwhile, we were able to pin down a number of 
key design elements. These included how the initiative 
would be assessed, how comprehensiveness – a term 
with many interpretations – would be defined, and how 
the program’s structure, as well as the relationships within 
it, would be formulated.
For CCRP, relationships were a make-or-break issue. All 
of the parties had to feel a sense of ownership for CCRP 
to succeed. This was not a simple matter. There were rela-
tionships between lead funders and secondary funders; 
between funders of every ilk and the CCRP program direc-
tor; between the program director and program operators 
(the CDCs), and program operators and target neighbor-
hoods (both their residents and organizations). An across-
the-board buy-in from all of the players would engender 
confidence in the initiative. Confidence, in turn, would pro-
mote the environment essential for long-term foundation 
and corporate support. It would also dissipate the sense of 
alienation that pervaded the South Bronx in the early ’90s, 
where residents and organizations alike had experienced 
decades of empty promises and bitter disappointments.
Figuring out our position on assessment – the critical 
business of evaluating our work – was one of our easier 
tasks. As we saw it, once one uses millions of dollars to 
fight problems that have plagued society for decades, 
and then calls what is being accomplished a “demonstra-
tion” (as we did), others should have the opportunity to 
learn from the experience – whether it be good or bad. 
Thus we opted for an assessment that would not be for 
internal purposes only but would be broadly distributed 
to the field.
We also wanted the CCRP assessment to be formative. 
This meant that we would regularly receive observations 
from the assessment team that we could use as the basis 
for corrective action throughout the life of the program. 
As for the team itself, we were convinced that those who 
assessed our program would have to come to the work 
with a keen understanding of just how difficult it was 
to intervene in a distressed community like the South 
Bronx. With the help of Jim Pickman, an expert in every 
aspect of community development, we set out to identify 
Chapter 3
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– Anita Miller
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observers of the urban landscape who could be counted 
on to understand that CCRP’s results would be incremen-
tal and that the earliest outcomes would surely be of the 
groundwork variety.
In the interest of enhancing confidence and trust in 
CCRP, we provided both the CDCs and our funders with 
an opportunity to contribute to the design of the assess-
ment and gave them a role in selecting the consultant 
who would be working with us. In return, we received 
the benefit of their expertise. The process we used led 
us to select the Philadelphia-based OMG Center for 
Collaborative Learning headed by Tom Burns. Tom, along 
with his colleague Gerri Spilka (now OMG’s Executive 
Director) grasped what we were trying to do and found 
a way to ensure that their reports continued to add value 
throughout the six and a half years of the demonstration.
Formulating a Program Strategy
There are a number of different program strategies from 
which current developers of comprehensive initiatives 
can borrow. Some focus on just one area such as fami-
lies and children. Here, the effort is to create synergy 
between multiple service providers so as to achieve bet-
ter outcomes for the target population. Such programs 
more often than not are top-down, seldom involving the 
target population in decision-making. The breakthrough 
they make is to bring to the table a host of disconnected 
agencies that can be more effective working together 
than in isolation.
Other initiatives are known to focus solely on eco-
nomic development. An example is the three-site 
Neighborhood Strategies Program launched in the mid 
1990s by the New York Community Trust. This effort hit 
its stride several years after starting up when a linkage to 
the SEEDCO organization’s welfare-to-work initiative was 
established, thus enabling participating organizations to 
develop the expertise needed to help their residents find 
and keep jobs.
Still others build their program strategy around the 
notion that social infrastructure is the key to reversing 
neighborhood decline – an idea popularized by Harvard 
professor Robert Putman in his book Bowling Alone. 
This approach, commonly labeled “community build-
ing,” may hold promise for those places, both urban and 
rural, where a community is fraying but is not severely 
distressed. In such situations bringing people together 
to strengthen a local social/civic fabric can represent 
the first step towards achieving positive change. As to 
complex revitalization initiatives like CCRP, they too see 
community building as important, but treat it as one 
ingredient among many that are needed to achieve 
neighborhood rebirth.
Certainly, for many urban and rural areas, there can be 
real value to programs with a singular mission. But this 
was not the case for the beleaguered and densely popu-
lated South Bronx of 1991 where there was so little in 
the way of health care, child care, after-school programs, 
quality education, parks or playgrounds, decent shop-
ping, or programs to connect people to jobs and to one 
another. Here, as in other poverty stricken neighborhoods 
all across America, the pursuit of revitalization called for 
a more comprehensive strategy that would take aim at 
the full spectrum of neighborhood life. It would include 
people and systems, economic vitality and the physical 
environment while incorporating features of the narrowly 
focused programs noted above.
Defining our view of comprehensiveness was only the 
first of a number of critical decisions. Others pertained to 
the vehicle we would create to manage the entire effort; 
the strategies that we would use to raise and deploy funds, 
the kind of “partnership” – if any – we would seek to foster 
with participants, with funders and with agencies of gov-
ernment, and too, the handful of initial principles that we 
would employ to guide how CCRP would operate.
Certainly, there is value to programs that have a 
sharp, singular focus. But we did not think such 
an approach was well-suited to the beleaguered 
and densely populated South Bronx of 1991 which 
had so little in the way of health care, child care, 
after-school programs, quality education, parks 
or playgrounds, decent shopping, or programs to 
connect people to jobs and to one another.
Determining the Delivery System
Understanding that CCRP’s delivery system would be 
critically important to the success of the entire enterprise, 
we undertook a brief scan of the field to learn what we 
could about how three other early comprehensive pro-
grams were structured.
We started with the Ford Foundation’s Neighborhood 
and Family Initiative (NFI) whose mission was to stimulate 
broad-based and sustainable change in neighborhoods 
located in four cities across the country. NFI looked to spe-
cially organized collaboratives in each city to first identify 
the needs and priorities of targeted neighborhoods and 
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then to define outcomes and strategies that would address 
them. Made up of people from a number of sectors, 
including local residents, all four collaboratives were struc-
tured as informal committees operating under the aegis of 
the local community foundation that served as both spon-
sor and fiscal agent on behalf of the Ford Foundation.
NFI did not prove to be a model that CCRP could 
draw upon. Even in the Initiative’s initial phase when we 
reviewed the program’s structure it was possible to see 
flaws in its design that promised to subvert the entire 
effort. All decisions were being made on a group basis by 
unaffiliated individuals. There was no local development 
organization positioned to drive the effort; also, decisions 
that required an expenditure from the Ford Foundation 
grant had to be approved by the board of a community 
foundation that did not have the experience at the time 
for the role it had agreed to play.
For a number of years after NFI was launched, people 
involved in the community development field debated 
the pros and cons of using a collaborative as the center-
piece for a comprehensive initiative. On one side were 
those who believed that this was an effective and demo-
cratic way to organize a large scale, place-based program. 
On the other were people, like those engaged in CCRP, 
who saw such an approach as the equivalent of setting 
sail in difficult waters with neither captain nor compass.
By the end of the ’90s the debate about collabor-
atives versus using one agency to lead the effort was 
pretty well settled. A good indication can be found in the 
final Chapin Hall report on NFI to the Ford Foundation in 
which the author, Robert L. Chaskin, concludes, “Initiatives 
that were organized around strong lead agencies rather 
than informal collaboratives tended to provide a more 
solid base of organizational capacity to build on, and 
were able to launch into program development and 
implementation with greater efficiency.”7
Also in our scan of the field, we reviewed the 
Enterprise Foundation program in Baltimore’s 
Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood known as 
Neighborhood Transformation (NT), another first-gen-
eration comprehensive initiative of scale. Lacking a local 
organization in the target area with sufficient capacity 
to lead the effort, NT’s program designers called for an 
outside organization to serve as the on-the-ground 
delivery system. The Enterprise Foundation filled this 
role by establishing itself within the target neighbor-
Sponsors of these comprehensive initiatives generally 
arrive at this new Promised Land by way of two quite 
different routes: one via human services and the other 
via community development. To review these two routes 
no longer means returning to the rivalry between two 
orthodox schools of social strategists and the people 
strategists, who argue for programs tailored to individ-
ual needs (e.g., education, job training, social services) 
versus place strategists, who argue for programs aimed 
at improving living and economic conditions within a 
given community (e.g., housing stock, economic devel-
opment, job creation). As they have moved toward 
comprehensive community strategies, both schools 
have transcended that debate. Both have developed 
new analyses of their roles.
On the one hand, many human service professionals (the 
“people” strategists) have concluded that a series of spe-
cialized programs aimed at the various needs of individu-
als is not working well. They are looking to link them, 
rationalize them, and make them more responsive to 
families through new oversight and planning structures. 
They are also seeking new ways to engage residents in 
the design and operation of the programs in an effort to 
strengthen communities’ problem-solving capacity. They 
are attempting to reform service delivery systems.
On the other hand, community development practitio-
ners have meanwhile determined that, despite their 
encouraging successes in physical development, they 
too need a new approach. They need to pay more atten-
tion to the goals of public safety, family self-sufficiency, 
and overall neighborhood stability more directly if their 
improved housing stock is to endure. They are setting 
more comprehensive goals.
Though human service professionals and community 
development practitioners now find themselves on com-
mon ground, they come to it with very different histo-
ries. As they establish new community initiatives, they 
are assessing which of the conventions, tools and values 
they carry will serve their new mission. What best sup-
ports comprehensive community strategies? What new 
approaches are needed? How can the wares of human 
service and community development be fitted together 
to create new results?
- From Sviridoff and Ryan, 1996
7 Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the Neighborhood and Family Initiative: A Summary of Findings. Chapin Hall Center for Children at the 
University of Chicago, December 2000. 
hood to work with city agencies, neighborhood groups 
and individual residents.
This initiative, too, was not what we had in mind. We 
were in the enviable position of being able to design 
CCRP around strong neighborhood-based entities with 
community development experience – an option that 
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Enterprise did not have when the Sandtown-Winchester 
project first began. This turned out to be NT’s Achilles 
heel. An evaluation completed at the end of NT’s tenth 
year by Prudence Brown tells us that despite notable 
community improvements, the outside entities and the 
local residents were never able to develop the unity of 
purpose and understanding that was required to actually 
achieve the comprehensive vision for ending poverty 
held by Baltimore’s Mayor Kurt Schmoke and Jim Rouse, 
the revered founder of Enterprise.8
The third large-scale program that we looked at, the 
$32 million Atlanta Project (TAP), was inspired by Jimmy 
Carter’s resolve to overcome poverty in twenty Atlanta 
neighborhoods. We could see – even in its first year of 
operations – that this massive effort was destined to 
stumble badly despite its strong support from Atlanta’s 
business sector. Lacking direction from a central core that 
had community development experience and without 
expert technical assistance, there was little likelihood that 
many of the twenty “neighborhood clusters” created for 
the program could build sufficient capacity to produce 
tangible outcomes for their communities. Several years 
after CCRP began, the Atlanta Project was downsized and 
restructured to eliminate its neighborhood clusters and 
replace them with a new delivery system and more real-
istic goals than those originally promised by TAP. This, too, 
was not a path we chose to follow.
Our examination of these early comprehensive pro-
grams confirmed our initial decision to mount CCRP 
with established large-scale neighborhood organiza-
tions positioned at the center of a place-based delivery 
system. They would engage local people in identifying 
what needed doing and involve them in making it hap-
pen. In the South Bronx, it was clearly CDCs that had the 
unique ability as well as the credibility to do this job. They 
had emerged over the years as prodigious developers of 
affordable housing and were already deeply engaged in 
rebuilding neighborhoods where they played the criti-
cally important leadership role we knew was needed.
Our examination of these early comprehensive 
programs confirmed our initial decision to mount 
CCRP with established large-scale neighborhood 
organizations positioned at the center of a place-
based delivery system.
Structuring the Intermediary
The decision to rely on large-scale CDCs to serve as 
“neighborhood-based intermediaries” that would take 
responsibility for implementing a CCRP program in their 
communities took care of only one half of the delivery 
system that CCRP required. A second critical decision had 
to be made about managing the demonstration.
We saw the value of having a central structure that 
would serve as a fulcrum for the entire initiative and 
understood that effectiveness would rest on it being 
independent of the protracted decision making pro-
cesses common to all foundations. Such an entity would 
perform numerous functions – all critically important. For 
example, it would receive and deploy funds, provide both 
coordination and leadership, and link its participants to 
resources beyond the insular South Bronx. This under-
standing led us to plan for a CCRP intermediary – a sepa-
rate operation – with a professional at its helm who had 
the type of experience needed to fill the multiple roles 
required for the program’s success.
8 Neighborhood Transformation Initiative: Lessons Learned about Community Building and Implementation. Paper prepared by Prudence Brown for the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2001.
Alternative Intermediary Structures
There are numerous options that the designers of a 
CCI can consider when structuring an intermediary. 
Several larger-scale demonstrations have been operated 
from within a foundation, such as the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation’s Rebuilding Communities and its Making 
Connections Initiatives and the Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation’s Neighborhood Partners Initiative. In all 
three, coordination and leadership are the domain of 
foundation staff.
In the case of Ford’s Neighborhood and Family Initiative, 
The Center for Community Change, a national Washington-
based nonprofit, coordinated the program. The Center 
used consultants to serve as mentors for each site, while 
local community foundations assumed both program and 
expenditure responsibility.
In some instances, an existing national or local inter-
mediary has assumed the intermediary role for a new 
comprehensive venture. An example is LISC Chicago. In 
1999, LISC started a three-CDC comprehensive program 
known as the New Communities Initiative (NCI). A few 
years later, the New Communities Initiative expanded to 
encompass 16 different neighborhoods throughout the 
city. It also provided help to Milwaukee LISC to mount 
a similar initiative. In both cities, the local LISC office 
continues to serve as the program intermediary.
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Because the office space that Surdna could make 
available to us was limited, we had to be extremely stra-
tegic about adding staff at the intermediary level. For 
instance, when it became necessary to hire a technology 
specialist to work with the CDCs, he had to work from 
home. And when we needed technical assistance for all 
of the groups on an ongoing basis, instead of hiring CCRP 
program staff, for whom we had neither office space nor 
job security, we contracted with major citywide organiza-
tions such as the Federation Employment and Guidance 
Services (FEGS) or the time of their professionals, who 
were then assigned to work with us.
Beginning the Real Work
With CCRP we started out knowing that the locale 
would be the devastated South Bronx, the nation’s long-
time symbol of urban decay. We also knew that with the 
South Bronx CDCs we would have access to a delivery 
system with the capacity to lead a complex program. 
Details about the program’s design were finalized only 
after innumerable visits to South Bronx neighborhoods 
and scores of conversations with people who reacted 
to our proposal with valuable information. The experts 
with whom we spoke included: South Bronx organiza-
tions and local officials, foundation personnel, national 
and citywide nonprofit agencies, and people from gov-
ernment and academia who were engaged in the field 
of community development.
They told me of the strengths and weaknesses of vari-
ous organizations, programs and agencies, and gave me 
feedback on how they viewed our notion of comprehen-
siveness. At the same time that they informed me, they 
were also informed about what was about to transpire 
and some even ended up as supporters of the program.
This outreach fed into a program paper clearly labeled 
“DRAFT” that was widely circulated with a request for 
comments. The draft set forth the rationale for the ini-
tiative, and in most general terms, its proposed modus 
operandi and structure. Looking back, that early thinking 
about what the program should aim to achieve (see box 
on next page) still makes sense to me.
A key idea in the paper was that those CDCs selected 
for CCRP would be called upon to play a new kind of 
role in their neighborhoods and that the demonstration 
would need to supply them with the resources and sup-
port to do so. “CCRP envisages CDCs as neighborhood-
based intermediaries rather than ‘super-agencies’ that 
would directly provide all the social and economic pieces 
of the revitalization puzzle. As intermediaries, CCRP par-
In countless ways, CCRP’s design and way of operating 
are a reflection of Anita Miller’s personal philosophy, 
operating style, and prior experience as a grantmaker. 
She brought to the initiative a deep understanding 
of the South Bronx, a respect for its CDCs and their 
accomplishments, and a gutsy blend of vision and 
entrepreneurship.
From the beginning, Miller knew that even though the 
CDCs participating in CCRP had committed to its goals, 
they also had many other activities on their plates that 
competed for attention. She also recognized from early 
on the need to find a balance between investing in a 
community engagement process and investing in proj-
ects with the potential to produce early, visible results 
that would give CCRP momentum. She had already 
learned as a grantmaker of the extraordinary value of 
foundation dollars when used flexibly, quickly and non-
bureaucratically. And she knew that the job required lots 
of advocacy and selling to attract new resources from 
government and other partners.
Skills like these are difficult to capture in a job descrip-
tion, but they made all the difference in how the demon-
stration worked and what it was able to accomplish.
- Tom Burns
Decisions about CCRP’s intermediary structure had 
to be made before the Surdna Foundation’s Board of 
Directors would meet to vote on making a $3 million 
grant to CCRP. Management of the program would 
be high on its list of considerations. Thus, even before 
the grant recommendation appeared on the Board’s 
September 1991 docket, I was asked by Ed Skloot to sign 
on as the initiative’s Program Director.
We configured the intermediary with a two-person 
staff that would be located in Surdna offices, and because 
we saw CCRP as a program with a limited life, we chose 
not to incorporate it. Instead, the Foundation took 
expenditure responsibility for all of the foundation and 
corporate money CCRP received. To satisfy other funders 
that this was indeed permissible under IRS regulations, 
the Foundation secured a legal opinion to that effect. This 
structure worked well: while Surdna gave CCRP its inde-
pendence, Ed Skloot and Marc Venoge, the Foundation’s 
chief financial officer, were always available to provide 
support. CCRP was included in the Surdna audit and we 
had a protocol – a very simple set of procedures – for 
releasing funds. Little else was mandated.
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ticipants would build their revitalization strategies around 
strengths found in their own neighborhoods and the 
wider community.”9
In my early interviews I found evidence of the readi-
ness of several South Bronx CDCs to move into this new 
role. One CDC had organized a small cadre of municipal 
agencies around the issue of junk-filled lots. Others had 
been successful in reducing drug dealing in their neigh-
borhoods through joint action by residents, police and 
the district attorney’s office. But a big unanswered ques-
tion that had to be addressed was: “What additional CDC 
capacity would be required to achieve credibility and 
effectiveness in this role?”
Seeking the Right Course
In the paper were many more questions about the way 
the CDCs might begin to work differently in their neigh-
borhoods:
• With respect to mounting collaborative efforts, I won-
dered, “How will CDCs work most effectively over 
time with such municipal providers as schools, and 
sanitation and police departments, and what changes 
in performance can we expect their joint efforts to 
produce?”
• With respect to improving human service delivery, I 
asked, “How does a neighborhood create a coordi-
nated, cost-effective human service delivery system 
that works in a unified way with families, rather than 
treating interrelated problems in a piecemeal fashion? 
Do CDCs begin incrementally, by focusing the joint 
attention of multiple agencies on a given number of 
families? Or do they start by organizing existing neigh-
borhood providers to initiate a new, full-scale referral 
and case work system at the outset?”
• With respect to the challenges of building individual 
self-sufficiency, we wondered, “How will CDCs meet 
the challenge of helping neighborhood residents rec-
ognize and act on their capacity for becoming more 
self-sufficient? For the South Bronx, faced with the task 
of re-housing over 20,000 new families, many headed 
by females, many dependent on welfare, the issue of 
‘empowerment’ is immediate. Most [CDCs] agree it 
must be addressed at the family level and reinforced 
at building and community levels.”
• With respect to the CDCs’ relationships with residents, I 
wanted to know, “Would CDCs [continue to] rely heav-
ily on traditional social work practices or would they 
9 CCRP Program Paper, p. 20.
CCRP’s Goals
The proposed Comprehensive Community Revitalization 
Program would have impact at two levels. At the macro 
level, it would provide useful information to the CDC 
movement nationally about organizing and implement-
ing broad scale revitalization efforts. It would also report 
on those strategies, both short-term and long-term, that 
make a difference.
At the micro level, six or more South Bronx development 
corporations with operations of scale would receive the 
assistance they need to begin an incremental process of 
change aimed at strengthening the fabric of their neigh-
borhoods. CCRP would assist them to insure the con-
tinued viability of newly rehabilitated and constructed 
housing and to increase the capacity of their residents to 
become productive members of their community.
The goals of participating CDCs would be embodied in a 
strategy for social and economic intervention that each 
participant would formulate for its neighborhood. A sec-
ond set of goals would respond to the national demon-
stration research dimension of the program. These would 
include demonstrating:
• Resources required by a CDC to permit it to function 
effectively in the role of a neighborhood based inter-
mediary that works collaboratively with other service 
providers;
• Systematic approaches to resident and community 
empowerment that employ community organizing 
techniques;
• The types of financial and technical assistance 
needed to assure the capacity of mature CDCs to 
spearhead the development and execution of holistic 
revitalization strategies;
• The ability of CDCs to mobilize other organizations, 
both public and private, for proactive programs to 
strengthen the performance of key institutions, such 
as schools and/or population groups, e.g., youth or 
the unemployed;
• Increased support for the devolution of government 
activities to capable CDCs and the organizations with 
which they work.
- From the CCRP Program Paper, 1991 
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combine these with CDC organizing techniques? If so, 
how? Would CDCs encourage independence through 
highly structured building and block councils that use 
both mutual support and peer pressure to assure a 
well-ordered living environment? ... What opportuni-
ties would CDCs create to involve residents of their 
buildings and the larger community (including public 
housing projects) in community life and what tech-
niques work to achieve their participation?”
• And finally, with respect to the CDCs’ ability to find 
resources to sustain their programs, I wondered, “Would 
a CDC with a holistic strategy for revitalizing its neigh-
borhood be better positioned to attract a range of 
needed programs and services than an organization 
continuing to pursue piecemeal approaches to com-
munity development? The same question could be 
asked relative to facilities. Examples would be parks 
and playgrounds, childcare facilities and those that 
could offer cultural and indoor recreation opportuni-
ties. Would a physical plan that reflects community 
priorities and fits into a larger neighborhood revitaliza-
tion strategy influence public and private funders to 
increase support for such facilities?”
Among those with whom I shared the paper were 
several of the CDCs most likely to be selected for CCRP. 
They were asked to review the draft and then give us 
their feedback in a joint session at which time they would 
be free to express their opinions about the projected 
program. In particular, we needed to know if the course 
suggested by the paper was attractive and important to 
them – as well as doable.
I shared the CCRP draft program paper with several 
of the CDCs most likely to be selected. We needed 
to know if this was attractive and important to 
them, as well as doable.
The process of consulting with a wide range of people 
achieved what we hoped it would. Feedback was highly 
informative and at the same time we were able to solidify 
relationships with potential allies for CCRP at a very early 
stage in its development. It allowed for one-on-one 
discussion of our assumptions and provided input on 
the structure and the delivery system we thought would 
work. As a result, when CCRP was launched some months 
later there were numerous individuals in key places who 
had contributed to the program’s development and who 
could feel some degree of investment in its success.
Defining – Then Changing –  
How We Chose Participants
In every program there will be some organizations that 
are naturals for being selected. In our case we were look-
ing for CDCs that were big organizations with large hous-
ing portfolios. They would have to enjoy a good relation-
ship with both public and private organizations, and play 
a clear leadership role in their neighborhood going back 
ten, fifteen or even twenty years.
Three of the South Bronx CDCs appeared to meet these 
criteria right off the bat. But even then I couldn’t be sure of any 
of the groups until I spent time in their neighborhoods with 
their executive directors and staff. This involved visiting them 
in their offices, and going with them to see their housing  
developments. I also spoke with others who worked with 
the groups and got a reading from the Borough President, 
a local elected official whose insights I trusted (and whose 
advice turned out to be most insightful when three years 
later we had to drop one of our six organizations).
I even spent time with one CEO who took over a 
housing organization from his father, whose reputation 
was quite clouded. Nonetheless, I approached the group 
with an open mind, only to find that all signs pointed 
to deeply entrenched problems, one of which was the 
total indifference of the young CEO to any organization 
Selection Criteria
A CDC eligible for participation in the demonstration 
program would be:
• Strongly rooted in its neighborhood and involved in 
reconstructing its local community;
• Responsible for a large housing portfolio;
• Committed to assisting community residents to 
assume new responsibilities for their personal devel-
opment, for their building and for the wider commu-
nity;
• Skilled at networking with other service providers, 
municipal agencies and neighborhood institutions;
• A strong advocate for its residents, and its neighbor-
hood at large;
• Well regarded by the private, nonprofit and public 
sector organizations with which it works.
- From the CCRP program paper
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outside of his own highly political realm. Another group, 
one we had helped to get started when I was at LISC, had 
the largest housing portfolio of all, but was still operating 
out of a tiny makeshift basement office with a skeleton 
staff. That would have been okay, but no matter how 
much I pressed the director, he could not see beyond the 
number of housing units he controlled to the isolation of 
his impoverished tenants and the distressed conditions of 
neighborhoods where they lived.
We followed up my visits by asking the likely candi-
dates to return a brief questionnaire that asked mostly 
for numbers and some ideas about what “comprehen-
sive” would mean in their community. A few were done 
thoughtfully; most were filled out perfunctorily and one 
never came back at all. With their oral and written com-
ments in hand, I began to prepare for the next step which 
was to select some eight to ten groups for mini-grants. 
The purpose of these grants was to underwrite the costs 
associated with their preparation of a program piece that 
we would use to evaluate their candidacy for CCRP.
But before we ever got to mini-grants and a competi-
tive process I realized that this was the wrong way to go. 
It didn’t really matter that we already had advertised the 
process. It was more important that we not start the program 
out badly. After all, these were strictly housing organiza-
tions. They plied their trade very well, but knew little about 
mounting health care practices or day care centers or 
attaching people to work or economic development. Also, 
they would not have sufficient time or resources to involve 
the people of their neighborhood in making strategic deci-
sions about the future of their community. CCRP did have 
the resources to help them make informed decisions and 
to organize people, but those would not be provided until 
they were official participants.
Before we ever got to mini grants and a competitive 
process, I realized that this was the wrong way to go.
Then, too, I worried that the competition could 
become too fierce. We were trying to bring organizations 
together – to foster teamwork. Would not the process 
we intended simply alienate them from one another? 
So we changed direction – a step I have never regret-
ted. Instead, I prepared extensive write-ups on seven 
of the candidates that Ed Skloot and I considered to be 
the strongest and presented them to the CCRP Funders 
Advisory Committee. This panel was formed to enable 
the funders then on board, as well as our would-be 
funders, to advise us on the selection of participants. 
Most knew the organizations by virtue of their grantmak-
ing activities. Banana Kelly, Mid Bronx Desperadoes and 
Mid Bronx Senior Citizens Council were easy choices 
while others were not so clear-cut. Phipps CDC was not a 
South Bronx-based organization, but rather a subsidiary 
of a very large-scale nonprofit housing agency based 
in Manhattan. Promesa was primarily a drug treatment 
agency that had been reaching out to the community 
surrounding its facility and was just beginning a housing 
program. The next CDC on our list was a very fine, pro-
ductive organization. Unfortunately, its executive director 
gave every wrong answer to questions that probed his 
willingness to buy into CCRP, and managed to convey 
a hearty indifference to the benefits that would likely 
be available to its participants. Mount Hope was the 
organization that had never returned the questionnaire. 
Nonetheless, this CDC had a new executive director who 
yearned to be included. The Committee chose six groups.
I should note that since CCRP I have been asked to 
advise two other comprehensive programs about selec-
tion (Edna McConnell Clark and LISC Chicago). In both 
instances I suggested that they use a combination of 
intensive site visits and an application form that was 
somewhat longer and more open-ended than the  
questionnaire I used. This worked well for both programs. 
In fact, even after extensive briefing, organizations 
thought to be excellent candidates for their programs 
proved to be very short on vision, failing to grasp how 
they could use a comprehensive program with deep 
pockets to improve the quality of life in their neighbor-
hoods. Others came thorough with flying colors.
The Six CDCs Selected to Participate in CCRP
• Banana Kelly Community Improvement Association
• Mid Bronx Desperados Community Housing Corporation
• Mid Bronx Senior Citizens Council, Inc.
• Mount Hope Housing Corporation, Inc.
• Phipps Community Development Corporation (West 
Farms)
• Promesa Housing Development Fund Corporation
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“Partnership” –  
Separating Reality from Rhetoric
Besides our struggle to select participants, we also 
struggled to define how we wished to work together 
with the CDCs in whom we would be investing for years 
to come. Looking back, CCRP’s approach to working with 
its participants produced an initiative with many, many 
positive outcomes at the same time that it managed to 
avoid some of the pitfalls related to partnership forging 
that other large-scale programs experienced.
A program officer for a California foundation described 
a thorny situation to me that came about because the 
program’s participants had come to expect that all of the 
money earmarked for the effort would flow to them. When 
the groups learned both they and an intermediary organi-
zation selected to manage the initiative would be funded 
from the same pool of funds, they did not hesitate to make 
their displeasure known to the foundation. While the pro-
gram eventually moved forward without rancor, this was a 
hard way for all concerned to come to an understanding 
about how “the partnership” that had been spoken about 
early on would actually work.
Another comprehensive program started out by par-
celing out substantial amounts of year one and year two 
money to its lead agencies. The intermediary expected 
that “partners” would quickly design and start to imple-
ment large-scale community building strategies. As it 
turned out, the participants did not share the intermedi-
ary’s interest in moving forward in a timely way.
Further, the lead agencies had, in effect, gone into 
“business” for themselves, negating opportunities to 
take on major community development issues common 
to the three CDCs and, in fact, all of Philadelphia’s poor 
neighborhoods. Also lost was an opportunity to stimulate 
learning from group to group, along with the chance to 
build momentum and credibility for both the CDCs and 
the initiative as a whole. Thus, the intermediary’s gener-
ous funding strategy left it without sufficient dollars to 
enhance the work of individual participants or to under-
take programs involving all of the groups that would 
serve to enrich the entire effort.
By year three, the initiative’s program director took 
charge and began to change the strategy. She recaptured 
unspent funds and required each organization to develop 
and justify an annual budget. This intermediary became 
proactive. For one of the CDCs, the program director 
was able to hire a consultant to structure a CCRP-like 
joint employment venture with a well-regarded citywide 
agency. This enabled the CDC to greatly professionalize 
and expand what had been a modest jobs program. She 
also negotiated a break-through single-family construc-
tion program for CDCs with both the city and state as 
major players, while working with participants to mount 
what turned out to be a substantial block-scape program.
I was never comfortable labeling CCRP a partnership 
because of the inherent inequality that is built into relation-
ships between intermediaries, who have control of a pro-
gram’s purse strings, and its participants. After all, the inter-
mediary makes the decisions about who gets how much 
money and for what purpose. However, others, like our 
evaluators OMG, who knew us better than most, insisted 
that while the CCRP intermediary and its participating 
CDCs were not actually equal, we did have a partnership 
that worked very well. They reasoned that this was possible 
because of the respect that the parties had for one another 
and because the roles of the partners were well specified 
from the outset. In particular, the funding partner was clear 
about its expectations as well as the responsibilities it was 
prepared to exercise as an entrepreneurial investor with a 
commitment to showing results.
I was never comfortable labeling CCRP a 
partnership because of the inequality that is built 
into all relationships between intermediaries and 
participants. However, others, like OMG, who 
knew us better than most, insisted that while the 
CCRP intermediary and its participating CDCs were 
not actually equal, we did have a partnership that 
worked very well.
There is a lesson in these tales. The first is that regard-
less of how one labels a relationship, when an initiative 
is relatively long term, and extraordinarily rich, all con-
cerned must arrive at ground rules – few as they may be 
– well before the program starts. Otherwise, as was the 
case in the scenarios above, there will be false expecta-
tions on the part of either the neighborhood participants 
or the funders, or both. It should not be hard to openly 
discuss how the “partnership” was designed and how it is 
expected to function. In fact, it is far easier to do this up-
front than to deal with misunderstandings that are likely 
to show up later on.
Establishing Initial Working Principles
In fact, we did not launch CCRP with a carefully consid-
ered list of working principles to guide us through the 
demonstration. But we did begin with certain notions 
about how we intended to work and as time went on, 
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CCRP’s Working Principles
• CCRP will be a bottom-up program building from 
strength at the neighborhood level.
• Its delivery system will be mature Community 
Development Corporations (CDCs) positioned as 
neighborhood-based intermediaries.
• CDCs will not act as super agencies; rather they 
will work with others capable of delivering program 
elements.
• The Initiative will look to CDC participants to 
actively engage residents and community-based 
organizations, both private and public, to obtain 
their support for the CCRP effort and contribute to 
its sustainability.
• Each CDC will be provided with funding for new pro-
gram management and outreach staff who must be 
dedicated to its CCRP effort.
• Planning will focus on assets as well as issues and 
problems.
• CCRP organizations will plan and do simultaneously 
so as to jump start their comprehensive programs.
• Energy and resources will be focused on implemen-
tation of neighborhood plans and leverage for the 
projects and programs they set forth.
• CDC and resident capacity will be built as a result of 
doing.
• Formal alliances with state and local government to 
secure support for plan elements will be pursued.
• CCRP will be both entrepreneurial and opportunistic.
• CCRP, together with its funders and participating 
CDCs, will select evaluators for the initiative and will 
make their assessments widely available.
Setting and Managing Expectations
Beyond having some working principles to start with, an 
initiative like CCRP needs to be mindful of shaping the 
kinds of expectations that those inside and outside have 
about what is possible, and what will be required to make 
things happen. What a challenge it was to find the right 
balance between thinking big and taking risks on the 
one hand and, on the other, zeroing in on doable projects 
and programs that yielded incremental improvements. 
All along, I was conscious of the need to temper our talk 
about outcomes in areas where we knew it would be 
difficult to show results during the relatively short span of 
time planned for the demonstration.
Managing expectations means sorting through the 
differences between things that can be done relatively 
quickly – and here I mean in a matter of a year or two, 
not months – and what will take much longer, perhaps 
decades, to accomplish. While momentum and early 
victories are all important, a comprehensive initiative 
with many players and numerous parts does not produce 
dramatic change overnight. In fact, I don’t know of any 
such program that does. The difference here is that, for a 
program of scale, many eyes are watching, some rooting 
it on, others waiting for it to stumble. Regardless, it does 
take time to move sizable projects forward. For example, 
we started work on the MBD shopping center even 
before CCRP was launched in early ’92. A decade later this 
ended up as a $50 million project that employs some 350 
people in a neighborhood where there was a paucity of 
stores and no decent place to buy fairly priced food and 
medication – a project long in the making but (typical of 
New York City) with a big payoff at the end.
A second example of what patience and hard work 
can produce is the $18 million Community Center that 
Mt. Hope has been inching forward ever since its com-
munity did its CCRP Quality of Life Plan in 1993. With a 
substantial portion of funds raised, a nationally known 
architectural firm under contract and two agencies 
identified – one for childcare and one to operate youth 
programs – Mt. Hope is looking forward to the project’s 
completion. When it happens, it will be a tribute to the 
perseverance of CDC leadership and its concern for the 
young people of its neighborhood.
Of course, there are many elements of a community’s 
plan that can see the light of day in much shorter time 
frames. These include community building around the 
preparation of a Strategic and Quality of Life Physical Plan 
and neighborhood-wide events such as an arts festival 
or back-to-school fair. Parks, playgrounds, even primary 
health care practices, job resource centers and anti-crime 
new ideas were added. With some help from our assess-
ment team, we began to see these ideas as a set of “core 
principles” that were influencing our decisions and that 
we often used in describing the CCRP approach to oth-
ers. These working principles, shown in the inset above, 
have stood the test of time in the South Bronx – and in 
Chicago, and wherever comprehensive programs are 
modeled after CCRP. These principles worked for us and 
for LISC Chicago and there is a good chance that they will 
prove highly useful to other initiatives. At the very least, 
they will likely stimulate the designers of similar programs 
elsewhere to come up with guiding principles applicable 
to their own situation.
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The Mount Hope Community Center
The soon-to-be-built Mount Hope Community Center 
will rise on an abandoned lot on E. 175th St., between 
Townsend and Walton Avenues. For the citizens who 
wrestled this South Bronx neighborhood from the brink 
of disaster, the Center’s existence will address this com-
munity’s past indignities, satisfy present critical needs, 
and help propel it into a better future. The Mount Hope 
Community Center will centralize not only recreational 
and cultural facilities, but also a broad array of Mount 
Hope community services. It will pull youth off the streets 
and give them a place to play, learn and be safe.
A hugely exciting aspect to the project, one of the first 
in the Bronx, is that the Center will be an example 
of sustainable design, also known as “intelligent” or 
“responsible” architecture. It will be energy efficient, 
environmentally sensitive and economically prudent. 
Human comfort is prioritized by clean air and abundant 
natural light, gardens and green spaces – especially 
valuable in an area with exceptionally high asthma rate 
and a severe lack of recreational space.
Mount Hope Housing Co. is on the last stretch of fund-
raising for the community center, with a goal of rais-
ing approximately $1 million more in order to open 
its doors.
- from the Mt. Hope website, 
www.mounthopehousing.org, 2006
(see p. 45 for architectural rendering)
efforts can often begin operations within a matter of 
one or two years. But it is important to be realistic. Every 
project requires enormous energy, high level brokering, 
and know-how to make it happen. But if all the par-
ties engaged in the initiative have an entrepreneurial 
approach, skillful management and a focus on capacity 
building, good results will surely follow.
Beyond projects such as these, and even those that 
take as much as a decade or more to complete, there are 
worthwhile program investments that continue over still 
longer timeframes. For example, CCRP’s work in improv-
ing access to primary health care has as its real outcome 
improved life prospects for a whole new generation 
of children growing up in the Bronx. CCRP’s efforts to 
expand resident access to jobs haven’t been just about 
assistance in landing that first job, but are aimed at get-
ting people started on a path toward improved employ-
ment that will likely involve a sequence of job opportuni-
ties that benefit those individuals and their families for 
many years to come.
The point of all this is that the early task of setting 
expectations is a challenge that requires clear thinking, 
balance and an element of realism. This holds not only 
about when meaningful results will be evident, but also 
about how the easier, shorter-term projects can reinforce 
and set the stage for the tougher, longer-term work that 
is essential for lasting neighborhood change.
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What We Learned Along the Way
H Take as much time as necessary at the very beginning of the comprehensive community program 
or initiative thinking through the assumptions and strategic options available that will inform its 
design. This early investment in mapping out what the program is trying to accomplish and how it will 
operate will save immeasurable time and energy later on when critical design decisions will need to be 
made. At a minimum, develop a clear picture of the program’s strategic goals, its scope and duration, the 
types of outcomes that are expected within the anticipated timeframe, and how you will track and gain 
feedback on progress being made.
H Figure out the strategy you will use in developing the essential working relationships that will be 
needed for the program to operate effectively. This means at a minimum the levels of involvement you 
will seek from each stakeholder when making important decisions about how the program will proceed. 
For example, the relationships that will need to be established with and among funders and investors, the 
relationship of program staff with CDC (lead agency) staff and boards who will be responsible for planning 
and implementing neighborhood-level programs, and the expected relationships those lead agencies will 
need to develop and maintain with neighborhood residents and other stakeholders.
H Determine the kind of intermediary structure that will be needed to achieve the program goals. 
This will require thinking through everything from the level of investment required for this function, to 
the kind of leadership and staffing it will need. In addition, there will be such matters as where it will 
be housed, the degree of discretionary freedom it will need to make effective program decisions, and the 
methods by which it will provide information to and receive guidance from the program’s funders and 
investors.
H Think through in the beginning not only the criteria and process for how participants will be selected, 
but also the guidelines and process that will be used to make decisions about their continuing in 
the program. In addition to having a clear set of criteria worked out that can be communicated to 
everyone in advance, it makes sense to determine in some detail how the information needed to make a 
sound decision will actually be gathered.
H Put together and obtain agreement on a few working principles that will help not only in establishing 
working relationships between the intermediary and lead agencies, but also in making any number 
of decisions along the way that cannot always be fully anticipated. Working principles provide a 
valuable frame of reference. They don’t need to be sharply defined rules and procedures, but they will go a 
long way in clarifying what is intended. And there’s nothing wrong with adding to a list of principles once 
established.
H Expectations matter, both internally and externally. If a program is exploring new ground or taking on 
an especially difficult challenge, then expectations need to be managed to acknowledge these facts. A well-
managed set of expectations can help in tempering unrealistic enthusiasm and in interpreting progress 
that may seem to take overly long and fall short of ambitious goals. And, of course there’s nothing wrong 




Dictionaries describe an intermediary as an emissary, 
mediator, agent, go-between, negotiator broker, interces-
sor or middleman (or woman). Together these words pro-
vide a pretty close picture of how an intermediary for a 
comprehensive revitalization program must function. We 
learned from our CCRP experience that when it comes to 
money matters, the intermediary – whether an individual 
or organization – has a sensitive and complex interstitial 
role between those who provide financial resources and 
the organizations that seek them. Structuring relation-
ships and devising strategies to obtain funds from the 
first group, and making them available to the second, is 
critical to the success of the entire enterprise.
Settling on a Financing Structure
Many intermediaries start out as independent nonprofit 
organizations with their own board of directors. Other 
intermediaries, like CCRP, are conceived as temporary 
entities – unincorporated subsidiaries of larger organiza-
tions created for the purpose of operating a program that 
will conclude in a finite number of years.
The permanence of a free-standing nonprofit corpora-
tion offers numerous advantages when it comes to raising 
money. These entities can build staff and programs that 
are highly attractive to funders. They also can assemble a 
board of directors whose members are capable of provid-
ing high-level access to both public and private sector 
sources of support. For example, former President Jimmy 
Carter and Jim Rouse, the visionary master builder, raised 
large sums of money for their comprehensive community 
initiatives in Atlanta and Baltimore. Another intermediary 
started in the early ’90s, the Corporation for Supportive 
Housing, also was blessed with a chairman with extensive 
experience and contacts – Richard Ravitch, a former head 
of the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority and past 
president of the New York State Urban Development 
Corporation. He worked closely with staff to attract well-
known people to its board of directors as well as to secure 
generous financing for its ambitious program.
In instances where the intermediary is expected to 
have a limited life, as with CCRP, it is likely to be estab-
lished as a program within a large agency or foundation. 
Several of the comprehensive initiatives that were funded 
in the ’90s did operate with such a structure. The Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation’s Neighborhood Partners 
Initiative and Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Rebuilding 
Communities Initiative are two examples. The New 
Communities Program operated by LISC/Chicago with 
major support from the MacArthur Foundation is another. 
All these programs had dedicated staff who were respon-
sible for the effort both internally and externally, and 
were free to shape how things happened within broader 
policy and budget guidelines.
In the case of CCRP, as I briefly noted in Chapter 3, 
we were created as a demonstration program and struc-
tured as a quasi-independent entity within the Surdna 
Foundation. Other foundations and corporations fun-
neled funds into a separate account at Surdna, which 
took “expenditure responsibility” for the money. To 
make this arrangement possible, Surdna’s attorneys pre-
pared a legal opinion to address donor concerns about 
how the IRS would look upon their granting funds via 
another foundation.
How CCRP’s Structure Evolved
Later in the demonstration we created CCRP, Inc., a 
501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation, so that we would be 
eligible to receive a $257,000 grant from NY State for the 
CCRP Ombudsman program. This program, which pro-
vided the missing link between pupil, home and teacher, 
involved all of the CDCs and took place in local schools. In 
a functional sense, CCRP, Inc. served as a subsidiary of the 
unincorporated CCRP program. Its purpose was to be a 
repository for funds from public agencies as well as from 
foundations and corporations, some of which preferred 
having their awards go directly to an incorporated non-
profit operation.
The not-for-profit New York Lawyers Alliance drew 
up the bylaws for the new corporation. The rules called 
for the executive directors of our CDCs to constitute the 
corporation’s board of directors. And because the new 
organization was a vehicle to support the activities of the 
CCRP program, the staff of the intermediary was to serve 
as the staff of CCRP, Inc. as well.
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The bylaws also anticipated the possibility of having 
to drop a CDC from CCRP for non-performance. They per-
mitted executive directors to serve on CCRP, Inc.’s board 
only as long as the CDC he or she headed continued as 
a participant in good standing in the CCRP program. This 
provision proved critical when we later had to remove 
CDCs from the program (that story is told in Chapter 7 
– Making it All Work).
Having a formal structure and bylaws served the ini-
tiative well. Although the demonstration that triggered 
the formation of CCRP, Inc. concluded in mid-1998, the 
corporation itself continued to operate for several years 
thereafter with revised bylaws, its own staff and joint CDC 
projects of significant scale. In fact, CCRP, Inc. evolved 
after the conclusion of the demonstration into a new 
kind of intermediary – perhaps the first of a new breed of 
comprehensive initiatives in which CDC partners actually 
own the entity and provide the leadership.
Money Worries
No matter how well formed the structure, an intermediary 
responsible for a community building initiative spends 
much time and angst raising and deploying money. This 
is likely even with an intermediary that operates as a pro-
gram within the foundation that launches it. While there 
may be no need to worry about budgets for such essen-
tials as core staff, planning, evaluation, technical assistance 
or technology, even these in-house intermediaries are 
under constant pressure to attract other resources – both 
public and private. There is always a need for funds to 
foster economic development or open space, develop a 
facility, or mount any one of a number of new programs in 
areas such as employment or health and child care.
Intermediaries in a community building initiative 
spend much time and angst raising and deploying 
money. Even intermediaries sponsored by 
foundations feel constant pressure to attract new 
resources. They have to demonstrate enough early 
success to attract the other money needed to get 
the level of impact they want.
Then there are intermediaries with a generous spon-
sor but insufficient funding to quickly develop a pipeline 
of significant projects. Yet without such a pipeline they 
cannot attract the added dollars necessary to achieve 
the impact they want. This was certainly true for CCRP, 
which started out with $3 million of flexible funding and 
a host of services from the Surdna Foundation. Initially, it 
seemed like a great deal of money. But as we began to 
plan the demonstration in some detail we became aware 
of three realities. First, we recognized that Surdna’s grant 
alone would not be enough to implement the program 
at the scale and with the outcomes we came to envision. 
Second, it was apparent that I as Program Director would 
have to be highly proactive, encouraging the CDCs and 
“doing deals” to get their projects off the ground. Third, 
we would have to be strategic in our spending so that 
the program would not run out of either time or money 
before we had much to show for early investments of 
money and effort.
The sense of urgency and purpose stemming from 
our money worries clearly served us well. By the time 
CCRP ended in mid-1998, the intermediary had raised a 
total of $9.5 million in support from 21 foundations and 
corporations. And we managed to jawbone our way into 
an innovative, albeit short-lived, New York State program 
of grants and loans for large CDC projects and programs. 
But, even more significantly, we used our funds to lever-
age another $44 million in support of CDC projects and 
programs, exclusive of housing. (Within several years this 
number more than doubled as projects and programs 
already in the pipeline when the demonstration ended 
began to come to life.)
Raising the Initial Funding
Back in 1991, when it was time to write the program 
paper that would describe CCRP, the world of community 
development was already intrigued with the idea of “bot-
tom-up” programming. No more, it seemed, would every 
philanthropy dictate rigid, highly prescriptive formulas for 
how their money would be spent. Instead, we began to 
talk about making room for the thinking and experience 
of grantees who would, at last, be able to respond to 
funder challenges rather than funder dictates.
Against this background and with few precedents to 
call upon, I embarked on creating a compelling, but not 
overreaching, “sales” document for the Surdna Foundation 
board of directors. Ed Skloot and I agreed that it would 
have to include a brief history of community develop-
ment, the rationale for undertaking a placed-based dem-
onstration in comprehensive revitalization, why it made 
sense to focus on the South Bronx and why we would 
choose CDCs to function as “neighborhood intermediar-
ies.” It would also have to spell out our modus operandi 
and the achievements or outcomes investors could 
expect from this exploratory journey.
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With few precedents to call upon, I embarked on 
creating a compelling “sales” document for the 
Surdna board of directors on why it made sense 
to choose South Bronx CDCs to be neighborhood 
intermediaries.
This was no easy task, for we were asking for $3 mil-
lion for CCRP at the same time that we were saying that, 
since this was to be a bottom-up program, we had no 
way of knowing the specifics of our pursuit nor what 
outcomes could be expected. The best we could offer 
was a vigorous, integrated framework aimed at improv-
ing the quality of life in neighborhoods where CDCs had 
already developed well over $500 million of affordable 
housing. They were neighborhoods, however, where little 
remained of human service systems and an economic 
infrastructure after decades of neglect.
Sketchy as our proposition was, Ed Skoot made a per-
suasive argument before the Surdna Foundation directors 
and won their full support. The CCRP program paper also 
struck a chord with a number of other foundations, and 
it caught the attention of many others in the community 
development field. We received scores of requests for the 
paper even before it became available over the Internet, 
and years later Aida Rodriguez, former Rockefeller 
Foundation Deputy Director and now an associate dean 
at Milano, The New School for Management and Urban 
Policy in New York City, reported that she regularly 
referred to it in her graduate school classes.
What the CCRP program paper did offer, explicitly, was 
fundamental questions, the answers to which would tell 
us whether or not our approach to renewing distressed 
urban areas would achieve positive neighborhood 
change. If so, our work would have significant value to 
others in the community development field. After all, in 
1991 we knew little of what to expect from efforts such 
as CCRP and were hungry for answers to even the most 
elemental questions. Some of these we listed in the pro-
gram paper (see Chapter 3, CCRP’s Goals sidebar).
Developers of similar initiatives today no longer 
face the dearth of history and experience that we 
did when designing CCRP.
Today developers of similar initiatives no longer 
face the dearth of history and experience that we did. 
There are now numerous comprehensive initiatives and 
variations of early program designs to draw upon. We 
now have access to published assessments that reveal 
the details of how initiatives were organized, what 
approaches they employed and what real challenges 
they faced over their history. Many researchers, includ-
ing Avis Vidal, formerly with the Urban Institute, Robert 
Chaskin and Prudence Brown at Chapin Hall, and Lisbeth 
Schorr at Harvard, have 
published on the subject of 
comprehensive community 
initiatives. Academics teach 
the practice, most notably 
Xavier Briggs, who was 
associated with CCRP while 
a Columbia University doc-
toral student and is now at 
MIT’s Department of Urban 
Studies and Planning. The 
Aspen Institute Roundtable 
on Comprehensive Community Development continues 
to serve as an important resource for discussion and 
information, offering its own publications as well as an 
Internet website (www.aspenroundtable.org) that provides 
an array of useful materials.
CCRP brought together a powerful consortium of private funders based on the 
conviction that clarity of vision, passionate and informed leadership, teamwork 
and tenacity all exist in low-income communities. It showed a new way to 
harness these things by giving power over decision-making and money to local 
intermediaries, and proved that when private funders “loosen the reins,” this force 
can lead to strong positive social change.
Aida Rodriguez, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Milano 
The New School for Management and Urban Policy 
(and former Program Officer at the Rockefeller Foundation)
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Being Smart about Spending Money
As to the deployment of funds, there were questions to be 
weighed, pitfalls to be avoided and guidelines to be estab-
lished. Some of what we grappled with is found here:
• Do you divide the money you’ve raised up front 
among the lead agencies? Or do you budget to allow 
for judicious core support for each participant while 
reserving for program-wide activities, technical assis-
tance and seed money?
• Do you skew funding so that movers and shakers mak-
ing dramatic changes in neighborhood conditions get 
more support than CDCs that are less ambitious?
• Do you invest long-term in worthy programs and 
projects that are unlikely to leverage other people’s 
money and/or create steady cash flows? Or do you 
support the start up of only those efforts sure to 
attract the financial resources needed to get off the 
ground and endure?
• Do you believe that lead agencies should not become 
“super” agencies, taking on projects outside of their 
own domain – especially if there are already other 
organizations with the capacity to get them done?
• As for consultants: What should they do? When should 
they be called upon? What do they earn? And impor-
tantly, are their services truly wanted by intermediary 
staff and by the CDCs?
While there are no pat formulas for dispensing money, 
we learned there are four key guidelines that help predict 
success: 1) the intermediary must devise a clear strategy 
for maximizing the impact of the dollars available, a 
strategy that promotes the goals of the initiative; 2) the 
intermediary must establish clear ground rules for work-
ing within that strategy; 3) the intermediary must then 
follow those ground rules; and 4) all of the recipients 
must understand and agree to the strategy.
As with all else in CCRP, we figured it out as we went. 
Our actual strategy and guidelines evolved only over 
time. When we were first getting started we had the 
instinctive feeling that we needed to set a tone for the 
program. We needed to clarify that CCRP’s funds did not 
represent a “pot” that we were going to divide among 
participating organizations.
As with all else in CCRP, we figured it out as we 
went. But our early instincts were that we needed 
to set the tone that CCRP’s funds weren’t a pot to 
be divided among participants.
We delivered our message at a large kick-off meeting 
attended by staff and board members from the CDCs, 
representatives from foundations and citywide agencies 
and organizations. This event also gave us the oppor-
tunity to talk about the importance to CCRP of the “we” 
factor – by which we meant teamwork and the pride we 
would share in one anothers’ victories. This was a unique 
message for New York City – and elsewhere as well.
Investing Flexibly and Strategically
Think for a moment of the intermediary as an entrepre-
neurial investor with flexible funding at its disposal, rather 
than as a traditional grant maker. To me it conjures up an 
image of an initiative that uses relatively modest startup 
support and has the ingredients necessary to attract a 
great deal of additional money to achieve both scale and 
sustainability. And because the entrepreneurial investor 
leading this initiative is not averse to taking risks, he or she 
is willing to deal where other funders dare not go. Always 
ready to take a leap of faith, this investor is first in with 
enough financial support and/or expertise to make a ven-
ture believable and doable to others with deeper pockets.
CCRP was just such an entrepreneur. We had no 
choice but to assume this role. Had we not, there would 
have been no hope of bringing to life local visions of 
renewed communities. So we focused on using our 
resources to leverage other people’s money. This meant 
that CCRP funds earmarked for new efforts would be 
used to lay the groundwork for attracting more substan-
tial sums added by others.
Often we would begin a project by finding highly 
qualified technical people – the consultants we had 
planned for – to help us. We sought out those who had 
strong track records and the ability to inspire the confi-
dence of our organizations. We felt there was no better 
way to learn about putting together a complex project 
on a new subject and to capture the interest of private 
foundations and/or public agencies.
For example, as much as we husbanded our funds, we 
never hesitated to spend for landscape architects to work 
with residents on an initial sketch of a park or playground 
that promised to stimulate the imagination of a funder. 
Nor did we hesitate to pay the Trust for Public Land to 
help scope and expedite proposed open space projects. 
Investments such as these – sometimes accompanied by 
a small grant directly to the provider – were often key to 
our being able to garner a total of some $6 million for ten 
new parks and playgrounds. This for neighborhoods with 
millions of dollars of new and rebuilt affordable housing 
– but no safe place to sit or play.
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MBD’s New Horizons Retail Center is a 136,000 sf shopping facility anchored by this Pathmark supermarket and pharmacy. 
Nearly 350 new jobs have been created since the Center’s opening, eight years after CCRP’s predevelopment grant that got  
the project moving.
Our flexible funding strategy included other invest-
ments. Without flinching, we offered the MBD board of 
directors $150,000 to begin developing a large-scale shop-
ping center in its neighborhood, provided the CDC was 
also willing to become an early investor by using some of 
its own money earned from the sale of affordable housing 
tax credits. For over a decade MBD, along with City and 
State agencies, had struggled unsuccessfully with the idea 
of creating a mini-industrial park on 11 acres of city-owned 
land – lots where the skeletons of derelict apartment build-
ings once stood. A promising alternative that had not been 
considered prior to CCRP was to use the land for a retail 
complex instead. With some $200 million of new and reha-
bilitated housing right there, and a staggering unemploy-
ment rate, such a center would fill an enormous need for 
both shopping and jobs.
There was no better way to grasp the viability of this 
concept, than to visit Monsignor William Linder, the genius 
who built the giant New Community CDC in Newark, New 
Jersey. Before we officially launched CCRP, I had arranged 
for Monsignor Linder to host a visit by Father William Smith, 
“When we talked about creating youth programs, CCRP funded us to begin with and then we got our own 
money. We also talked about economic development and that catering kitchen. And we went out and got a 
person to write the proposal and got the necessary dollars. The other thing was the daycare center – CCRP gave 
us extra money so that we could attract an experienced director.
Yes, Anita sometimes turned us down, but she always found some way to say no that didn’t make you feel like you 
were begging. Usually it was, ‘If you can’t find the money, we’ll get you started. If you run into trouble, we’ll help 
you out.’ That was very important – because you weren’t being told how your community should be run.”
 – Jeanette Puryear, MBSCC
MBD’s chairman and Ralph Porter, the CDC executive 
director. Together we viewed Linder’s new retail center 
anchored by a large Pathmark supermarket and pharmacy. 
On the same day of our site visit to New Community we 
also met with the executives of Pathmark and its parent 
corporation, Super Markets General. Soon after, the CCRP 
grant together with a $100,000 match from the CDC itself 
got the project moving.
It took eight years of overcoming one serious obstacle 
after another before LISC and MBD were able to open the 
doors of the New Horizons Retail Center. Costing near 
$50 million, the 136,000 square foot facility is anchored by 
a state-of-the-art Pathmark supermarket and pharmacy, 
with 19 other stores offering goods and services long 
absent from the area. Together these retail outlets pro-
vided almost 350 new jobs.
In the same vein, CCRP paid for consultants and 
a modest grant to match a federal contribution that, 
together, enabled the Mid Bronx Seniors to turn an 
ancient kitchen into a modern facility for a new catering 
venture. Healthy Living Systems’ mission was to provide 
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jobs for the unemployed and hundreds of meals each 
day for publicly-funded feeding programs under very 
large competitive contracts.
In the case of Mid Bronx Senior’s Head Start center, we 
had a three-pronged approach. CCRP engaged Childcare, 
Inc., a large citywide agency, to complete a needs assess-
ment and later to act as a consultant. We also supple-
mented the salary of the Head Start director whom the 
CDC wanted to hire. And we captured the interest of the 
New York City Agency for Child Development by offering 
a donation towards first-year operating costs (which they 
ultimately did not request help with).
Opened in 1995, the Head Start Center is a marvelous 
facility. The Agency’s initial budget for the Center included 
funds for asbestos removal, renovation, and equipping 
four classrooms, in addition to offices in Mid Bronx Seniors’ 
Family Support Center. Thereafter, with $100,000 from the 
State of New York, the CDC created additional daycare 
classrooms bringing the annual total of children served 
to 324 and the total of individuals employed to 63. As to 
public funding, the program garnered nearly $9 million in 
its first eight years of operations.
The Mount Hope and Promesa CDCs and the Bethex 
Credit Union, which was located in a Mount Hope apart-
ment building, came together in a new three-way joint 
venture to mount a neighborhood-based micro loan pro-
gram. CCRP supplied a modest grant for outreach to their 
residents along with a writer to work with the organiza-
tions to develop the proposal that succeeded in winning 
a $50,000 start-up grant from Citibank. The relationship 
How CCRP Handled its Money
• Two-thirds of the money CCRP raised was unrestricted funding. Although some funders placed restrictions on the kinds 
of activities their funds could be used for, CCRP did not take any money for purposes that did not mesh with its own pro-
gram goals. The majority of CCRP’s dollars were available to be used flexibly at the discretion of the Program Director to 
support a range of program activities.
• CCRP’s Program Director had plenty of authority to make decisions on her own about how program dollars could be 
spent. CCRP’s funders received annual budgets for informational purposes only. They were not asked to approve annual pro-
gram budgets, nor did they approve individual requests by the CCRP Director before spending decisions were made. So the 
Program Director could respond quickly to requests by the CDCs for support to launch new projects, deal with emergencies 
and help out when things didn’t go as planned. A simple system of checks and balances established with Surdna’s executive 
director and chief financial officer, together with an annual audit, assured the financial integrity of the initiative.
• CCRP’s funders were kept well informed about how CCRP dollars were being spent. Reports on fund expenditures were 
prepared prior to every meeting of the Funders Advisory Committee and reports on program spending were reinforced by 
CDC presentations and site tours to make CCRP’s activities tangible.
• CCRP’s participating CDCs did not receive an up-front funding commitment when the demonstration began, nor did 
they each receive equal amounts of funding, nor were their annual allocations the same from one year to the next. 
CCRP’s support was provided flexibly based on each of its CDCs’ particular staffing and program needs. The CDCs prepared 
and negotiated annual requests with the CCRP Program Director. Annual budgets generally covered salaries for their CCRP 
program managers and outreach workers and included a small discretionary funding pool to cover additional program needs. 
These annual requests were made on the understanding that the CDCs could approach CCRP at any time for unusual or 
unanticipated support for CCRP-related activities.
• CCRP dollars were frequently committed or advanced as “first-in” money to gain additional resources for programs 
and projects. Playing an entrepreneurial investor role, CCRP often made funding commitments early in the development of 
new CDC ventures to assist them in their fundraising efforts and also signal to other prospective funders its endorsement 
of the new project or program.
• With one notable exception (the program-wide CDC employment initiative) CCRP funds were not used to support 
continued staffing for individual efforts. CCRP’s support was largely focused on core staff for CCRP activities and new 
program development responsive to Quality of Life plans. When program support was provided, it was usually to help test 
or launch a new program idea, or occasionally, to cover gaps in program funding. In this way, CCRP avoided building longer 
term dependence on CCRP dollars for new programs developed during the demonstration.
• CCRP’s participating CDCs were encouraged and supported by the Program Director in their efforts to identify addi-
tional funding, preferably public dollars, to support longer term programs. Because its funding was limited, CCRP 
recognized early on the value of working closely with its participating CDCs in finding the longer term support needed to 
ensure that new programs could continue after the demonstration was over.
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between Mount Hope and Bethex continued to flourish. 
With the CDC at its side, Bethex became a Federal Credit 
Union and went on to open a new branch in a second 
neighborhood. Today Bethex has grown to 11,000 mem-
bers and has $5 million in loans outstanding.
As an outgrowth of this relationship Mount Hope 
went on to create an Individual Development Account 
(IDA) program, encouraging employed Bronx residents to 
save by matching each dollar of their savings (to a maxi-
mum $1,500) with $2 in IDA dollars raised by the CDC. 
Launched in 1996, this CDC-operated enterprise was a 
pioneer for IDA programs in both New York City and New 
York State.
CCRP support enabled Promesa to secure $500,000 
from the Department of Health and Human Services for 
its youth program. Here, too, the winning combination 
was using technical assistance early on to help frame the 
organization’s program and convert its thinking into a 
draft proposal, joined with a small matching grant often 
consisting of in-kind services.
Meanwhile, all neighborhoods in which the CDCs 
worked were desperate for primary health care as an 
alternative to seriously overcrowded and understaffed 
hospital emergency rooms. We quickly learned that 
certain hospitals were willing to open primary care prac-
tices provided they could obtain funds to help convert 
CDC spaces into medical offices. Using the Engleberg 
Foundation’s $300,000 grant earmarked for health ser-
vices to make the needed capital improvements was 
an easy decision. By the time our negotiations with the 
health care providers ended, we had made it possible 
for three quality nonprofit medical practices to open in 
neighborhoods that had lots of new affordable housing, 
but no doctors.
The lesson from these stories is that without flexible 
funding – the most difficult support to obtain – none of 
this would have happened. It is this kind of funding that 
enables a comprehensive initiative to be responsive to 
the needs of the people with whom it works. Without 
this type of support, there is little momentum, no entre-
preneurial thrust, no opportunistic endeavor, and little 
opportunity to achieve a holistic approach to commu-
nity development. With flexible funding, communities 
can actually pursue their plans and, in fact, the future of 
their neighborhoods.
The lesson from these stories is that without 
flexible funding – the most difficult kind to obtain 
– none of these results would have happened.
Fortunately, there are some foundations and corpora-
tions that readily understand this. Others find it impos-
sible to deviate from categorical grantmaking. Even so, it 
is sometimes possible to work closely with a supportive 
program officer to reconcile the initiative’s mission with 
narrow funder guidelines. Of course, no matter how 
appealing the dollars, an organization should never take 
money that would divert it from its established priorities.
Building and Managing the 
Investor Relationship
There are numerous lessons about financing a large-scale 
initiative that we learned along the way. Many would 
apply to other initiatives, regardless of the type of pro-
gram being pursued. One suggestion to the field that 
comes from the CCRP experience is to create a funders’ 
committee so as to tap into the considerable wisdom 
and energy that exists in the philanthropic community. 
Such a panel can raise awareness of, and stir enthusiasm 
for, the added value that a comprehensive, multi-disci-
plinary program adds to the funds they invest. In addi-
tion, CCRP had no real board of directors, so the funders’ 
Advisory Committee served as an informal, quasi board 
that met three or four times a year to review progress and 
to respond to our expressed need for advice when we 
had challenges to resolve.
Another suggestion relates to maintaining the sup-
port of those who become involved in the early years of 
an initiative. We started with the governor’s staff while 
the program was still in a formative stage, and then went 
on to brief the various state departments to whom we 
would be looking for funding. Thus when the state came 
out with its comprehensive program, the NBA, we were 
known to the various officials who had to approve a 
waiver allowing our multi-neighborhood program to be 
selected for participation.
Our entry to city government was via the Plan 
Commission and the Mayor’s office. We asked for and 
received their imprimatur, which may have been of some 
help in some instances. I also took advantage of a long 
time relationship with the Bronx Borough President to 
discuss CCRP with him even before we launched the pro-
gram and, too, we held several events for local politicians 
and their staff. In the long run though, it was most often 
up to the groups to call upon their own elected officials 
to deliver – something that only they could do.
As to putting in place the core funding for this size 
initiative, it is important to start right away to reach 
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investors – getting them in early enough to participate 
in making critical decisions before the initiative is offi-
cially launched. For us, this meant that Ed Skloot and I 
would seek funding partners even as Surdna’s board of 
directors was considering its $3 million startup award. 
When Surdna’s approval came through, we acceler-
ated our efforts, adding some candidates who at first 
blush were not interested in community development 
and didn’t know much about CDCs. One was the Clark 
Foundation, which focused on economic development, 
and another was the Engleberg Foundation, whose 
main concern was health care.
When putting in place the core funding for this size 
of initiative, it is important to start right away to 
reach investors – getting them in early enough to 
make critical decisions before things are officially 
launched.
This required many an escorted visit to the South 
Bronx and numerous conversations aimed at convinc-
ing potential partners that our program would render a 
superior product with outstanding results. We provided 
two reasons: we could deliver the program in which they 
were interested at the neighborhood level, and, because 
other funders were tackling other pieces of the puzzle, 
their money would reinforce, and be reinforced by, the 
larger comprehensive effort.
After some three months, when it appeared that we 
had indeed built a cadre of interested philanthropies, we 
invited both the committed and the tentative to Surdna 
for a briefing and to ask their opinions about which of 
the seven CDCs under consideration should be invited 
to participate in CCRP. Thereafter, with only one funder 
declining support, five came on board with us, adding 
some $2 million to the program almost immediately.
Other philanthropies responded to our requests 
once the initiative began to produce serious programs 
and projects. By the time CCRP concluded it counted 21 
funders. As to the Clark and Engleberg foundations and 
their narrower program interests, over the life of CCRP the 
two contributed more than $1.2 million. In return each 
got exactly what had been promised. Clark’s $900,000 of 
economic development funds seeded the MBD shop-
ping center and Mid Bronx Seniors’ catering venture. 
It also paid for the computerization of all the CDCs, 
and financed their neighborhood-based Job Resource 
Centers, along with the technical assistance those proj-
ects required. The Engleberg Foundation‘s grant in the 
amount of $300,000 for health care represented a very 
large vote of confidence in CCRP by its executive director, 
Rabbi Balfour Brickner. These were the moneys that we 
used to supply the missing ingredients needed to get 
three of four CDC-sponsored primary health care centers 
off the ground at a time when resources for basic capital 
improvements were nearly impossible to find anywhere. 
We achieved the outcomes we did because Al Engleberg 
directed us to use his gift in any way that we saw fit.
Another aspect of funder relations was the attention 
we paid to our supporters’ desire for timely and detailed 
information about progress. The working relationships we 
established included a regular flow of very substantive 
information, much of it captured in a well organized “board 
book” that included both program reports and financial 
detail. Joint meetings of the funders involved presenta-
tions from individual CDCs, our planners, and/or regular 
site visits to the South Bronx. OMG, our assessors, also met 
annually with the Advisory Committee and worked with its 
evaluation subcommittee, the only subcommittee formed 
by the larger group. That committee’s members were 
experienced at evaluation and provided feedback on CCRP 
progress and outcomes. This committee also performed 
the important task of reviewing the drafts of all three 
evaluations prior to their being finalized, while continuing 
its informal advisor role until the program ended.
The Funders Advisory Committee proved a worth-
while vehicle for engaging our supporters and giving 
them an appreciation for the comprehensive approach, 
regardless of the type of funding they had made avail-
able. The information and reports they received were not 
limited to just one piece of the program but spoke to 
the entire effort. Suppliers of flexible support saw how 
their dollars advanced the larger strategy and achieved 
maximum leverage. In this way, those foundations that 
remained categorical funders, or were new to community 
development, grew more flexible over time, no doubt a 
result of learning how we went about fitting together the 
pieces of our comprehensive mosaic.
The Funders Advisory Committee proved a 
worthwhile vehicle for engaging our supporters 
and giving them an appreciation for the 
comprehensive approach, regardless of the type 
of funding they had made available.
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Finally, it is important to recognize that only rarely, if 
at all, can one come up with an ideal funding scenario 
for multiyear efforts that need a steady and sizeable 
stream of money. The head of one large comprehensive 
program told me that the main reason he finally left his 
job as director of the initiative he founded was he could 
no longer deal with wooing, winning over and reporting 
to the scores of agencies – both public and private – that 
supported his program. In other words, he burned out. By 
the time CCRP ended in mid-1998, I, too, was pretty worn 
down from raising and deploying the nearly $10 million 
dollars from many sources, each with their own idiosyn-
crasies. This became increasingly difficult once we hit year 
five – despite the national attention focused on CCRP for 
the solid performance of our CDCs, and considering the 
work we had left to do.
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What We Learned Along the Way
H Seek funding that can be used flexibly, and make as few promises as possible about how program 
funds will be used. We are in an age of “outcome funding,” when there is considerable pressure on funders 
and program managers to define ahead of time, and with unprecedented clarity, what can be accomplished 
with the funds being raised. Initiatives like CCRP don’t fit this model. In fact, they are probably impossible 
without a large pool of open-ended resources like those provided to CCRP. It may even be necessary to turn 
down offers of grants and/or loans that cannot be tailored to meet the interests of program participants 
rather than divert them from their primary goals.
H Invest in a seasoned initiative manager with whom all are comfortable in giving the authority to 
make significant program spending decisions. CCRP was able to accomplish what it did because the 
Program Director was well-regarded and trusted by the funder and nonprofit communities, as well as the 
public sector. She was able to negotiate with authority with the participating CDCs and move quickly when 
needed to commit funds to help out in an emergency or to take advantage of an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
Having this kind of flexibility was critical to CCRP’s success and will be important in other initiatives modeled 
on CCRP. The big lesson here is that you should budget adequately to get the right person.
H Keep funders informed about how things are going, including both the good news and any not-so-
good news. Regular and accurate narrative and financial reporting is only part of the challenge. Funders 
want to see progress and share success with those who are doing the hard work on the ground. At the same 
time, they don’t want surprises and genuinely appreciate knowing in advance should serious problems 
arise, or when a difficult decision may be approaching.
H Don’t tie up resources too early and be ready to respond quickly when needed. In a program like 
CCRP, committing too large a percentage of available dollars early will greatly reduce the possibility of 
supporting new ideas and projects when opportunities arise. Avoid the temptation to budget all the 
funds in advance. In this way you can keep attention focused on goals and avoid creating unintended 
organizational or program dependence on initiative resources. In addition, you’ll then have funds available 
to commit quickly if required by lead agency directors, who may need to act fast to seize an opportunity 
or avoid a disaster.
H Think from the beginning about how the activities you support can be funded over the long term 
and be prepared to help in lining up stable financing for sound new programs. An initiative like CCRP 
can only support startups long enough to prove validity, make adjustments and prepare for departure. 
Having an exit strategy is important. Working to leverage your resources with the funds of others should 
start early, even while the new program is taking shape. This requires thinking from the outset about the 
prospects for longer term support and then lending a helping hand in securing public or other dollars to 
carry on activities after their value is proven.
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Visioning and Planning:  
Laying the Foundation for Neighborhood Renewal
– Anita Miller
When CCRP started in 1992, New York City was well on 
its way to making its first $2 billion investment aimed at 
rebuilding housing in the South Bronx. Hard as it is to 
fathom, this massive construction effort was not accompa-
nied by a City plan to ensure that stronger communities, 
not just housing alone, would emerge from the ashes 
of what were once vital neighborhoods. Here, amid the 
nation’s very poorest Census tracts, where the income of 
45% of the population was below the poverty line and 
37% of all households were on public assistance, the basic 
services and amenities that make for a sound community 
were being ignored. Neighbors young and old were iso-
lated in a dysfunctional environment disconnected from 
one another and from the mainstream of New York life 
a short subway ride away. Still, the South Bronx did have 
assets – the people themselves, their churches, the agen-
cies that did not flee, and central to all, the CDCs that were 
physically rebuilding whole neighborhoods and struggling 
to help the people who lived in them.
By 1996, when the National League of Cities named 
the South Bronx an All-American City, the tide had begun 
to turn. Today, the South Bronx is a borough on the move, 
still poor, but enjoying a rebirth that few thought pos-
sible some fifteen years ago. But when we were strug-
gling with how best to launch CCRP, the South Bronx 
was beyond the pale – an international symbol of urban 
decay.
It was clear that if CCRP were to actually be the bot-
tom-up program we envisioned, it would have to start 
with plans developed by each CDC and the people 
in their respective neighborhoods. As we saw it, there 
would be two integrated plans for each CCRP com-
munity. One would address the physical infrastructure, 
the other the human services infrastructure. Both plans 
would give voice to the people who lived and worked 
there to assure that the plans, as well as the entire pro-
gram, would have legitimacy both within and beyond 
the communities.
Local people, after all, were the ultimate experts in 
matters affecting the quality of community life. Their 
involvement would also serve as the first of many steps 
to create a sense of resident ownership and responsibil-
ity for the neighborhood, and to ameliorate widespread 
feelings of alienation and isolation. A simple yet concrete 
vision of a future that actually belonged to the people 
would, moreover, lead to consensus about what had to 
be done and who would do it – a rarity for any New York 
neighborhood.
Each participating CDC would serve as the leader in its 
own neighborhood and thereafter become the keeper of 
the plan, assuring that it remained a living document that 
would continue to galvanize both individuals and orga-
nizations even after CCRP concluded. And we hoped that 
the plans would serve as powerful tools when advocating 
with government, raising money and attracting success-
ful programs from elsewhere in the country.
We also believed that it would be foolhardy to urge 
the CDCs to set up a formal planning body, or to cre-
ate a plan, until such time as the organizations were 
fully prepared to assume the mantle of leadership. Each 
would first need to create a broad vision for their neigh-
borhood’s future; they would also have to feel grounded 
in CCRP; and they would have to become familiar with 
the programmatic possibilities that could help turn their 
vision into reality.
Searching for the Future
How to begin? This is the question we had to deal with 
in early 1992 and the question that every community 
building effort faces at the time of its launch. Among our 
greatest challenges was to help our participants break 
out of the categorical funding box to which they were 
accustomed. Instead they would have to think boldly 
about the possibilities that a comprehensive initiative like 
CCRP held for them. We also understood that planning 
activities had to be bottom-up so that neighborhood 
people would make the decisions that mattered. Using 
a planning process that valued their participation was 
the surest way to engender the sense of community we 
knew would be essential to building and sustaining a 
new South Bronx.
Our first exercise was called Future Search. This uncon-
ventional planning technique, developed by Marvin 
Weisbrod of the University of Pennsylvania, proved to 
be a perfect choice for our initial CCRP planning session. 
It enabled the CDCs to define their optimal community 
future and, by doing so, refine the goals and approaches 
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of CCRP itself. The CCRP Future Search took the form of 
an all-day retreat for CDC principals and key community 
stakeholders whom they invited to participate – about 60 
people in all – as well as a handful of foundation observ-
ers. By the end of the retreat, we knew that we had found 
the powerful tool that we were seeking.
While the Future Search made it possible for each 
group to end the day with a vision of the community 
they hoped to have, they each had to start by looking 
back to conditions that existed when their organizations 
began, and then to identify what they had accomplished 
since. Each group brainstormed separately and after-
wards reported on how things used to be compared to 
what they had become. They proudly cited their housing 
production, their working relationships with other orga-
nizations or agencies, reduced incidents of arson, support 
they were giving to families and the resident organizing 
they had done.
The CDCs were also asked to identify those things 
they were “sorry about” or wished that they had done 
differently. High on most lists was the frustration of not 
being able to garner funds other than for their housing 
operations. Some expressed regret for having become 
too bureaucratic or losing touch with their community. 
Others cited lack of time for planning or staff training. 
Some included inadequate progress in registering voters, 
involving tenants or enabling them to move forward on a 
path to self-sufficiency.
Each group was then asked to look ahead five years 
and to create a comprehensive vision of their community 
rather than a series of programs or responses to current 
problems. Virtually all the visions called for an improved 
quality of life. They saw neighborhoods that were drug-
free, where crime and violence were greatly reduced, 
where decent housing, day care, health care, job training 
and jobs were readily available to all. But the CDCs’ defini-
tion of an improved quality of life did not end there. They 
also visualized residents who were more involved and 
communities that were more empowered.
Our Future Search retreat was a catalytic experience 
for everyone involved. Instead of being caught up in bit-
terness and disappointment about the past, the CDCs 
used their recollections of neighborhood devastation as 
the jumping-off point for taking stock of their achieve-
ments and plotting a course for the years ahead. Jeanette 
Puryear of MBSCC described the Future Search as the 
very first opportunity they ever had to dream. Moreover, 
by the end of the day the CDCs – all strangers in the past 
– had gotten to know one 
another. African American 
and Latino community 
leaders shared their histo-
ries, their achievements, 
their pain and their hopes. 
They also found out just 
how much alike they were. 
Each group left that day 
with a newfound respect 
for the others.
The Future Search 
turned out to be a defining moment for the CDCs and 
the CCRP initiative. But it was only the first of many steps 
requiring critical decisions that continue to impact the 
neighborhoods even now. The first decision had to do 
with planning assistance. We had to find professionals 
who would have the sensitivity to work with local South 
Bronx people in a process that would elicit and value 
their judgment and experience. Next came decisions 
about the makeup and role of the planning task force 
that each CDC would create, as well as how they would 
engage large numbers of people from their wider com-
Reflections on CCRP’s Beginnings
Tom Burns, OMG: Was there something about the initial 
planning event that laid the basis for your building the 
trust and the joint work?
Joyce Davis, Mt. Hope: The constant coming together, the 
monthly meetings, the ongoing contact we had around 
issues that were all similar for us – I think that may have 
been the starting point.
Jeannette Puryear, MBSCC: I do think we sort of married 
each other. I think the wedding day happened not just 
the day of the planning – maybe that was the reception 
– but it took place over that period. We needed to have 
that joint understanding, because I think once we had 
that we bonded.
I think that the organizations that participated in CCRP were groups that were all 
in the trenches, dealing with community problems in our own different ways. And 
it was always these groups fighting for the same pot of money – which meant that 
we were competitors even though our goals and our needs and desires and hopes 
were the same or similar. The thing that CCRP did for us – for me anyway – was 
that I didn’t have to be afraid of the other groups. We were finally able to get in the 
same room and begin to trust each other.
– Joyce Davis, Mt. Hope
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munity. Coming up with CDC neighborhood boundaries 
was a task new to all of the groups and one that only 
they could perform best. Another issue to be decided 
was how we would all interact with agencies of govern-
ment, both in the Bronx and downtown. The big chal-
lenge: being respectful of their bureaucratic turf without 
encouraging their interference.
Round One –  
An Imperfect Beginning
Following the Future Search, the CDCs started on the 
first of three CCRP-inspired planning initiatives. This initial 
effort was aimed at producing a relatively simple three 
year action plan.
It began with a conference we held to introduce 
the groups to subject areas – such as employment, 
open space, health care access – that would likely be 
on their agendas. Rather than one-on-one technical 
assistance, they received guidance on a group basis 
along with a written description of what the document 
should include. As the mid-January 1993 deadline for 
plan submission approached, I sent each organization 
the following encouragement: “Your three-year plan will 
become your CDC’s marketing tool, whether to obtain 
money or partners. Moreover, we are about to negotiate 
a Neighborhood Based Alliance (NBA) designation with 
the State. If we are successful, your plan will be submitted 
to 21 state agencies for their sign-off and endorsement. 
We’ve got to put our best foot forward!”
When the plans were finally delivered, I recognized 
that I had made a serious mistake. It could have been 
avoided had I looked into what, if any, previous strategic 
planning experience the CDCs had. Five of the six submis-
sions proved to be very much wanting in both substance 
and organization. Clearly, developing and writing a stra-
tegic plan was not a skill the five groups brought with 
them to CCRP. They needed more help than we provided. 
To be credible, their action plans would have had to 
describe their neighborhood priorities, speak to how they 
arrived at them, and lay out the implementation goals 
and outcomes they would seek. Later we learned that we 
were not alone in misjudging the difficulty of this task for 
organizations like those participating in CCRP. But it was a 
mistake we could fix.
Round Two –  
Quality of Life Physical Plans
While the first plans were hardly adequate, they did lay 
the groundwork for the Quality of Life Physical Plans and 
Strategic Neighborhood Action Plans that followed. All 
was not lost. Outstanding in both form and substance, 
the second generation of plans formed the foundation 
for the entire demonstration, and for all that has been 
accomplished since.
“One of the important things in that planning process was that each CDC had the 
flexibility and freedom to approach their planning in their own way. We weren’t 
told, ‘You’ve got to get to X amount.’ That flexibility gave us a chance to really 
think about what was right for us.”
– Ralph Porter, MBD
“After that relationship of trust was built, and we worked on our planning, the 
things Mt. Hope and the others needed didn’t necessarily happen the moment 
that you might have wanted. But that was ok.
“And it didn’t matter to us that someone else needed a supermarket, because 
we already had some supermarkets in our community. They needed what they 
needed, and we needed what we needed. It didn’t separate us. That didn’t break 
the marriage.”
– Joyce Davis, Mt. Hope
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Quality of Life Physical Planning actually began when 
we retained a professional team to work first with the 
CDCs and then with the Planning Task Force they had 
formed. One member was Xavier De Sousa Briggs, then a 
Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University and now a faculty 
member of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. 
Another was John Shapiro, a principal of a small New York 
City planning firm. Previously a president of the New York 
Metro Chapter of the American Planning Association, John 
had also worked successfully with community residents on 
a locally-inspired project in West Harlem.
Xav Briggs, who served as our planning coordinator, 
was fluent in Spanish and used this skill to assure that 
Spanish-speakers were comfortable in the workshop set-
ting and could participate fully. He was also a talented 
graphic artist who could bring both pictorial content and 
a sharp physical focus to task force sessions, as well as to 
community-wide meetings held to review and comment 
on draft plans. As CCRP’s planning coordinator, Briggs set 
workshop agendas, coached CCRP program managers and 
outreach workers on their roles and duties, guaranteed 
that agreed-upon timelines were met, facilitated meetings 
when necessary and assured that the thinking and prin-
ciples of CCRP were introduced into task force discussions.
The Shapiro team’s responsibilities included produc-
ing such materials as land use surveys and maps and 
information about the few city agency plans that existed 
for the six target areas. They also researched such mat-
ters as demographics, schools, health status and crime, 
and provided home mortgage disclosure reports that 
told us about lending activity in CDC census tracts. John 
Shapiro’s most important assignment, however, was to 
help community planners turn ideas into achievable 
projects grounded in neighborhood experience. Contrary 
to the top-down advocacy planning approach normally 
used by the profession, John did what he has come to 
call “empowerment planning.”
The strategy for engaging the larger CDC communi-
ties in the planning process was to hold well-advertised 
open meetings at which draft plans were presented. 
Scores of people attended some of the meetings; hun-
dreds came to others. All turned out to be constructive. 
Each one started with a mini Future Search that asked 
people to close their eyes and envision how they would 
like their community to be in approximately five years. 
Once again, the Future Search worked. It helped people 
think beyond the despair of the present and contribute 
their ideas to a blueprint for the future.
Once again, the Future Search worked. It helped 
people to think beyond the despair of the present 
and contribute their ideas to a blueprint for the 
tomorrow that lay ahead.
The CCRP experience has prompted me to change the way I do planning, not just for neighborhoods but for 
municipal master plans, for downtown revitalization, for anything where implementation belongs to more 
than one entity.
Most planners pursue some form of what I call validation planning – a start-up outreach effort (workshops, 
surveys, whatever) to define problems, and a final effort to test the validity of the plan that the “experts” generate. 
A growing number of planners now pursue some form of vision planning – town meetings where the community 
generates the plan. CCRP used elements of both. Like in validation planning, the full expertise of the planners is 
employed; like in vision planning, the emphasis is on community input. But in CCRP planning, the community, 
implementers and outside experts all collaborate. The task forces and workshops bring residents, stakeholders 
and implementers to the same table for in-depth discussion. The planners’ homework provides a solid base of 
research. The funder’s participation provides the key money to jump-start implementation. The big meetings and 
neighborhood tours provide the passion. The combination of these things provides the momentum. This is how 
CCRP generated meaningful planning.
– John Shapiro, Phillips Preiss Shapiro Associates
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As a result, the plans developed by Task Force 
members reflected the wisdom of people who lived 
and worked in South Bronx neighborhoods. They were 
bottom-up, written in plain language, illustrated in an 
accessible free-hand style and highly focused on doable 
projects that would take no more than five to seven years 
to achieve. We were all very proud when in 1994 the 
CCRP plans won the American Planning Association’s first 
Annual Presidential award.
Round Three –  
Strategic Neighborhood Action Plans
Later that same year we succeeded in negotiating 
our way into the State’s comprehensive program, the 
Neighborhood Based Alliance (NBA), which promised 
to be a source of funds for many of the projects and 
programs included in CDC Quality of Life Physical 
Plans (see Chapter 6). Step one was to comply with 
the State’s requirement that each CDC create a formal 
Neighborhood Advisory Committee, or NAC, to prepare 
a Strategic Neighborhood Action Plan that would focus 
largely on human service delivery. The State was highly 
prescriptive about the NAC, indicating that every organi-
zation in the lead agency’s neighborhood – regardless of 
track record or reputation – had to be included. This was 
a problem. The South Bronx had no shortage of shady 
and/or argumentative activists. So we solved the problem 
in the only way we could. We turned a deaf ear to the 
requirement. Instead, the CDCs relied largely on their 
existing planning groups, adding only a few judiciously 
chosen newcomers whom they believed would not dis-
rupt or slow down the work.
To be somewhat responsive to the State require-
ment for inclusiveness, as well as to assure a CCRP 
identity within the NBA program, we created a special 
CCRP wide advisory committee made up of represen-
tatives from major South Bronx and citywide public 
and non profit agencies. This advisory committee was 
the first such umbrella group ever created for the NBA 
program. It turned out that committee members were 
enthusiastic about CCRP and NBA, and forthcoming 
when called upon for help.
In Chicago, with Quality of Life planning, the CDCs in NCI had an exciting tool 
which enabled them to rally their communities around their strengths while 
identifying important ideas for rebuilding their neighborhoods. The outcome 
here, like in New York, was integrated, comprehensive strategies that have caught 
the attention of both public and private sector funders. Would their support have 
been available had we taken a piecemeal approach to neighborhood rebuilding 
without the involvement of the target communities themselves? We doubt it.
– Amanda Carney, NCI/NCD Program Officer, LISC/Chicago
CCRP is a model for the approach to planning to which we committed when we 
launched the Agenda for America’s Communities. It is the perfect group to receive 
our first presidential award.
– APA board member Vivian Kahn
CCRP is one of the most exciting things I’ve seen in city planning. It brought 
together professional planners and community based organizations to provide 
the highest level of technical assistance to groups that would not normally have 
it. It is a brilliant linkage. Planning is at the heart of the program and they show us 
all how it should be done.
– Eugenie Birch, former Assistant Provost 
Hunter College, now Chairman, City Planning Department, University of Pennsylvania
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The State also required the CDCs to describe 
their neighborhood boundaries. They all identified a 
“Comprehensive Core” within their generally larger service 
areas that was similar in size to the one they had delin-
eated for their Quality of Life Physical Plans. When previ-
ously asked for guidance in this matter, I had suggested 
that the groups think about constructing neighborhood 
borders that would encompass a significant number of 
CDC sponsored housing units while making sure that 
their designated areas would be big enough to be sub-
stantial in size, but small enough to be manageable.
I also offered two caveats having to do with political 
realities. The CDCs could avoid a problem with a local, 
politically appointed community planning board by 
showing that the CDC Comprehensive Core would be 
located in only a portion of a board’s total area. And they 
could steer clear of a hostile and/or competitive neigh-
borhood organization by gerrymandering the borders 
of a Core to include only turf that clearly belonged to 
the CDC. This was particularly an issue for one CCRP par-
ticipant, Banana Kelly (BK). Its territory was intertwined 
with that of a neighboring CDC with whom there had 
been bad blood for more than a decade. No love was 
lost between Banana Kelly and its executive director and 
Father Louis Gigante’s powerful SEBCO organization. 
Taking our advice, the borders of the BK Plan turned out 
looking like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Nonetheless, it 
was an honest portrayal of how turf was divided in the 
community and it worked to defray tensions that would 
have otherwise erupted.
Perhaps social scientists and planners who make a 
career of defining neighborhoods would be appalled at the 
criteria we used. However, every one of these CDC defined 
neighborhoods withstood the scrutiny of officials from 
both the Borough of the Bronx and the City of New York, as 
well as from local groups, both friendly and unfriendly.
The state’s NBA application also caused us to examine 
the notion of forming a collaborative versus developing 
some other type of participatory vehicle. It was not a sub-
ject to be taken lightly, for a collaborative is a mechanism 
that, like a partnership, calls for both joint decision-mak-
ing and joint action. That’s a notion that can conflict with 
the idea of having a lead agency responsible for driving 
a comprehensive effort. Yet, the word collaborative was 
very much in vogue. For CCRP, terms such as cooperation 
or coordination were more accurate.
In our case, each CCRP participant was positioned as 
a fulcrum with an advisory committee of its own choos-
ing to guide the development and implementation of 
locally developed strategic and physical plans. The CDCs 
knew to make such committees broadly representative in 
order to assure the validity of their work and achieve the 
community-wide consensus needed to realize their goals. 
While they served as lead organizations, we were dead-
set against our lead CDCs functioning as super-agencies 
– organizations that would “do it all” when others were 
available with the requisite skills to tackle specific plan 
elements. Rather, we helped them to engage their com-
munities by supplying both technical assistance and 
support for staff outreach workers. Further, we believed 
that it was not up to us to propose new governance 
structures of any kind, including formal collaboratives 
that would make binding decisions for neighborhoods. 
Within these parameters, the CDCs of CCRP did a great 
deal of “collaborating.”
As might be expected, no two CDC planning commit-
tees looked alike. Mid Bronx Seniors took advantage of a 
CCRP consultant to think through how it would organize 
its NAC. This CDC, like the others, saw the NAC as an impor-
tant community-building tool and assigned a senior staff 
person to nurture it. Forty members strong and made up 
of both residents and agency representatives, the MBSCC 
NAC is alive and well today, advocating on behalf of the 
community and planning still for its future.
At the other extreme was the Mt. Hope NAC. Its parent 
CDC had few other nonprofits located in its target area and 
also harbored a deep distrust for a number of municipal 
agencies, especially the local police precinct. As a result, Mt. 
Hope structured its NAC to mirror membership in its com-
munity organization plus a few respected providers. We did 
nothing to try to change that.
The Phipps NAC, with some 15 members, was the 
smallest of all. Included were the leaders of the neighbor-
hood’s major nonprofit agencies and several residents, 
both adults and youth. This is the structure with which 
the CDC’s executive director – a former high level city 
official – felt most comfortable. The Task Force strength-
ened relationships among people who operated cheek-
by-jowl, but who, nonetheless, rarely worked together. 
The group functioned well, and after the work at hand 
was finished, operated only sporadically and informally 
for a short period of time.
MBD’s story is quite different. Its Task Force was also a 
representative body. For years it continued to sponsor an 
annual outdoor “community planning cookout” in a park-
like setting adjacent to an MBD apartment building. Here, 
in an atmosphere that felt very much like an old fash-
ioned political rally, planning committee members and 
staff brought the wider community up to date on the 
last year’s progress and received input on the next year’s 
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plans. Hundreds of residents together with trades people 
and service providers attended each and every year.
Even today, I remain convinced that final decisions 
about the role of a planning or advisory committee and 
its membership should be left to lead agencies operating 
at the neighborhood level. Presumably, such organiza-
tions have been carefully selected for the program and 
are quite capable of making decisions about whether an 
NBA-like advisory committee or a formal collaborative or 
something in between is best for their situation. Certainly, 
an intermediary can discuss the matter and urge that 
membership be broadly representative, as we did, but I 
believe that this is about as far as an outsider should go 
without overstepping.
Even today I remain convinced that final decisions 
about the role of a planning or advisory committee 
and its membership should be left to lead agencies 
operating at the neighborhood level. Presumably, 
such organizations have been carefully selected 
for the program and are quite capable of making 
decisions about what is best for their situation.
The strategic action plans that the groups developed 
for NBA related closely to the Quality of Life Plans they 
were just completing. The format we used for the NAC 
plan was the same for all of the groups, while the content 
reflected neighborhood considerations. Two CCRP con-
sultants coached the community planners, helping them 
pinpoint their concerns and then fill in the blanks relative 
to implementation.
Meanwhile, the CCRP managers, now with the expe-
rience of two previous planning exercises, were able 
to move the process at a pace that kept participants 
engaged. Their work produced straightforward and con-
cise strategic action plans that spoke with one voice to 
what each community saw as its most important and 
doable interventions. Not only did the planning groups 
lay out their major issues – neighborhood safety, employ-
ment, and health care – they also set priorities and named 
the organizations most capable of implementing projects 
and programs. The plans also listed the resources that they 
could tap for each. And they projected time lines and mea-
surable outcomes to insure that all involved would be real-
istic about just how long it might take to produce results 
and just what those results should look like.
How We Conducted the Planning
Based on my experience as a Ford Foundation program 
officer, I often found that the mere presence of the lady 
with the checkbook (so to speak) could alter the dynamic 
of a meeting. So I never attended either a training session 
for CCRP managers or an actual physical planning session. 
While I was confident that my presence would not faze 
the CDC people with whom I regularly worked, I couldn’t 
feel sure that the other participants would not feel intimi-
dated if I were in the room. Instead, I consulted regularly 
with Xavier Briggs and John Shapiro, and gave them 
feedback after reviewing minutes from each session. I 
also monitored costs closely and, despite my jawboning, 
watched an initial $175,000 “guesstimate” for the entire 
project become an actual expense closer to $250,000. As 
it turned out, compared to costs for this kind of neighbor-
hood planning in other cities, we didn’t do badly at all.
Workshops for the planning groups on economic 
development and job creation produced a number of 
ideas, one of which was to improve commercial strips as 
a way to address rampant unemployment in the South 
Bronx. What the task force members did not grasp was 
that, while this tactic could help a relatively small number 
of people, it could not possibly address the needs of the 
thousands who were on welfare or out of work. Clearly, 
a meaningful response to the problem of joblessness 
could not be found in the neighborhoods alone. Instead, 
we suggested another solution that was readily adopted 
– a program to connect residents to the many jobs that 
existed outside of their immediate area but which could 
be reached by public transportation.
Other problems were more personal in nature. There 
was the need to counsel the executive director who was 
bedeviled by a particular task force member whom he 
had appointed, but who was bound and determined to 
dominate, if not sink, the entire effort. A polarizing force, 
she even called on me to complain. While the executive 
director had many talents, getting into the trenches with 
the likes of this resident was not one of them. Eventually, 
at my urging, he met individually with all of the other task 
force members and found that they, too, thought it would 
be best to remove her from the group. When he did act, it 
was on behalf of the entire task force – not his CDC alone.
John Shapiro, our professional planner, brought to the 
planning process a keen sensitivity, enthusiasm for the 
program, and knowledge – especially about the proto-
cols we needed to employ in order to maintain the good 
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will of city planners. Further, he was adept at dealing with 
participants even on those occasions when they would 
engage in contentious exchanges. His way of handling 
such delicate situations was to come up with alternatives 
that would enable the group to meet its original objec-
tives. This approach worked well.
Our professional planner John Shapiro brought to 
the process sensitivity, enthusiasm and knowledge 
– especially about how to maintain the good will 
of city planners. He also handled participants’ 
contentious exchanges by offering alternatives to 
get the group back to its original objectives.
Addressing Deeper Issues
Midway through the planning process we called the ses-
sions to a halt in order to respond to what was perhaps 
the clearest and most recurring theme of our physical 
planning work with neighborhood residents – crime and 
their fear of crime.
Upfront it became apparent that there could be no 
safety for the residents of the South Bronx without a com-
mitment from the police department to work proactively 
with them. I sought out Jerry McElroy of the nonprofit 
Criminal Justice Coordinating Council who helped 
me to reach into the top levels of the New York Police 
Department (NYPD). We secured their active involvement, 
beginning with an all day working session that dealt with 
the business of “Making our Neighborhoods Safe.”
A hundred people attended the workshop – 60 from 
the six CDCs; 40 from the NYPD. The day included expert 
presentations, as well as working sessions that teamed up 
neighborhood representatives with their local precinct 
police officers. Together they identified specific crime 
problems and the strategies they would use to address 
them. The most moving moment of the day occurred 
when a resident whose daughter had been killed on the 
streets of her neighborhood rose to speak. First she spoke 
with passion of police indifference to her CDC’s persistent 
pleas for attention to criminal activity in its community. 
But then she told how a local precinct officer had been 
unjustly accused of negligent behavior. She explained 
how she had spoken out on his behalf because it was the 
right thing to do, and told us that he was subsequently 
exonerated. At the end of the day there were commit-
ments from police and community leaders to work 
together to fight the plague of street crime infesting each 
of their neighborhoods and to monitor the results they 
were able to achieve.
The Bronx Borough police commander, who was an 
unknown when it came to community policing, and 
Ralph Porter of MBD, closed the meeting. The com-
mander surprised us all. He not only lauded the partner-
ship that the workshop promised, but heaped praise on 
the CDCs for the housing they had produced, comparing 
the renewed South Bronx that was emerging to prosper-
ous suburbs nearby.
Ralph Porter, speaking for the CDCs, told the audience 
that the workshop had no precedent in his memory. 
“This is the first time in nearly 30 years of working in the 
field that I’ve ever had such a roll-up-your-sleeves ses-
sion, working directly with law enforcement officials and 
members of the community.” His appraisal was seconded 
by a well-regarded consultant in the field who called our 
workshop “the strongest endorsement I’ve ever seen of 
what community policing is all about.”
Did we wipe out crime in the CDC neighborhoods as 
a result of that day? Certainly not. But things did improve, 
and the sense of hopelessness that had pervaded CCRP 
neighborhoods abated. New lines of communication 
between residents and their police led to arrests for all 
kinds of criminal behavior. Police officers began to turn 
up at community meetings and became more responsive 
to resident complaints. Later a CCRP neighborhood safety 
consultant, who was attached to the Citizens Committee 
for New York, came aboard. She worked with CDC out-
reach workers to organize parents into patrols that kept 
areas around schools safe from criminal elements. She 
also helped organize cadres of residents whose reports of 
illegal activity made it possible for police to close down 
businesses serving as fronts for illicit drug and gambling 
activity. John Shapiro worked with the planning groups 
on physical improvements that would create safer envi-
ronments, while the CDCs pressed for better street light-
ing and increased police presence to deal with neighbor-
hood “hot spots.” At the same time that they organized, 
they reclaimed parks and playgrounds from drug dealers 
who had taken them over for their own purposes.
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The Quality of Life Plans:  
What They Accomplished
John Shapiro, his staff, Xav Briggs and I actually wrote the 
Quality of Life Plans and the texts for the plan posters. We 
made sure that documents were faithful to the ideas and 
language and, in fact, the words of the community plan-
ning groups. And we expected the CDCs, when it was 
their turn to edit our drafts, to do the same, even when 
they decided that a major change would improve the 
document. Indeed, we took care to send the CDCs each 
and every revised draft for their comment. Finally, they 
reached the point of saying no – no more drafts! We had 
worn them out.
We wrote draft Plans and worked to make sure they 
were faithful to what the CDC planning groups 
had agreed on. We took care to send them each 
new draft for their comments. Finally, the groups 
said no more! We’d worn them out.
CDC plan posters were disseminated to community 
members, public officials and CCRP supporters. Thanks to 
Xav Briggs, they were in both English and Spanish. Each 
was printed in the CDCs’ trademark colors. John and I were 
at the printer’s until near midnight one evening, deter-
mined to get the hues just right. They were beautiful.
Written in the voice of each task force and approxi-
mately 50 pages in length, the CDC plans broke new 
ground for neighborhood planners, both lay and pro-
fessional. Moreover, they delivered everything we had 
hoped for. They created a road map for revitalization that 
the CDCs continue to pursue even today. The community 
action they called for has helped bring residents together 
and strengthened the social fabric of their buildings and 
blocks. Moreover, the goals set forth in the plans inspired 
each of the communities to go far beyond the initial 
efforts they made in 1992 and to develop a full range of 
quality of life improvements. These include both physical 
improvements and improvements in the number and 
quality of human service programs for their residents.
A larger theoretical question was also answered. The 
initial CCRP program paper asked whether a CDC with 
a holistic plan would secure greater investments for 
community improvement than an organization seeking 
support on a piecemeal basis. The answer is clearly yes. 
Based on the reactions and results generated, I have no 
doubt that the plans were a huge asset in attracting both 
public and private money and programs for the CDCs 
and CCRP itself. When the demonstration ended in 1998 
it had received some $9.5 million from 21 sources, while 
the amount leveraged for CDC projects and programs 
stood at $44 million. Just after the turn of the century this 
number exceeded $80 million, indicating further that the 
confidence our funders had placed in the CCRP strategy 
was indeed justified.
More importantly, the plans had begun to work their 
magic. Berne Zimmerman, chief planner for the Bronx 
borough president’s office and a strong supporter of 
CCRP, told me that he never signed off on a land disposi-
tion request without making sure that it conformed to 
CDC plans. John Shapiro had kept Berne and local staff of 
the New York City Planning Commission informed about 
plan details along the way so that neither they nor we 
would experience any surprises. And so it was that the 
chairman of the Planning Commission warmly recom-
mended us to the deputy mayor who, in turn, set up a 
briefing for us in her office with high-level representatives 
of every city agency whose cooperation was essential to 
projects and programs identified in the plans.
But what of the impact of the plans from a CDC per-
spective? One example says much: William Nelson of 
Mt. Hope noted that the largest item called for in their 
plan was a community center. Yet in terms of quality of 
life, smaller ambitions also delivered some of the most 
meaningful results, such as open space reclaimed from 
drug dealers. “Echo Park was totally drug-infested when 
we got there. We decided to find a way to take it back. It 
was actually in the plan and we used that to jump-start 
what we wanted to do. We kept partnering with more 
and more organizations in the community, started to find 
ways to get into that park and in the end weeded out 
the drugs.” As for the community center, that too is finally 
becoming a reality – the beautiful new Mount Hope 
“Crime pervaded their lives, shaping the way they 
used parks, retail, human services and other commu-
nity resources, dimming their hopes that revitalization 
efforts could really make neighborhoods a better place 
to live and raise their children. Without making streets, 
housing, shopping and other areas safer, residents told 
us, no physical or programmatic improvements would 
make a significant or lasting contribution.”
- From “Making our South Bronx Neighborhoods Safe: 
Working with the Police Department”
 CCRP Report, December 1993
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“CCRP was responsible for our seeing that our communities had both assets and 
deficits. We came to look much more at the assets. It taught us to recognize the 
whole community, not just in terms of the kinds of services we could provide, but 
how we could mobilize people, get them engaged.”
– Jeanette Puryear 
Mid Bronx Seniors
Community Center, for which the CDC raised in excess of 
$11 million, is expected to open its doors early in 2008.
We also believed that the community planning pro-
cess as conducted by the CDCs would result in a reexami-
nation of their own organizations and their communities. 
Some groups, when encouraged to take a fresh look at 
the diversity of their boards, found that their members 
were still being drawn largely from one racial or ethnic 
group, despite the dramatic changes in neighborhood 
composition that had occurred. Those CDCs moved 
quickly to take corrective action, assuring that members 
of racial groups that had become a significantly larger 
percentage of the South Bronx populace would be added 
to CDC staff and have a voice on its governing body.
Mid Bronx Seniors is an excellent example of the grad-
ual shifts in thinking that took place. As Jeanette Puryear 
of MBSCC said:
“CCRP was responsible for our seeing that our 
communities had both assets and deficits. We came 
to look much more at the assets. It taught us to rec-
ognize the whole community, not just in terms of 
the kinds of services we could provide, but how we 
could mobilize people, get them engaged. We began 
to understand how that engagement really helped 
us to do the work we wanted to do, how it helped us 
to revitalize the community. So you didn’t see your-
self any more as the agency that does it all, but as 
a partnership between the agency, the community, 
the other institutions, the government groups.”
This new thinking has lasted.
Ralph Porter confirmed that Future Search and the 
process of widening the circle of neighborhood players 
was the first time that MBD had an opportunity to look at 
its community from a holistic point of view:
“I think that’s really critical. You’re getting people 
involved in the process and there’s a lot of wisdom 
in our community, but it had not been recognized 
yet. We created a forum for people to actually come 
and speak out, which created success, which breeds 
leadership, which gives a sense of hope. We began 
to change thinking.”
The plans also made it possible for me as the CCRP 
Program Director to react quickly to CDC requests for 
money or technical assistance, or both. I knew every ele-
ment of every plan and the reasoning behind it. When 
requests fit within the parameters of the plans, it was 
easy to structure a “yes.” And, too, they made it possible 
to measure CCRP progress and how I should play out my 
role. Is the CDC making headway in implementing the 
neighborhood plan, or is there foot dragging going on 
and if so, why? Did it bite off too much at one time, and 
if so what kind of added support should I offer? Or is the 
lack of activity a wake-up call that tells me the organiza-
tion is abandoning its commitment to the initiative?
The new Mount Hope 
Community Center, a cen-
tral element in the CDC’s 
Quality of Life Plan, is 
expected to open its doors 
sometime in 2008 (architec-
tural rendering seen here).
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If the principals of a community based program 
take away only one idea from this book, I genuinely 
hope it is the notion of undertaking a bottom-up 
planning effort like CCRP’s. With it, I believe that we 
began the process of changing the face of South 
Bronx communities and the lives of the many who 
call them home.
Now, years after the formal conclusion of the CCRP 
initiative, I am even more convinced that our $250,000 
investment in visioning and planning yielded great value 
at many levels. We found powerful common ground 
among neighborhood stakeholders. We forged new 
relationships with City agencies, particularly law enforce-
ment. Through the formal Plans, we created a roadmap 
and a tool for speedy decision-making about funding 
specific projects. And we gained the attention of impor-
tant new funders whose resources helped expand even 
further the impacts of the CDCs’ efforts. If the principals 
of a community based program take away only one idea 
from this book, I hope it is the notion of undertaking a 
bottom-up planning effort like CCRP’s. With it, I believe 
that we began the process of changing the face of South 
Bronx communities and the lives of many who call those 
communities home.
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What We Learned Along the Way
H It is important to convene participants very early in the program so that they can be helped to 
think creatively about the future and discover the common values and shared vision that provide 
the basis for working together. This process requires skillful preparation and guidance. A modest early 
investment in expert facilitation will almost surely yield benefits over the life of the initiative.
H In a program such as this it would be a mistake to treat planning as an initial stage that must be 
completed before moving into implementation. If widely agreed-upon projects can be launched even 
before planning is completed, you will start out with immediate credibility and momentum. No doubt you 
will find that planning will continue to be needed as the program evolves to enable each lead agency’s 
planning task force to measure progress and advance new priorities. It may prove useful to engage in 
alternative planning exercises at different stages or in response to new circumstances or opportunities 
that may arise.
H If your goal is to formulate plans that are creative, respond to community priorities, and make good 
sense, then you will want to find and invest in high quality technical expertise. Community planning 
is challenging and requires skills that most organizations do not have in-house. While the process should 
not be allowed to drag out, it is time-consuming and will likely require a substantial outlay of resources.
H Good plans can be made better with additional investments in presentation and communications. 
Investing both in time and some additional money once plans take shape may be necessary to assure that 
they are packaged properly for the wider audience you want to reach. Make an extra effort to refine the 
presentation of ideas and strategies produced by the planning process into documents that are visually 
exciting and persuasive tools that can help in attracting support and resources for implementation.
H Trust that the communities with whom you are working will know what they need. They do, however, 
need help expressing those needs. Your role should be to create the opportunities for them to do so and 
deliver the talent and resources needed to capture their ideas and weave them together into a powerful 
vision and action framework.
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CCRP was all about building capacity by doing. The initia-
tive was designed around the proposition that meeting 
the challenges that each neighborhood identified for 
itself would improve the health of the community. At 
the same time, organizations and residents would build 
the capacity to sustain progress after the demonstration 
ended. This belief was fundamental to CCRP. However, 
the challenges faced by the CDCs were so substantial 
that they could not possibly undertake them alone. They 
would need help linking to all kinds of new resources if 
they were to achieve their goals and build lasting capac-
ity within their own communities.
We knew from the outset that we would have to 
move forward aggressively with the best technical sup-
port available to implement a quality comprehensive 
program, and we guessed that doing this collectively, 
whenever possible, would pay big dividends. CDCs work-
ing side by side could master more of the nuts and bolts 
of a comprehensive strategy than if each organization 
performed as a solo act. This led us to the notion of using 
one consultant for CCRP-wide programs to work with all 
of the participants, both individually and as a group. This 
would help to build a sense of community among CDC 
staff and make it possible to achieve both cost savings 
and continuity.
But this was easier said than done! Early on we learned 
the difficulty of identifying technical assistance providers 
who were both expert in their field and conversant in 
the programmatic nuances that resonate with would-be 
funders. In addition, the professionals we engaged had 
to be the kind of people who could readily grasp the 
comprehensive nature of CCRP and understand that their 
role was to help the CDCs expand capacity by deliver-
ing on their plans. Probably the most frustrating aspect 
of our search for technical assistance providers was our 
inability to find Latino and African-American profession-
als in numbers sufficient to satisfy either the CDCs or me. 
(Today, thankfully, the ranks of skilled technical assistance 
providers have far more men and women who reflect 
the diversity of the neighborhoods where they’re being 
engaged to provide expertise.)
Early on we learned the difficulty of identifying 
technical assistance providers who were both 
expert in their field and conversant in the 
programmatic nuances that resonate with would-
be funders.
While many of the technical assistance people 
referred to CCRP were truly capable and worked well with 
one or more groups, this was not the case with all. There 
were also those candidates who had considerable experi-
ence but who were unable to grasp our needs. For exam-
ple, one of our funders recommended someone who 
was very effective in designing and managing displaced 
worker programs. He stood before our groups and told 
them that, should they mount an employment initiative, 
they had no chance of succeeding: “There are no jobs out 
there.” Unfortunately, he had not done his homework. He 
did not take the time to learn about his audience, nor, for 
that matter, their audience. He was not invited back.
Then there was the disappointment we suffered with 
an individual who was highly regarded by neighborhood 
organizations and the obvious choice for the role of 
CCRP’s physical planner to work with the CDCs. Despite 
advance memos and telephone calls asking that he speak 
at our first CCRP retreat about the rationale for bottom-up 
planning, he instead presented a glowing story about 
a young and utopian organization that had a visit from 
President Jimmy Carter on his second 1986 trip to the 
South Bronx. We all knew that the group received a sub-
stantial award from HUD thereafter. We also knew the end 
of the story. The organization never produced a viable 
housing development, squandered its HUD money and 
had long since gone under. This would-be consultant, 
as well, had not done his homework; this audience had 
already built and were managing housing developments 
in the South Bronx totaling near $500 million.
Chapter 6
Building Bridges to Needed Resources
– Anita Miller
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Knowing When and How to Help –  
Making Technical Assistance 
Effective
As the program progressed, so did our experience with 
technical assistance. We retained consultants to under-
take specific tasks for CCRP itself and to work with the 
individual CDCs. For example, when CCRP needed help 
with an RFP (request for proposals) for the evaluation, 
we turned to Jim Pickman, a well-recognized commu-
nity development consultant who was then manag-
ing a large multi-city housing development effort, the 
National Community Development Initiative supported 
by a consortium of national philanthropies. Frank 
Schneiger, an individual identified by Ed Skloot, intro-
duced us to the Future Search as a way to kick off CCRP 
and actually conducted our all-day visioning session. 
Goetz Obtsfeld, now a developer of affordable housing 
after many years at the helm of the Banana Kelly CDC, 
and Ricki Granetz of the Federation Employment and 
Guidance Services (FEGS), put in 16-hour days helping a 
CCRP team prepare a complex application for designa-
tion as a Federal Enterprise Community site.
On their part, the individual CDCs asked for and 
received help on a wide range of subjects. The CDC and 
I had to mutually agree on the technical assistant and 
the scope of the work, but the consultant was actually 
accountable to the CDC, not CCRP, in spite of the fact that 
we paid their fee. (Though this sounds like a contradictory 
arrangement, it worked well.) Bob Brandwein was one 
technical assistant to whom we turned on several occa-
sions. His track record as a community development con-
sultant was excellent; his fee was fair and he never took an 
assignment that he knew would fail to meet the criteria of 
the agency to which the CDC was applying. Bob helped 
two groups win Federal grants for economic develop-
ment projects, while a third obtained a large award for its 
youth program. Then there was Grizelle Ubarry, who came 
from New Jersey to do leadership training with MBD’s 
newly formed Community Council; Beth Rosenthal who 
assisted Mid Bronx Seniors in developing a local Advisory 
Council; Bea Laurie, our neighborhood safety expert, who 
worked tirelessly with all the groups; and Bill Link who 
provided management training and technical assistance 
to three of the CDCs, two of which had board-related 
issues that needed to be addressed.
Over time, we also learned more about handling both 
contracts and relationships with those organizations 
that supplied us with the “dedicated staff” – either full or 
part time – who were assigned to work with CCRP on a 
continuing basis. The dedicated agency staff methodol-
ogy gave us people who were both hard working and 
imaginative, as well as the services of more experienced, 
senior staff. As we hoped would be the case, they pro-
“Health Realization” Comes to the South Bronx
Our first real test of employing an organization for an ongoing program-wide consulting assignment came in mid 1992 when we 
retained Roger Mills and his Florida team to train trainers from the CDCs in a personal and community empowerment program 
that Roger called “Health Realization.” The idea behind Roger’s model was that an individual’s ability to participate in com-
munity-wide change was a function of their self-esteem and psychological well-being.
I was introduced to Health Realization by Ed Skloot who had learned of it from one of his board members. For many months I 
ignored the Health Realization materials that sat at the side of my desk. However, I did think often about the fact that the CDCs 
were not as they once were. No longer a small cadre of dedicated souls who set out to stop the destruction of their neighbor-
hoods, they were now large entities with many newcomers who never had a chance to experience the idealism and concern for 
people so characteristic of CDC founders. Could community building really succeed if such near bureaucrats could not be turned 
into employees who saw themselves as being “in service” to the people of their neighborhoods?
Then, too, I began to fully recognize how difficult it would be to reverse the alienation and lack of hope that years of poverty 
and struggle had created in so many South Bronx residents. That was when Ed and I put skepticism on hold and took a trip 
to Dade County to visit the program and learn first-hand about the results it claimed. Once there, I was won over by a public 
housing mother who ascribed the monumental changes in her family’s life to her involvement with Roger’s program.
We engaged Roger and his team only after he had met individually with each of the CDCs. All had been given to understand 
that CCRP would engage Roger to work only with those groups that wanted to participate. Much to my astonishment, all gave 
Health Realization a thumbs-up and thus began the training of several hundred CDC staff and residents, a number of whom 
became expert in delivering the program. Was it a panacea? No. Did it end up costing too much money? Yes. Do many of the 
CDCs and their staff and residents consider it to have been worthwhile? Absolutely. That is the way these things go!
- Anita Miller
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large and established agencies – agencies we were pay-
ing for technical assistance – would draw a line when it 
came to giving us such help.
Our technical assistance strategy also included out-
reach to a number of extraordinary agencies that, as a 
part of their own mission, provided invaluable services 
to CCRP and its participants. The New York Hospital Fund 
went beyond researching the need for health care in the 
South Bronx to help MBD and Mt. Hope create partner-
ships with health care providers and assist them in start-
ing up their primary health care centers. The Lawyers 
Alliance prepared the bylaws for CCRP, Inc. Even more 
important than saving us a legal fee was their ready 
understanding of the delicate issues involved in creating 
a CDC-owned corporation that was, in effect, a subsidiary 
of an unincorporated foundation-funded demonstra-
tion program. Another example was the Corporation 
for Supportive Housing. It put together the financing 
that the Mt. Hope Community Organization needed to 
turn a former brothel into housing for residents who 
were homeless and HIV-positive. The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Urban Resources Program, conceived by the 
Under Secretary Jim Lyons, did more than grant $600,000 
for three CDC parks. It also gave the CDCs the time of fed-
eral employees who helped to move the projects along.
Technology was the one area where we chose to go 
beyond the contracted technical assistance route. Here 
we needed an intensive hands-on approach. Paul Winkler 
joined the two-person CCRP staff to introduce the CDCs 
to technology and start them on the case management 
system recommended to all of us by our consultants, 
Metis Associates. Paul had no small job, for many of the 
staff were computer illiterate when we started. Not so 
when we concluded. But progress was not the same from 
site to site, with the greatest variable being the attention 
and discipline that each group’s supervisors brought to 
the effort. Having the dedicated services of Paul on a reg-
ular basis was critical in moving this large effort forward.
As a result of their work with CCRP, many of our tech-
nical assistants, both individuals and organizations, had a 
learning experience that promised to last long after their 
association with CCRP ended. In the course of helping the 
CDCs build capacity in their fields, they had assumed a 
new hands-on role that actually connected them to poor 
communities and organizations in distressed neighbor-
hoods. As for the CDCs, there is no question that they had 
existed in the South Bronx isolated from sophisticated 
resources. Because of CCRP this is no longer the case.
I am convinced that the organizations participating 
in CCRP would not have achieved the substantial results 
The most innovative aspect of CCRP’s technical assis-
tance approach was the CCRP-funded agency staff 
model. This model proved to be critical to the prog-
ress of several CCRP-wide projects, and to building 
the capacity of the CDC staff in new fields. The Self-
Sufficiency and Neighborhood Safety initiatives each 
had a dedicated staff person who worked full-time with 
the CDCs under contract to CCRP, while the Open Space 
initiative had 2 1⁄2 days per week of staff time for two 
years that was dedicated to advancing CDC objectives.
In addition to being cost-effective, this approach 
allowed the individuals selected within the provider 
agency to devote all or a large portion of their time 
to CCRP, reducing the competing demands of multiple 
projects and allowing them to concentrate on working 
with the CDCs. Staff on the Self-Sufficiency, Open Space 
and Neighborhood Safety Initiatives, even though fully 
dedicated to CCRP, remained employees of their respec-
tive organizations – the Trust for Public Land, Federation 
Employment and Guidance Services (FEGS), and the 
Citizens Committee for N.Y. Thus, these CCRP-funded 
staff had a unique opportunity to provide the CDCs with 
access to an array of resources and expertise provided 
by their respective agencies, and over time, to begin to 
introduce learning from CCRP into how their own organi-
zations delivered services to neighborhood-based CDCs. 
With their organizations backing them, these individuals 
had access to deep knowledge and contacts, and had 
credibility in their specific fields of practice. Also, they 
were able to effectively keep abreast of best practices 
and introduce state-of the-art ideas into CCRP. Their 
deep, field-specific expertise enriched the more general-
ist CDC staffs’ understanding of the new program areas 
into which they were moving.
- From the CCRP Final Assessment Report, 
OMG Center for Collaborative Learning, 1998
vided a continuity of effort that was important to CDC 
capacity growth. Nonetheless, in year two we called 
upon the CCRP managers at each of the CDCs and their 
technical assistants to develop a joint work plan so that 
projects in which they were engaged would progress 
on a timely basis without the finger pointing that some-
times occurred when they hit a snag. We quickly came to 
understand that we were remiss in not requiring such a 
plan from the beginning.
We were not equally successful in finding a solution to 
another issue that greatly diminished the value of these 
otherwise fine relationships. The organizations we had 
turned to for technical assistance often backed off from 
helping us to compete for grants or contracts needed to 
launch the initiatives they helped shape with the CDCs. It 
turned out their own agency was going after some of the 
same funds. It was disappointing to find that these very 
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they did without the expert assistance they received 
via CCRP. I am similarly convinced that my performance 
as manager of the initiative was greatly helped by the 
smart and caring professionals we employed to advance 
the effort. Yes, I was demanding when it came to laying 
out a scope of work and putting forth our expectations. 
Thereafter, the right consultant with the right skills, work-
ing with energetic people at the ground level, could 
always get the job done. Thus CDC staff knew how to do 
more, and in a more professional manner, after the con-
sultants departed. This was our experience.
However, it would happen from time to time that a 
CDC would think that loyalty and a comfortable relation-
ship were the best criteria to use in selecting professional 
assistance. It was my job to convince the CEO that having 
a person or team with a very high level of specialized 
expertise had to be the first consideration. Most often 
I succeeded, but then again, in CCRP we learned more 
than once that it is very difficult to give a participant 
advice they do not want to hear.
During CCRP it was apparent that a number 
of our technical assistants, both individuals 
and organizations, were engaged in a learning 
experience that promised to last long after their 
association with CCRP ended. In the course of 
helping the CDCs to build capacity in their fields, 
they had assumed a new hands-on role that 
actually connected them to poor communities 
and organizations in distressed neighborhoods.
Making Introductions and  
Finding Partners
Technical assistance was just one of the many kinds of 
resources CCRP needed in order to make the initiative 
succeed. The search for new and promising programs that 
CCRP could import to the South Bronx led us to CET (the 
Comprehensive Employment Training program) based in 
Southern California. When Monsignor Lindner of the New 
Communities CDC in Newark told me about CET and their 
interest in joining forces with his CDC, I decided to take a 
trip to the West Coast to actually see the operation on the 
ground. Accompanying me was Joe Cruickshank of the 
Clark Foundation, an early and generous supporter of CCRP 
whose interest was in economic development.
Joe and I liked what we saw. CET lived up to its repu-
tation of being a highly effective model for training and 
placing large numbers of people in jobs, including those 
who were Spanish speaking. By limiting English lessons to 
whatever language competency was needed to do the job 
for which they were training, the program helped Spanish 
speakers quickly enter the economic mainstream. Joe and 
I left California convinced that, given the large Spanish-
speaking population of the South Bronx, the wooing and 
winning of CET should be a priority for us.
But this was not to be for several years, despite Clark’s 
generous support for a New York City CET program located 
in downtown Manhattan. Then in 1996 LISC and CCRP 
joined forces with the Phipps CDC and MBD to pressure 
CET’s reluctant CEO, Russ Tershay, to accept City funding 
to come to the South Bronx. CET opened up in a Phipps 
shopping strip not far from MBD. Unfortunately, the pro-
gram did not prove to be transferable in the way we had 
envisioned. Among the many disappointments we experi-
enced was the rigidity of the City regulations that required 
applicants from all over New York to be assigned to the CET 
center from a central intake point. These regulations, which 
we were unable to change, defeated our dream of having 
a highly regarded training program as a component of all 
the CDCs’ comprehensive initiatives.
While we were all deflated to have this encounter 
turn out as it did, we never saw CET as the sole workforce 
development initiative for our communities. It was a 
piece of a larger employment strategy. There was also the 
New Bronx Employment Service, a program of our own. 
Designed with a job resource center in each of the CDC 
neighborhoods, it was well suited to the needs of the 
CDC neighborhoods and worked well.
All agreed that Neighborhood Housing Services 
(now NeighborWorks) could play an important role 
in the South Bronx, provided we could convince its 
staff and board to reverse the NHS neighborhood 
selection criteria that had been in place for some 
25 years.
We were far more successful in bringing Neighborhood 
Housing Services (now NeighborWorks) to the South 
Bronx and integrating it with our CCRP initiative. The effort 
to create a partnership started when the CDC-led plan-
ning groups were in the process of creating their Strategic 
Neighborhood Action Plans. That was when I suggested to 
the CCRP managers that it would be worthwhile to investi-
gate NHS, the nation’s foremost program for treating frayed 
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neighborhoods made up mainly of single-family hous-
ing. After doing so, all agreed that NHS of New York City 
could play an important role in the South Bronx, provided 
we could convince its staff and board to reverse the NHS 
neighborhood selection criteria that had been in place 
for some 25 years. This would involve bringing NHS into 
a neighborhood where multifamily buildings, rather than 
homeowner housing, predominated.
I had been a fan of Neighborhood Housing Services 
ever since, as a Ford Foundation program officer, I was 
introduced to the first NHS – a partnership of residents, 
lenders, foundations and city government located in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, I watched NHS 
take hold in scores of neighborhoods across the coun-
try, where its formula for eradicating redlining – illegal 
housing practices – and treating troubled working class 
neighborhoods never failed to achieve lasting results. In 
1980 I spearheaded the effort to get NHS going in five 
neglected New York City neighborhoods. All were made 
up largely of homeowner housing with a smattering of 
multifamily buildings.
Achieving teamwork between the staff of each 
CDC and newly hired NHS personnel was not an 
easy matter. It took persistence and follow-up and 
involved regular monitoring of outreach and loan 
activity to track the program’s progress.
Like most every South Bronx neighborhood, those 
participating in CCRP had a predominance of apartment 
houses. Funding flowed to the CDCs for the revival of this 
stock, while both lenders and the public sector ignored 
the needs of the neighborhoods’ relatively small numbers 
of old and blighted single-family homes. In fact, when we 
asked CCRP planners to research the data made available 
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, we found that 
almost no private sector lending to support the purchase 
or repair of older one-to-four-family houses had occurred 
in the CDC areas for several decades. Clearly, we needed 
the intervention of NHS with its unique capacity to pro-
vide the services homeowners needed, and to package 
improvement loans that they could afford.
In year five of CCRP, then NHS executive director, 
Fran Justa, accepted our invitation to come to the South 
Bronx. The idea was to try a brand new NHS approach, 
one that promised to have relevance in many other areas 
of New York City. CCRP contributed to the first year’s bud-
get. In addition, I worked with Fran to raise funds for both 
operating expenses and below market-rate loans from 
several lenders – mostly what was then Fleet Bank, the 
Chase Bank and several foundations, including Astor. As 
was her usual practice when considering grants, Brooke 
Astor, head of the Astor Foundation and one of New 
York’s most revered philanthropists, then well into her 
nineties, came to meet us on site in the South Bronx. She 
was to have tea and lots of homemade pastries with a 
small group of Mt. Hope homeowners in one of their vin-
tage houses before making her final decision. She arrived 
in her chauffeured limousine, coifed and dressed to per-
fection and, upon joining the women assembled to meet 
with her, promptly became “one of the girls.” We received 
her $25,000 grant shortly thereafter.
Achieving teamwork between the staff of each CDC 
and newly hired NHS personnel was not an easy matter. It 
took persistence and follow-up and involved regular moni-
toring of outreach and loan activity to track the program’s 
progress. Our earliest and greatest success was in Mt. Hope. 
Here, in no time at all, NHS personnel had teamed up with 
Peter Bray, the CDC’s imaginative housing development 
officer. He was determined to transform and sell boarded-
up homes that had defaced the neighborhood for a 
decade or more. The financing pieced together by NHS 
made this possible. In addition, both organizations worked 
together to open an NHS facility in Mt. Hope that would 
teach repair techniques to homeowners as well as handy-
men (and women) from all over the South Bronx. Little 
did we know then that, in later years, this training center 
would serve as an important resource for improving the 
skills of workers employed by the CCRP Inc. Maintenance 
Company, a joint CDC enterprise launched in 2000.
Connecting with the Public Sector
Throughout these chapters we have emphasized the criti-
cal role that the public sector played in CCRP. We present 
more detail here because clearly, private and nonprofit 
organizations alone could not rebuild the devastated 
human service and physical infrastructures of the South 
Bronx without a massive infusion of government dollars.
Recognizing that the enormity of rebuilding the South 
Bronx would strike fear in the hearts of public servants, 
we always took pains to convince them that the CCRP 
initiative would focus only on realistic goals achievable 
within about five years. Further, we would stay away from 
advocating for huge capital projects. This was the prag-
matic approach we had to take to avoid being written off.
While the City’s financial condition at the time was 
extremely troubled, the health of New York State was 
excellent. My approach to the Governor’s office began 
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even before we announced the start of CCRP. It centered 
on the fact that the CDCs would be a superb delivery 
system for achieving the state’s goals, and that CCRP had 
access to substantial amounts of flexible, philanthropic 
dollars. Nearly two years later my persistence paid off. We 
were admitted to a state-conceived comprehensive ini-
tiative, the Neighborhood Based Alliance program (NBA) 
– provided that we covered staff and planning costs 
that the state ordinarily would have paid. In return, they 
waived a regulation that would have required each CDC 
neighborhood to compete for entry individually, rather 
than as a component part of one “wholesale” program.
This was a small price to pay for the special access to 21 
state agencies NBA provided, not only to each CDC lead 
agency, but also to scores of other organizations located in 
their target areas. Some state agencies created programs 
especially for NBA participants; others issued statewide 
requests for proposals that added bonus points to the com-
petitive score of any organization in an NBA neighborhood.
Together we traveled to Albany to present our 
Strategic Neighborhood Action Plans and Quality of Life 
Physical Plans. Both opened the doors to grants and/or 
loans for activities that ranged from neighborhood safety 
programs with local police to the development of a new 
child care center and the staffing of a retail business asso-
ciation. Meanwhile, a member of the Mid Bronx Seniors’ 
Neighborhood Advisory Council, the Women’s Housing 
and Economic Development Corporation (WEDCO), won 
a multi-million dollar state loan that made it possible to 
convert the long-abandoned Morrisania Hospital into a 
housing facility with space for a medical practice, child 
care center and catering venture.
The NBA was a program developer’s dream come true. 
Because it was to be a seven-year initiative, it gave us the 
reason we needed to extend CCRP beyond three years. 
It would now terminate at the same time the NBA did. 
Then, in 1994, Governor Mario Cuomo lost his reelection 
bid and the following January George Pataki took office. 
For the NBA program this meant sudden death. This was 
a bitter disappointment. The only consolation was that 
the CDCs had a massive amount of work on their plates, 
and a respite was not unwelcome. But this was not the 
response for the long term.
Recognizing that they would now have to bring in 
substantial dollars to implement their plans, the CDCs 
began to go out and court South Bronx elected officials. 
All had access to public dollars. One source of sup-
port was in Washington D.C., where Congressman Jose 
Serrano was the ranking majority member on the House 
of Representatives Appropriations Committee. Closer to 
home were state senators and representatives, city council 
people and the Bronx Borough President. All of these rela-
tionships proved fruitful over time as the CDCs’ revitaliza-
tion efforts built upon one another, producing substantial, 
visible impact in every CCRP community.
An introduction from Hooper Brooks, Director of 
Environmental Programs at the Surdna Foundation, along 
with our award-winning Quality of Life Physical Plans, 
jump-started our relationship with the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Urban Resources Partnership (URP). Armed 
with a new appropriation to assist the creation of open 
space in urban areas, the Department of Agriculture cre-
ated an interagency team to pursue the program in several 
cities. One was New York, where a hoard of entrenched 
open space groups was vying for the money.
The CDCs’ Plans won the day for us because they con-
vinced Agriculture representatives that they had found 
what they were searching for: residents of organized urban 
neighborhoods who had already developed open space 
strategies and with whom they could work hands-on. To 
enable the federal team to choose specific sites for their 
program, we asked each of the CDCs to nominate a project 
from their Plan knowing that there was little chance that 
all would be selected. John Shapiro, CCRP’s professional 
planner, and I escorted the group on a day-long van trip 
to the South Bronx to meet with the CDCs and visit pro-
posed sites. Three of the most daring and large-scale proj-
ects were selected. All would receive funding – a total of 
$600,000 for the three – plus agency technical support.
With the realization that they would now have 
to bring in substantial dollars to implement their 
plans, the CDCs began to go out and court South 
Bronx elected officials. All these relationships 
proved fruitful over time, producing visible impact 
in every CCRP community.
Thus did the Phipps CDC’s notion of creating a 
“Zooway” begin to see the light of day. The idea was both 
exciting and practical – a newly landscaped pedestrian 
walkway from the Beacon School and a nearby subway 
stop up to the Bronx Zoo, and a mini-greenbelt on the for-
merly junk-filled banks of the Bronx River. Phipps received 
the $200,000 Urban Resources Partnership award and 
soon supplemented it with a sizable ISTEA grant from the 
U.S. Department of Transportation. Further, the CDC man-
aged to get a buy-in for its Zooway scheme from the City’s 
transportation agency. The agency agreed to fuse its own 
plans for renovating the elevated subway station in West 
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Farms with those of the CDC. The result is nothing short of 
wonderful. The station, which serves as the port of entry for 
thousands of visitors to the nearby Zoo, reinforces the new 
image of a revitalized community and remains an impor-
tant element of the West Farms Quality of Life Physical Plan.
The gardens of MBSCC’s Andrew Freeman mansion on 
the Grand Concourse were considered among the most 
beautiful in all of Bronx County when the block-long build-
ing was constructed in the 1920s. Like the mansion itself, 
the gardens deteriorated badly in the decades leading up 
to 1982, when the CDC bought the vacant property to turn 
it into a facility for elderly residents threatened with home-
lessness. Since that time, Mid Bronx Seniors has converted 
a portion of the mansion into a Family Support Center to 
house a number of social service agencies under one roof, 
starting with its own MBSCC/CCRP Head Start center.
The URP support that Mid Bronx Seniors won made 
it possible to begin the massive job of restoring the gar-
dens of the Freeman facility. This money and technical 
assistance were available nowhere else for this landmark 
of great local importance.
Finally, the third grant, MBD’s Rock Garden Park, was 
URP’s most courageous choice. Just over an acre in size, 
the site was a steep rocky crag with debris piled a dozen 
or more feet high from decades of dumping. Rats, oblivi-
ous of neighborhood children who played nearby, were 
the denizens here. Clearing the site and preparing it for 
the play spaces, gardens and fountain that are there now 
was a yeoman task. Adults and children alike planned 
the park and today watch over it while the City Parks 
Department maintains it.
URP’s $200,000 grant was the vote of confidence that 
made the notion of creating a park here real. The grant 
leveraged an additional $2 million to finish the project, 
with most of the money coming from the City Council, 
via MBD’s local councilman, Jose Rivera, who understood 
the importance of the park to the people of Longfellow 
Avenue. There were a number of other heroes here as well, 
including the residents involved in the project, MBD’s exec-
utive director and CCRP manager, the technical assistance 
providers from URP, and Abel Cruz of the Borough’s sanita-
tion department – who had his crews work over a span 
of months to clear the site of countless tons of rubbish so 
that construction of the park could proceed.
To my mind, URP was one of the best programs that 
ever came out of Washington. Unfortunately, it too was 
discontinued when an administration changed hands.
Nonetheless, there are a few words of wisdom here 
for others. The fact that our ideal program – the state’s 
Neighborhood Based Alliance – evaporated is no reason 
to believe that, at another time in another city or county 
or state, an NBA-type effort cannot be mounted. Certainly 
it deserves a try. Clearly, big hopes and dreams require 
generous public dollars to reach fruition. Had the NBA 
lasted until its seven-year sunset, it could have turned 
out to be our magic formula. But like so much else in our 
field, it did not. It is important, however, to emphasize the 
CDCs doggedly turned to other sources of public funds, 
and over time found that, in many cases, the officials in 
charge of those funds understood the value of a com-
prehensive initiative like CCRP and were prepared to help 
make it happen.
There are a few words of wisdom here for others 
even though our ideal program evaporated. 
The CDCs doggedly turned to other sources of 
public funds, finding over time those officials who 
understood the value of a comprehensive initiative 
like CCRP and who were prepared to help.
MBSCC bought the vacant 
Andrew Freeman mansion 
on the Grand Concourse 
in 1982. As part of CCRP, 
MBSCC restored the 
grounds and converted 
the mansion into a Family 
Support Center housing a 
number of human service 
agencies, including the 
MBSCC/CCRP Head Start 
center.
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Connecting to Corporate Resources
Corporate involvement in CCRP was never all that it 
should have been. I very much regret that we never 
found a way to systematically tap into the people 
resources so abundant in our city’s business sector. No 
doubt one factor was the sheer size and complexity of 
the city and the isolation of the South Bronx from the 
corporate community. In most other American cities one 
is likely to find major businesses involved at the micro 
level of community life. Not so in New York.
Of course, there were a number of corporate founda-
tions that contributed to CCRP and many businesses, 
both large and small, worked closely with the New Bronx 
Employment Service, teaming up with its staff to fill vacant 
positions with residents from the CDC neighborhoods. 
And, yes, there were several remarkable relationships that 
the CDCs themselves cultivated.
Mid Bronx Seniors used an introduction to SCORE (the 
Service Corps of Retired Executives) to obtain the exper-
tise of retired professionals to help the CDC plan for the 
transformation of the block-long Andrew Freeman home 
into a family support center. The challenge here was to 
continue to house some 100 senior residents in a portion 
of the massive building – a worthwhile but money-los-
ing venture – while converting thousands of square feet 
into sorely needed space for childcare and human service 
programs. Achieving this goal has had a double social 
utility for the CDC: addressing critical service needs for its 
community and adding rental income from the facility’s 
new tenants to generate needed cash flow.
Included in Phipps CDC’s Zooway project was a 
Herculean effort to salvage the Bronx River shoreline 
behind the CDC’s Beacon School. This attracted volun-
teers from such companies as Viacom and Chase Bank, 
with Sumner Redstone, Viacom’s high-profile CEO, serving 
as leader of his company’s volunteers. These and others 
recruited by Phipps teamed up with neighborhood resi-
dents and the Bronx arm of the Department of Sanitation 
to help rid the rat-infested area beside the river, and 
the river itself, of mounds of debris and garbage, even 
discarded stoves and refrigerators that had accumulated 
over a period of several decades. Today a small amphithe-
ater and a lovely garden built by students and named for 
the CDC’s dedicated CCRP Manager Drew Hyde, stand on 
the site. The beautiful river itself is once again used and 
enjoyed by people from all over New York.
In addition, there is a small group of volunteers in 
particular whose contribution to the people of the South 
Bronx was truly remarkable. These are the attorneys from 
top-notch law firms who worked for nearly seven years, 
donating hundreds of hours of pro bono legal work for 
MBD and its New Horizons shopping center. One was 
Robert Clare III, a partner in White and Case. He and his 
associate, Mario Springer, were responsible for drafting all 
of MBD’s contracts. These included the contract for acqui-
sition of the site from the City; the contracts with the 
builder and others actually engaged in constructing the 
project; and agreements with LISC’s Retail Initiative (TRI), 
the patient lender needed to make the financing work. 
A second set of attorneys led by William Rubin served 
as MBD’s leasing counsel, crafting and reviewing all the 
MBD’s Rock Garden Park 
was a joint venture of 
community residents, the 
City of New York and the 
Department of Agriculture, 
under the leadership of 
MBD. Illegal dumping made 
site cleanup and prepara-
tion a daunting challenge 
for the partners but resulted 
in a beautiful neighborhood 
facility.
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leases with New Horizons’ tenants. Both sets of attorneys 
were recruited via Lawyers for the Public Interest, a non-
profit organization that puts volunteer lawyers together 
with nonprofit clients. They brought to the South Bronx 
and to a very difficult project the best of what the New 
York City legal profession has to offer.
I realize now, in thinking about this matter, that I could 
have taken a far more proactive approach to connect the 
CDCs with the business community. Rather than merely 
providing them with information about groups that 
could help them tap into corporate technical assistance, I 
could have actually organized this aspect of the program 
as I did with many others. Perhaps I should have started 
by brainstorming with each CDC to create a package of 
opportunities, and then taken those ideas to agencies 
whose mission it is to make the kind of connections we 
needed. I believe that this program-wide approach would 
have helped to develop serious interest, and I suggest it 
to others, even though it was not tested in CCRP.
I realize now that I could have taken a far more 
proactive approach to connect the CDCs with the 
business community – actually organizing this 
aspect of the program as I did with many others. 
Using a program-wide approach would have 
helped develop serious interest.
Keeping Track of Progress – 
Getting the Most from Monitoring 
and Evaluation
When CCRP started we engaged in a brief but inclu-
sive process that led us to choose the Organization 
and Management Group (OMG; now the OMG Center 
for Collaborative Learning) from Philadelphia to do an 
assessment of CCRP that could be made available to the 
field. As previously mentioned, I was fortunate to have 
Jim Pickman work with me on the design of a request 
for proposals that we sent to more than a dozen orga-
nizations. All were approached based on their size and 
familiarity with community development. In addition, all 
were located between Philadelphia and Boston to avoid 
having too much of our $185,000 budget for evalua-
tion dedicated to travel expenses. More than half of the 
groups we had solicited turned up for a briefing some 
weeks later, and of that number approximately five sub-
mitted proposals. When it came down to making a final 
choice, we included the CCRP managers from the CDCs 
and representatives from the newly formed evaluation 
subcommittee of the CCRP Funders Advisory Committee 
in interviewing the two finalists.
OMG’s proposal called for a formative assessment. 
This approach would provide us with the benefit of their 
observations at regular intervals throughout the program 
Young participants enjoy enrichment opportunities at the Phipps CDC Beacon Program, situated in a partner public school which 
serves as an anchor for the “Zooway” first envisioned in the CDC’s West Farms Quality of Life Physical Plan. 
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OMG’s philosophy guiding larger-scale program evalua-
tions is that neighborhoods do not become transformed 
overnight through initiatives like CCRP. Achieving 
quality of life improvements is highly incremental and 
results may take years to materialize. Even so, there are 
real indicators of progress along the way that we can 
use to point to the positive changes that the initiative 
is helping to bring about. These go way beyond counting 
housing units produced, or dollars leveraged.
- Tom Burns
rather than waiting for a full-blown analysis when the 
initiative ended. Such a retrospective would have been 
of little use – instead, we needed interim feedback to 
confirm what we were doing well and to correct what 
needed improvement. For example, when we were called 
to task for the rapid growth of several of the groups, an 
effort was made to both slow down their expansion and 
help them to strengthen their infrastructure to accom-
modate growth. Of course, the success we achieved was 
largely dependent on how ready the CDC was to accept 
both advice and the assistance.
Lesson learned? Yes, indeed. A requirement for ongo-
ing management assistance and attention to the issues 
– such as too-rapid growth among our CDCs – should 
have been built into the initiative from the start. At mid-
stream it was extremely difficult to place strictures on 
participants. They could have been a natural part of the 
program at the outset.
All of the CDCs, with one exception, welcomed the 
OMG reports. The one participant that resented OMG’s 
critiques did so despite the fact that every group had 
agreed to being evaluated prior to their final acceptance 
into the program. Perhaps not surprisingly, this was one 
of the organizations that did not make it to the end of 
the demonstration phase. As to the Funders Advisory 
Committee, its members met regularly with the assess-
ment team and received highly informative reports. In 
this way the funders were assured that the initiative was 
moving forward as planned, an assurance that led to the 
numerous grant renewals we received each year.
What was attractive to us when we initially examined 
OMG’s design for the assessment was not only its forma-
tive approach, but its clear perspective on what they 
should be looking for at each stage of the initiative. They 
did not raise the bar higher than it should have been 
at any phase in the program’s life. They understood the 
rhythms of getting a program as difficult as CCRP off the 
ground. Thus their early reports merely concentrated on 
signs of progress that told how it was advancing. Further, 
they did not look for outcomes until it was time to do 
so, being confident instead that the pieces were coming 
together that promised the results we were after. Nor did 
they seek to measure that which was not yet measur-
able. Jobs secured, primary health care visits, community 
events, new parks and playgrounds, new child care slots, 
dollars leveraged – these were what they saw as reason-
able indicators of progress on a comprehensive agenda 
taking hold in CDC neighborhoods.
The OMG evaluators understood the rhythms 
of getting a program as difficult as CCRP off the 
ground. They did not look for outcomes until it 
was time to do so, being confident that the pieces 
were coming together that promised the results 
we were after.
When CCRP started it was projected to be a three-year 
odyssey. In negotiating our contract with OMG, it was 
agreed that they would prepare an assessment at the 
conclusion of each year and that we would publish each 
and circulate it to the field. When unexpectedly we were 
able to gain entry to the state’s seven-year NBA community 
development program, we had the perfect rationale for 
extending the life of CCRP from three to seven years. This 
meant rethinking how the assessment should work and 
extending the OMG contract.
As planned originally, we did publish three different 
assessments: one after the first year, one at the mid-point 
and one at the end of the initiative. Thousands of cop-
ies went out from our offices to nonprofit groups, aca-
demic and research institutions, government agencies, 
philanthropic organizations and interested individuals. 
This was clearly a worthwhile endeavor. We had spent 
nearly $10 million on CCRP operations over a six-and-a-
half-year period. What we learned along the way, what 
we achieved and what we were unable to achieve was 
information that belonged in the public domain, where 
we believed it would be helpful to others seeking a more 
hopeful way to challenge the conditions that exist in 
every distressed community across America.
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What We Learned Along the Way
H Building the capacity needed to implement a comprehensive effort requires a substantial investment 
in technical assistance over the life of the program. Make a generous allowance for TA consulting help, 
but don’t assume you can map out the technical assistance strategy in detail at the outset, or that you 
can know each year what your technical assistance expenditure will be. Having flexible resources available 
to use when needed is paramount. But be wary of TA overkill. It has been known to happen.
H Finding the right technical resources and managing the process requires a readiness to experiment 
and a lot of trial and error. The work of guiding the technical assistance aspect of a comprehensive effort 
often includes substantial direct involvement in finding the right kinds of technical resources, being sure 
the scope of each assignment makes sense, and ascertaining that the fit is right between consultant and 
client. Even then there will very likely be a few mistakes that require a readiness to reassess what works 
and what doesn’t and the flexibility to make changes when needed.
H Don’t be afraid to be engaged and get your hands dirty, but also know when to step back. Both the 
participating organizations and the TA providers you and they choose will likely welcome your involvement 
as they sort out how they will work together. You will want to see them agree on a scope of work, timetable 
and proposed outcomes, as well as the regular reports they will generate. However, it is best if you 
maintain a respectful distance once their joint effort is underway. You may also find it valuable to bring 
TA providers together from time to time so they can compare notes and clarify expectations about their 
respective roles. Although you are most likely underwriting the technical assistance work and guiding the 
process, it is best to treat the organizations as clients since it is they who must ultimately value and make 
use of the results.
H Provided the fit is right, the model of contracting with a single agency to provide staff dedicated 
to supporting technical assistance needs can greatly improve the quality of technical assistance 
available to program participants. This model especially makes sense for program-wide efforts or 
for program components such as planning, where issues are likely to be similar across sites and where 
proven skills and an established base of knowledge and expertise are especially valuable. Remember, 
too, that for your chosen technical assistance providers, working in similar ways with several different 
organizations and neighborhoods often has both financial and staffing advantages, so you might well 
get a bit more for your investment.
H Beyond the provision of technical assistance, a comprehensive initiative is greatly strengthened 
by efforts to open access to new program resources, both public and private. Do not underestimate 
the value of your own contacts and those you can establish in your role as a program director. These can 
be of enormous benefit to the groups with whom you choose to work. Be prepared to spend time opening 
and building relationships between your CDC counterparts and the people and resources that they and you 
need to strengthen the overall program.
H Invest in an external evaluation team with the right technical skills, a solid plan and a commitment 
to providing timely feedback. Contrary to the views of some funders and program managers, evaluations 
can be more than a burdensome requirement. The right team really can add value throughout a program, 
not just to the participants but also often to you as a program manager. Your evaluators can open 
opportunities to gain perspective on your role and provide you with a well-informed sounding board for 
ideas and strategies you may be considering.
There are few jobs as challenging (read difficult) in the 
community development field as managing a compre-
hensive initiative. After all, it involves intensive work with 
a number of audiences all at one time – first to build 
momentum and then to achieve outcomes on a scale 
that makes a difference. Working with community based 
organizations, funders, technical assistants of every stripe, 
government officials and evaluators requires the man-
ager to be at times a leader, follower, sales person, admin-
istrator, program developer and even tour guide. Often 
times simultaneously.
For me, there was never a more satisfying job than 
being at the helm of CCRP. For seven years we labored 
and saw how our efforts produced results that were truly 
important to the people of the South Bronx. We watched 
new ties being woven among CDCs located cheek by 
jowl in the same nine-square-mile area – groups that had 
rarely worked together or talked to one another before 
about their common issues. Then there were the relation-
ships that flowered between the residents and the CDCs 
and the residents with one another. How gratifying it 
was when the first primary health care facility opened 
and then the second, third and fourth followed. Before 
long there were 35,000 patient visits made right in the 
neighborhoods by people whose only previous access to 
health care was overcrowded emergency rooms at local 
hospitals. Childcare and job resource centers and parks 
and playgrounds were priorities for every community. The 
CDCs of CCRP delivered those and more.
As I started to work with Ed Skloot at Surdna to develop 
CCRP, it soon became apparent that both knowing the 
South Bronx and being known almost everywhere was 
a very real asset. I had worked with the CDCs when at 
the Ford Foundation and the Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation (LISC). I built relationships with many profes-
sionals from the foundation, corporate and public sec-
tors in the course of my tenure at both places – a period 
spanning some eleven years. Always a proactive program 
officer, I had gained a reputation as a deal maker and an 
advocate for those in the neighborhoods with whom I 
worked. Both things were true. I first got my hands dirty 
in East Harlem in the late ’60s. Here I learned how tough 
it could be to inch a housing program forward and how 
naive it was to think that bricks and mortar alone could lift 
long-impoverished families out of poverty. Yes, I bought 
into the notion of comprehensiveness way back then, on 
119th Street in East Harlem, and was as determined an 
advocate as any indigenous group could have.
Being entrepreneurial and knowing the worlds from 
which all of our players came was only the beginning of 
what was required to run CCRP. The CCRP intermediary 
would need a manager who was both responsive and 
flexible, but not to the point that its mission and basic 
strategy were compromised. Then there was the matter 
of respect. I greatly admired the CDCs for the difficult 
work they did and the commitment they brought. It was 
critically important, too, never to tread where the CDCs 
alone had the right to go. Their local politics and their 
local politicians were their business, not mine. Securing 
the favors and funding that they needed for their own 
initiatives was up to the CDCs. Program-wide efforts were 
different. This was my turf too. As to trust, with all of the 
people from all of the domains engaged in CCRP, it was 
an out-and-out imperative.
Lest I leave you with the impression that running a 
large-scale program such as CCRP is exclusively about 
leadership, let me quickly acknowledge the importance 
of management backup. CCRP benefited greatly from 
being situated at the Surdna Foundation. Here, we had 
people and systems support of the highest caliber. A 
second all-important source of support came from a 
trusted lieutenant with extraordinary people skills. Linda 
Diamond could be counted on to do everything from 
arranging meetings and maintaining our financial records 
to putting together our board books and working what-
ever number of hours were needed to meet whatever 
deadline we faced.
It was in East Harlem where I learned how tough it 
could be to inch a housing program forward and 
how naïve it was to think that bricks and mortar 
alone could lift long time impoverished families 
out of poverty.
Rarely was there a day that did not involve at least 
one thorny issue that called upon my skills and /or 
tested the values upon which CCRP rested. Unlike the 
Chapter 7
Making it All Work: Leading and Managing
– Anita Miller
0	 Comprehensive	Community	Revitalization	Program
people I now counsel, I had no experienced intermedi-
ary manager to whom I could turn. As a result, CCRP was 
all about “learning by doing.” Indeed, this fast became 
CCRP’s mantra, not only for me but for the CDCs as 
well. It was learning by doing when we set out to select 
the participants and then reversed course; when we 
launched the program, raised over $9 million for pro-
gram operations from 21 corporations and foundations, 
designed a CDC enterprise to carry on after the dem-
onstration; and especially when it became necessary to 
drop one CDC in year three and another in year four.
Getting Off to a Fast Start
Momentum is highly critical to the credibility of a com-
prehensive initiative and getting things moving is no 
small part of an initiative manager’s job. In the case of 
CCRP, there were quite a number of organizations, agen-
cies, funders and neighborhood residents who had to feel 
invested for the effort to work well. Engendering a sense 
that they were part of something dynamic, something 
that at last held great promise for the beleaguered South 
Bronx, was highly important to CCRP’s success.
Fortunately, I was one of those people in Mike 
Sviridoff’s orbit during my career at both Ford, where 
he headed up the National Affairs Division, and at LISC, 
where he had been the founder and first president. The 
greatest pro of them all, Mike was highly strategic in the 
way he went about introducing new concepts and new 
programs. As a member of the small team that started 
LISC, his marching orders were to put together a handful 
of “deals” – no small projects – that could be cited at a 
press conference announcing the program. This proved 
impressive. The message we conveyed at the press brief-
ing not only validated the program design, but showed 
we had real momentum.
Momentum is highly critical to the credibility 
of a comprehensive initiative and getting 
things moving is no small part of an initiative 
manager’s job.
We did no less in managing the start-up of CCRP. Well 
before we were ready to “go public” I began working with 
the CDCs that I knew would surely be selected on a hand-
ful of difficult and highly visible projects that either had 
been on neighborhood agendas for some time or would 
be at the top of priority lists once they began planning.
We used the CCRP kickoff in 1992 to talk about our 
commitment to “planning while doing” – or “doing while 
planning.” We explained that we were not interested in 
waiting for the end of a planning process to tackle the 
most compelling needs of the six neighborhoods. The 
proposed MBD shopping center was one of several that 
provided a fine opportunity to boost CCRP’s credibility in 
this regard and send a message about our shared vision: 
“When MBD cuts the ribbon to start construction on its 
supermarket, all of CCRP will be there to cheer its victory. 
And, too, we will be at Banana Kelly, sharing the commu-
nity’s pride when BK and Montefiore Hospital together 
open the doors of their children’s health care practice.”
That afternoon ended with our first CCRP executive 
session. It was a brief, informal meeting with all six CDC 
executive directors to devise an expedited process for 
hiring the two CCRP staff each organization would need 
to steer the work. I had prepared draft job descriptions 
for both the CCRP manager and the outreach worker, and 
proposed a classified ad with all six agency names. We 
would place it on their behalf. We agreed they would give 
us any changes they wanted within three days. We also 
agreed that I would have an opportunity to sign off on 
their final candidates prior to a job offer being made.
We were not interested in waiting for the end of 
a planning process to tackle the most compelling 
needs of the six neighborhoods.
To build support and enthusiasm for CCRP soon after 
the kickoff, we set out to hold a number of events for 
the CDCs that would give CCRP a kind of panache of its 
very own. During the all-day Future Search or “visioning” 
session we describe in Chapter Five, the CDCs learned 
first-hand of each other’s struggles and accomplishments, 
while also sharing the future they would seek as a CDC 
engaged in CCRP. The day proved a learning experience 
for everyone and did more than I imagined possible 
to both energize the program and build camaraderie 
among its participants.
The Future Search was followed by a retreat for 
CDC staff, board leaders and funders. It was aimed at 
enhancing relationships while increasing programmatic 
know-how. After all, organizations engaged largely in 
one sphere of activity, mostly housing development, 
or drug treatment, in the case of Promesa, would now 
have to address a number of new and unfamiliar sub-
jects as they worked with their communities to develop 
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a holistic agenda. Primary health care, employment, 
neighborhood safety and physical planning were some 
of the subjects addressed by professionals in each field 
at the two-day program.
In the summer of 1992 we held a dinner in the beauti-
ful elephant house of the Bronx Zoo to honor our CCRP 
participants – board, staff and resident leaders alike. 
Several hundred local people came together that night 
and former President Jimmy Carter was our guest of 
honor. Getting the former president to come back to the 
South Bronx was no small feat. I had to penetrate innu-
merable layers of staff surrounding him. Most, it seemed, 
had never heard of Charlotte Street or the South Bronx, 
despite all those 1986 pictures of the President standing 
there amidst acres of rubble and abandoned buildings. 
In the end, he said yes, so long as the schedule included 
revisiting Charlotte Street to see the 89 impeccably main-
tained homes that had been built on the 13-acre site.
There was no advance public notice of his visit. 
However, homeowners immediately recognized the 
President and, to the discomfort of the Secret Service 
men guarding him, poured into the street, surrounding 
President Carter to express pride in their community. It 
was a wonderful and very moving experience for all – the 
former President, the homeowners and me, the teary-eyed 
former LISC program officer responsible for LISC’s financing 
of the model homes at a time when few people believed 
single-family houses on this barren site could possibly 
work. A private meeting with the six CDC executive direc-
tors and a speech at the CCRP dinner, which was followed 
by brief presentations by the six CDC executives, capped 
President Carter’s time with us. All told it was a very special 
day for the South Bronx, for which we had Ed Skloot to 
thank. This spectacular event honoring the CDCs was his 
idea and the Surdna Foundation footed the bill.
Now it was time for the CDCs to get back to work. 
What remained to be seen was how effectively 
each organization would use CCRP’s money and 
TA, how they’d work cooperatively, and what they’d 
do to become the intermediary CCRP envisioned.
Now it was time for the CDCs to get back to work. Our 
efforts had been geared to delivering both energy and 
information to help them move their comprehensive pro-
grams forward. We were at their side, but only to support 
them. What remained to be seen was how effectively 
each organization would use CCRP’s money and technical 
assistance, how the groups would take to the notion of 
working cooperatively with one another, and what they 
would do to turn themselves into that neighborhood-
based intermediary that CCRP envisioned.
Working Out Rules of Engagement
Like much else with CCRP, our rules of engagement 
evolved as the program unfolded. An early test was 
the hiring of CCRP managers and outreach workers. 
Sometimes a CDC’s favorite candidate did not have the 
experience called for in the job descriptions we had all 
agreed upon. This was one of those thorny decisions 
that an intermediary would rather not face. I tried to dis-
courage the executive directors from making the wrong 
choice, but if the effort did not succeed, I backed down 
rather than exercise a veto. I reasoned that to negate the 
first program decision the CDC was asked to make would 
have started both the CCRP initiative, and my relationship 
with the CDC executive director, off on the wrong foot. 
Instead, I chose to assume that an individual wrongly 
selected would fail at the job. Were that to happen, the 
CDC, now knowledgeable about the experience and skills 
required, would find a more suitable candidate.
In one case a poorly chosen CCRP manager stayed 
on – and on – requiring a special effort from us to keep 
the group up to speed. In two others, events validated 
my early reasoning. The second CCRP managers hired 
were excellent. They had both the creativity and mana-
gerial skills that the position demanded. Then there was 
the executive director who completely shunned the 
consultative process we had adopted. Instead, she filled 
the CCRP manager job with a succession of junior staff 
people rather than bringing aboard an individual with 
the solid experience the position required. That was our 
first inkling that this executive director would be a most 
indifferent CCRP participant.
Collective decision-making was an important part of 
the CCRP ethos and after a while we got quite good at it. 
Among the many decisions we arrived at together were: 
to make employment a priority and treat it as a joint pur-
suit; to compete as a group for very large scale state and 
federal programs; to have all of us, including the CDCs 
and our planning consultant John Shapiro, go to Florida 
as a team to accept the American Planning Association’s 
first annual Presidential Award; to launch CCRP, Inc. to 
succeed the demonstration; to mount the same com-
puter system for all; and even to field a (winning) CCRP 
softball team.
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However, we all fully understood that having respect 
for the individuality and privacy of each CDC was impor-
tant to the success of the initiative, as well as to my 
relationship with each of the groups. So we were careful 
to keep information about the amount of core support 
granted to each CDC confidential in order to avoid com-
petition among the organizations. This was the limit of 
what we held back, however. The CDCs did receive the 
very same Board books that were prepared for our foun-
dation and corporate supporters in conjunction with 
their regular Funders Advisory Committee meetings. 
These books contained both financial information and 
narrative reports from the CCRP program director and 
our consultants.
Each CDC had control over matters that related 
exclusively to its own comprehensive initiative. Each also 
participated in consensus decisions about CCRP-wide 
programs and events. The vehicle for joint decision-mak-
ing, as well as for program-wide communication, was the 
CDC Advisory Committee. We met about once a month 
at CDC offices in the Bronx. In attendance were executive 
directors, their CCRP program managers and those con-
sultants or technical assistants whose work was on our 
agenda for the meeting.
Of course, there were special meetings as well. On 
two occasions we came together to decide whether to 
enter the competition for very large government awards. 
The first had to do with the state’s Neighborhood Based 
Alliance (NBA) program that would give the CDCs special 
access to state program money. The second was the 
federal government’s Enterprise Communities program. 
In both cases, the groups believed it was worth a fight 
to have CCRP considered. At stake was generous sup-
port that could provide the CDCs with dollars needed to 
implement large-scale projects and programs called for in 
their Quality of Life plans.
As important as solidarity was to our quest for both 
programs, we never deviated from a clear understand-
ing that applied to all CCRP-wide programs: If any one 
of the CDCs wanted to opt out, for whatever reason, 
they could do so without jeopardizing their role in CCRP. 
One CDC, Mt. Hope, hesitated about going into the 
state program, fearful that doing so would fracture its 
relationship with the Northwest Bronx Community and 
Clergy Coalition of which it was a member. In the end, 
after much internal debate, Mt. Hope willingly joined 
forces with its fellow CDC participants in what turned 
out to be a winning application.
As to the federal program, CCRP received the required 
nod from City Hall to apply only four days before the 
Enterprise Community application deadline. Undaunted, 
program staff, aided by a small cadre of loyal consultants 
led by Getz Obtsfeld, worked until four in the morning 
each day to meet the deadline. The application we submit-
ted under the CCRP banner was prodigious. In the next 
several weeks I received a number of calls from HUD in 
Washington which led me to believe we were a serious 
contender. However, when Harlem, home to Congressman 
Charles “Charlie” Rangel, sponsor of the federal legislation, 
won an Empowerment Zone designation, it negated the 
possibility of an Enterprise Community next door in the 
Bronx. Disappointed? – yes. Surprised? – no.
Childcare and employment are other examples of the 
difficult challenges that the groups took on together. In 
1993, well before the welfare reform legislation of 1996, 
the CCRP CDCs recognized the importance of childcare 
to employment success. Instead of treating childcare 
strictly as a service for kids – as was the norm – Head 
Start and daycare showed up in the economic develop-
ment sections of the CDCs’ strategic action plans, where 
they were described as critical to overcoming joblessness. 
Reluctant to get into the child care “business” themselves, 
they decided to work together on another approach. 
They asked existing South Bronx child care agencies 
to expand so as to meet the area’s sizable short-fall of 
day care and Head Start slots. Despite our offer of CCRP 
help, none of the existing providers agreed to enlarge 
their programs. Then Mid Bronx Senior Citizens Council 
stepped forward. Working with its fellow CCRP partici-
pants and our consultant, Child Care Inc., Mid Bronx 
designed a new initiative. It would include a central head 
start center in an MBSCC building as well as satellites 
based in the homes of child care providers in CDC neigh-
borhoods. The first program of its type in New York City, 
the MBSCC/CCRP Head Start Center began with 144 chil-
dren and a $900,000 budget funded by the City of New 
York. It wasn’t too long before this childcare program was 
serving some 324 children with an annual operating bud-
get in excess of $2 million.
The CDCs also chose a team approach in tackling 
unemployment. With Ricki Granetz, their talented FEGS 
technical assistant, the groups explored workforce 
development programs then being offered in the South 
Bronx. The research proved illuminating. Most programs 
involved “deep skills” training. Not only were slots in 
these programs few in number, but the bar for entry was 
exceedingly high. Clearly, there was nothing here for 
the vast majority of CDC neighborhood residents whose 
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needs the CDCs saw as being very straightforward. They 
needed work readiness training; they needed help in 
locating a job or ESL (English as a Second Language) 
classes or a training program; and they needed a range 
of support services for themselves and their families that 
would enable them to be successful at whatever path to 
self-sufficiency they chose.
The CDCs also chose a team approach in tackling 
unemployment, finding a need for programs 
addressing work readiness and various support 
services that would assist neighborhood residents 
in gaining self-sufficiency.
In 1994, we launched a joint CDC neighborhood-
based workforce development initiative and called it the 
New Bronx Employment Service (NBES). The name was 
inspired by our pro bono publicist, Fred Danzig, former 
editor of Crain’s New York. He insisted, and we agreed, 
that the time had come to distinguish the revitalizing 
South Bronx from the bruised and embattled South 
Bronx of previous decades. NBES, the first of several 
New Bronx entities, was a network of CCRP-supported 
Job Resource Centers located in CDC buildings with 
programs designed to meet the needs of local residents. 
Soon thereafter NBES evolved into being the centerpiece 
of each CDC’s human service activities.
The CDCs turned in excellent results. By the end of 
2001 they had put 2,000 people to work. But financing 
NBES was a struggle. When it started, both public and 
private funders were interested in “deep skills” or “sectoral” 
training despite the fact that this type of program was 
costly and could serve only a small fraction of the city’s 
jobless. They turned a deaf ear to our arguments that a 
variety of programs were needed. Later, when welfare 
reform came along, NBES found itself in New York City’s 
vast political labyrinth, without the clout to secure the 
financing it deserved. Yet, NBES managed to continue 
and do well. Two of the CDC Centers were partially 
supported with funds raised by CCRP, Inc. which also 
provided NBES coordination, while the other two relied 
on their CDC parent for operating support. In the case 
of MBD, the employment service was transformed into a 
hiring center for the 21 employers at its shopping center, 
while the other CDCs incorporated the program into their 
regular human service offerings.
What had we learned? The first lesson was that break-
ing an important program rule can sometimes be justi-
fied. In this case, we were faced with a challenge central 
to our mission: helping residents of CDC communities – 
among the poorest in the nation – begin the long climb 
out of poverty. The rule we broke was never to mount an 
operating program without having lined up long-term 
financing in advance. In this case, we decided that we 
had to wing it. This was a risk, but we believed that once 
NBES began with CCRP dollars, the sheer wisdom of its 
approach would win support from other sources. Instead, 
the premise of our original rule proved correct. The sup-
port we hoped for did not materialize and CCRP had 
to stretch its own funds to keep NBES going. However, 
I have no regrets. Neither do the CDCs. They built the 
capacity to operate a first-rate jobs program in their 
neighborhoods and put hundreds of people to work!
LISC/Chicago used our lesson to good advantage. 
Based on the difficulties that CCRP experienced, they 
made sure to secure city funds for its CDC neighbor-
hood-based jobs programs well before launching. 
Consequently they sleep better than I did then.
Operating with Flexibility
The autonomy I enjoyed as the CCRP intermediary made it 
possible to respond quickly to CDC requests and to pursue 
numerous opportunities that promised to enhance CCRP’s 
impact. Because I had both program flexibility and dollar 
flexibility, I could quickly back up decisions with commit-
ments on which others could rely. This flexibility was a key 
factor in distinguishing CCRP from other grant-making and 
lending operations – even other comprehensive initia-
tives. It enabled me to be highly proactive – to introduce 
the CDCs to new ideas and resources, to act on a need for 
assistance or the opportunity for a CCRP-wide program. 
In other words, to say, “we can help you do that.” Looking 
back, I believe that this flexibility may have been CCRP’s 
most important weapon. It would surely have great value 
for other comprehensive initiatives as well.
Having this flexibility also made it possible to keep 
up the program’s momentum. We could respond on the 
spot to requests for technical assistance to scope out a 
project, or prepare a grant application that would further 
a CDC’s strategic or Quality of Life Plan. If the organization 
had an individual or technical assistance group in mind, 
we’d ask to see the resume. If not, I would offer a recom-
mendation. Either way, it was understood that we would 
be looking for the best talent available.
I also regularly responded to requests for letters of 
recommendation in support of all kinds of applications. 
Sometimes two CDCs competing for the same award 
needed letters. What all of these requests had in common 
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was that they always arrived just before the submission 
deadline. No matter. We turned them out in record time, 
saying the appropriate thing, careful never to favor one 
CDC over another.
Having flexibility distinguished CCRP from other 
grant-making and lending operations – even other 
comprehensive initiatives. It enabled me to be 
highly proactive – to introduce the CDCs to new 
ideas and resources, to see a need for assistance or 
the opportunity for a CCRP-wide program.
This was the scenario that unfolded when Promesa 
and Phipps pursued the same federal award. Promesa 
emerged the winner of a $500,000 grant that enabled 
it to mount a new program for neighborhood youth. 
During the application period CCRP not only suggested 
and funded a consultant to work for Promesa, it commit-
ted a modest early grant to the program and provided a 
letter of support. Phipps asked for, and received, only our 
letter. When word of Promesa’s award was announced, 
the first congratulatory call that the CCRP manager 
received was from his peer at the Phipps CDC.
There were also times when it was necessary to turn 
down a request. Here again, Promesa serves as an exam-
ple. When Promesa’s CCRP manager suggested a micro 
loan program, we agreed that given his lack of first-hand 
experience with such enterprises, he would likely need a 
consultant. The consultant he selected had good creden-
tials, but he submitted a rather expensive proposal that 
included only his time and a limited amount of money for 
several micro loans. The proposal did not build in techni-
cal assistance for the borrowers beyond the creation of 
mini business plans. Nor did it contemplate using CCRP 
money to tap other funds so as to create a loan pool, or 
to build or borrow the capacity needed to both originate 
and administer loans.
While I could not respond positively to this request, I 
did keep looking for a workable micro loan program that 
Promesa could pursue. Then CitiBank came out with a 
request for proposals that would provide $50,000 to start 
up a micro loan program. This presented an opportunity 
for Promesa to join forces with Mt. Hope Housing, its 
neighboring CCRP participant, and the Bethex Credit 
Union, which was located in Mt. Hope space. Bethex, a 
small-scale but skillful community institution, pledged its 
own funds to supplement a CitiBank grant, while provid-
ing the capacity and systems needed to both make and 
administer loans. CCRP helped to prepare the three-way 
grant application and also volunteered a modest amount 
of money for community outreach. The trio won the 
CitiBank award – one of four nationally – along with acco-
lades for the soundness of its proposal.
The relationship between Mt. Hope and Bethex has 
continued to flourish and the credit union has continued 
to make micro loans. Additionally, the CDC has helped 
the credit union expand its banking services to organiza-
tions and individuals in underserved areas across the 
South Bronx. It is one of the very first community devel-
opment credit unions to offer Individual Development 
Accounts. These provide savers who have goals, such as a 
home purchase or an advanced education, with match-
ing funds raised by Bethex.
MBSCC’s proposal for CCRP funding to support an 
after-school youth program was another initiative that 
did not receive a resounding nod. While a worthwhile 
notion, MBSCC did not have an ongoing source of funds 
to maintain the effort and CCRP’s pockets were not deep 
enough to fund program operations (although we did 
later breach this policy when it came to the CDC Job 
Resource Centers). Pressed by MBSCC, we agreed to make 
a six-month start-up grant. Thereafter, the CDC would be 
responsible for keeping the youth program alive. At the 
end of the sixth months, the program did continue with 
new funding, although it never received the amount 
needed to operate at the scale the CDC wanted. Keeping 
it alive proved difficult, but MBSCC was unwilling to aban-
don the effort. To do so would have left the youngsters 
of their community without any after-school resource 
whatsoever.
The flexibility that was built into CCRP, together with 
my knowing the CDCs and the goals listed in their plans, 
made it easy for me to make quick funding decisions. Had 
this not been the case, and had the organizations been 
required to rely on foundation, corporate and govern-
ment support, they could not have reached the high lev-
els of productivity they achieved as CCRP participants.
Building capacity in CCRP was all about building 
capacity by doing. The initiative was designed 
around the proposition that meeting the 
challenges that each neighborhood identified for 
itself would improve the health of the community 
while at the same time its organizations and 
resident body would build the capacity to sustain 
progress even after the demonstration ended. This 
belief was fundamental.
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When Things Go Awry
It was to be expected that a program as daring and 
complex as this would experience serious problems. And 
it did. Dealing with these turned out to be particularly 
sensitive because of the number of parties involved 
and because we were committed to assuring that the 
interests of all would be duly considered. There were 
the funders for whom the Surdna Foundation exercised 
expenditure responsibility; there was the CCRP intermedi-
ary, which served as a surrogate for the funders; and there 
were the organizations experiencing problems, whose 
confidentiality we sought to maintain so that their repu-
tations would not suffer. As to the other, less troubled 
CCRP participants, they watched from a distance as we 
attempted to isolate troublesome issues so they would 
not slow the entire initiative. Solving the major problems 
we experienced with three of our six participants ate up 
an inordinate amount of my time. Perhaps this proves 
crisis management for a comprehensive intermediary is 
no different than crisis management in any other situ-
ation where the objective is to respond fairly, promptly 
and with discretion.
The first two of our major problems had to do with 
CDCs that had become CCRP “drop-outs.” Rather than 
formally exiting the program, both organizations showed 
little concern for CCRP’s basic requirements which were, in 
fact, very simple and non-bureaucratic. In both instances 
our actions were guided by the CCRP Funders Advisory 
Committee. The third major problem had to do with a CDC 
torn by a conflict involving two board factions. This one I 
handled on my own while keeping Surdna informed of the 
corrective action I was attempting.
In dealing with the first problem CDC, Ed Skloot, in 
his role as chairman of the Funders Advisory Committee, 
called a series of five meetings. The first was with a newly 
constituted special committee of the Advisory Committee 
whose advice we sought. The second was with the full 
Funders group, with whom we arrived at a set of pro-
cedures for handling the matter. These began with a 
suspension of the CDC until the shortcomings that were 
reported in the organization’s audit, along with CCRP 
issues, were addressed. Next we met with two senior LISC 
staff, since the CDC’s multi-million dollar housing portfolio 
represented one of the largest LISC/National Equity Fund 
investments anywhere in the country. The purpose of this 
meeting was to discuss the CDC’s deeply troubled housing 
program and what interest LISC had in corrective action. 
The fourth meeting was with the Board of Directors of the 
CDC to convey our concerns about the CDC’s poor overall 
condition and the indifferent attitude towards CCRP of 
its president/chair. It was then that we informed the CDC 
board of our decision to suspend the organization from 
CCRP on the basis of its unsatisfactory performance.
Thereafter, when the CDC president and board of 
directors promised substantial improvements in writing, 
we lifted the suspension. As it turned out, I did this pre-
maturely, for despite our efforts to be supportive, nothing 
changed after all. In fact, matters worsened as the few key 
reforms instituted were up-ended by the CDC’s president 
without board consultation. Left with no other choice, 
we recommended to the CCRP Funders Committee that 
the CDC be dropped from the program. The Committee 
concurred, bringing an end to a difficult chapter in CCRP 
history.
Our next major problem occurred a year later. Another 
of the CDCs experienced a serious tragedy that was aired 
by nearly every newspaper and television station in New 
York City. The organization’s controller was murdered on 
the steps of the CDC’s offices. Much later it came to light 
that an employee of the organization’s drug treatment 
program committed the crime in an effort to cover up 
his theft of program monies. However, this incident led 
to numerous revelations in the press about the organiza-
tion itself, some that focused on its fiscal condition; oth-
ers about financial disagreements between the agency 
and the state. At the time, the organization was a stellar 
CCRP performer. And unlike the situation with the first 
problem CDC, here the executive director, who was the 
organization’s founder, was unabashedly enthusiastic 
about CCRP and gave it added support from his own staff 
and budget.
Faced with an avalanche of bad news, but no proof 
of CDC involvement in the tragedy or malfeasance in the 
handling of its funds, CCRP maintained steadfast neu-
trality and conveyed the same to both the other CCRP 
participants and funders. In the end, the organization was 
exonerated, but not without the executive director hav-
ing to step aside to make room for a new CEO.
Under the new executive director, whose sole focus 
was a total remake of the agency, the CCRP program suf-
fered badly. In hardly any time at all there was little left of 
CCRP at the CDC. Under these circumstances, our posture 
was to work flexibly with the CEO and his ambitious turn-
around strategy, while seeking to salvage what we could 
of the CCRP initiative. Unfortunately, our efforts did not 
prove successful. Neither did our attempts to obtain from 
the new executive director or his staff even minimal com-
pliance with CCRP’s requirements for remaining in the 
program. There was no functioning CCRP manager, while 
a once vibrant neighborhood council and a federally-
funded youth program – all products of CCRP involve-
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ment – languished for lack of professional support. Weeks 
turned into months and we were unable to obtain the 
bare bones CCRP reports and plans that we had to have 
before processing a new annual grant. So the Funders’ 
Committee decided to cut them loose.
The third problem involved a long smoldering 
animosity between the two organizations that had co-
founded one of our CDCs. It came to a head when the 
chairman of the CDC board summarily fired the executive 
director without cause and took over the organization’s 
operations. Clearly, an intervention was needed. As a 
neutral party of interest with close to $1 million invested, 
CCRP intervened. I started with an emergency meeting 
with the board, at which time its members agreed to 
both a financial review and our assistance in finding a 
new executive director.
My next step was to get local staff from the Enterprise 
Foundation involved. Enterprise had worked closely on 
housing matters with the CDC for more than a decade. 
We needed William Frey, its New York City director, to 
weigh in as mediator and to share the costs of outside 
professional help. He agreed to both.
Two highly skilled professionals, an interim CEO for 
the organization and a management consultant to act 
as a mediator between the two factions, were brought 
in to help. Hiring a new executive director who was both 
apolitical and highly qualified was a major step in the 
right direction. However, this did not stop CDC board 
members from preparing to engage in a legal battle. In 
the end, an agreement engineered by their attorneys and 
a new chairman of the board – a retired fire department 
official with great stature in the community – set the CDC 
on a stable course. But not before the executive direc-
tor, who had been hired only two years before, resigned. 
Fortunately, within the organization’s ranks was another 
person – the chief financial officer – who was equally 
talented and well suited for the position. The ending to 
this story continues to be a happy one. The CDC has been 
moving forward and once again is a vital organization, 
setting and meeting ambitious goals.
Each one of these cases required that we communi-
cate promptly about what was happening both to the 
CDCs and our technical assistance providers. In doing 
so I made every effort to be both discreet and honest. 
To say that the events described above went by without 
notice would be a gross exaggeration. All involved in the 
initiative were well aware of the troubles that surrounded 
all three groups. This was all the more the case because 
of the camaraderie and interaction we had encouraged 
among CCRP players. In the end, in the case of the two 
CDCs we dropped, I found it best to focus on our com-
mitment to due process and to articulate our unwilling-
ness to have precious program dollars go to organiza-
tions that no longer took seriously the opportunities that 
CCRP presented – for whatever reason.
Dropping CDCs from the program was considered 
by some to be a bold and unprecedented move. 
We considered it necessary to ensure the integrity 
of the program.
Many in the community development world were sur-
prised that we actually dropped CDCs from the program. 
This was considered by some a bold and unprecedented 
move. We considered it necessary to ensure the integrity 
of the program. Others thinking about mounting a com-
prehensive initiative should anticipate the possibility of 
having to let go at least one of the groups they choose 
at the outset. Situations change over the course of a 
multiyear program. CCRP is a good example of this. By 
starting off with several organizations – at least three or 
four or more – there still would be enough participants 
to sustain the program should it become necessary to 
jettison non-performers. Certainly, one would want to 
avoid a situation where it was necessary to hold on to a 
non-performer simply because the program could not 
tolerate the shrinkage.
As to helping to straighten out a difficult situation, 
such as two factions of one CDC going to war, effective-
ness rests on being both proactive and evenhanded. Our 
ability to intervene came not only from past support for 
the organization, but also from our immediate offer to 
bring in outside professionals as problem solvers. This is 
another instance where having flexible dollars to spend 
can make a huge difference. CCRP invested some $35,000 
to keep one organization from self-destructing. It was 
money well spent.
What did we learn from these experiences that could 
help intermediaries for programs like CCRP? In retrospect, 
the choice of a social service (drug treatment) agency 
with clients across the city rather than an organization 
whose first loyalty would be to the neighborhood where 
it is located brought with it a risk. If the going got tough 
for any reason (as it did in this case when the murder, bad 
press and financial woes arose) this agency’s interest in 
community building quickly faded. Under similar circum-
stances, a neighborhood-based organization whose pri-
mary mission was community improvement might have 
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hung in there and welcomed the support that a sym-
pathetic funder could render “to right the ship.” Further, 
I believe that I was remiss in not being rigorous about 
meeting – perhaps annually – with the boards of each 
participant organization, although at the outset, the CDC 
executive directors had little enthusiasm for my doing so. 
In all likelihood, we – the CCRP intermediary – could have 
been more responsive to board concerns, and they to 
ours, had we stayed in regular communication. No doubt, 
this would have had to have been a condition of partici-
pation, agreed to prior to the start of the program.
Above all, we learned that serious organizational 
problems seldom right themselves. If an organization 
flounders as a result of internal conflicts, but is worth 
saving, getting one’s hands dirty by intervening judi-
ciously can prove worthwhile. That was our experience. 
But if a deeply troubled organization, along with its 
board of directors, is in the tight control of a leader who 
turns his or her back on both the neighborhood and the 
outside world, there is no other choice for a program 
like ours than to leave it to its own devices. This, too, was 
the experience of CCRP.
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What We Learned Along the Way
H Don’t overlook the importance of building early momentum and showing visible results. Part of the 
leadership task is demonstrating very early, both inside and outside the initiative, that results matter. 
Many of its goals will be difficult to achieve and take years to accomplish. But there ought to be some 
opportunities for showing early results that set the stage for those that are to come later. Even before the 
program begins, think through the opportunities available to show some visible changes. These early wins 
are invaluable in building confidence and enthusiasm for the hard work that follows. Programs that require 
ongoing fundraising and additional partners need the momentum that comes from a few early wins that 
reinforce planning and strategy development. Momentum builds credibility, sustains interest and attracts 
resources.
H Spend time early on and regularly thereafter defining the rules of engagement that set the stage 
for how you lead. A leader can only lead with confidence if there is clarity about his or her role and the 
roles of others. This applies to how the initiative manager relates to both CDC and funder participants. No 
leadership role can be fully defined at the onset, but an early investment in talking through assumptions 
about key decisions will help in getting off to a good start and will make future conversations about roles 
and decision-making easier. Later on, when conflicts and uncertainty arise, having a common point of 
reference will greatly simplify the task of working through differences.
H Sensitivity toward the players and their work, hands-on knowledge, and an entrepreneurial 
bent are all indispensable to the leadership of comprehensive community initiatives. This work 
is different from lots of other work in the foundation and nonprofit sectors. Comprehensive initiatives 
present challenges that call for a unique blend of skills over and above those often associated with good 
grant-making or effective nonprofit management. Respect for the strengths of your lead agencies and their 
neighborhoods, practical knowledge of their worlds and the constraints under which they operate, and a 
willingness to trust their judgment and share in their risks, are absolutely necessary to be successful in 
leading initiatives of this kind.
H Design into the program manager’s role the flexibility and discretionary authority needed for real 
leadership. The challenges of leading and managing this type of comprehensive initiative are difficult 
enough without adding the additional challenges of working within an overly prescriptive structure of 
guidelines and procedures. For the initiative manager, a preoccupation with detailed prescriptions may 
be a sign that funding partners have not fully thought through the decision-making process or that they 
are not comfortable delegating the authority needed to effectively lead the effort. For the funders of such 
initiatives, excessive worrying about guidelines and procedures may signal underlying doubts that the 
initiative manager is the right person for the job. Either situation spells trouble ahead.
H Anticipate that there will be occasions that call for tough decisions, and once the evidence is clear, 
don’t hesitate to act. Before acting, it’s always wise to go to program advisors in advance to prepare them 
for what is coming and secure their concurrence. When things turn difficult, discretion matters. Finding 
the right balance between what to reveal and what to keep confidential is never easy. In general, your goal 
should be to offer enough information to your program advisors to show that you’re acting fairly while not 
revealing more than they need or want to know.
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From the start, the CCRP demonstration was intended 
to yield lessons for others in the field. Even before it 
was launched CCRP attracted interest from people who 
wanted to know such things as what it was trying to do, 
how its funders were brought together, how the CDCs 
would work with one another and with CCRP’s staff, and, 
of course, what it hoped to accomplish. As the years 
passed, that interest continued to grow. Funders and 
public officials from across the country, and beyond, 
showed up for site visits to the CDCs and tours of their 
neighborhoods. All sought to learn more about the 
approach and see its results. CCRP’s director and staff 
from its CDCs were invited to conferences to share their 
experiences and offer advice.
Much of the CCRP experience already has found its 
way into print. Interest in receiving the interim and final 
evaluation reports was strong and steady during the 
actual demonstration. CCRP itself in 1996 invited commu-
nity development experts Mitchell Sviridoff and Bill Ryan 
to do an early analysis of CCRP and its contribution to the 
field. During the nineties CCRP was the subject of several 
case studies and articles that helped broaden knowl-
edge of comprehensive strategies in the US and beyond. 
Looking back over the years since it was first conceived, 
we feel confident that this experiment has met early 
expectations about its contribution to the theory and 
practice of comprehensive community revitalization.
Now, some fourteen years after the demonstration 
was launched, it ought to be possible to determine which 
parts of the CCRP experience still have validity in a new 
era – one in which comprehensiveness is pretty much 
a given and there are a variety of sources from which 
to draw guidance. One of the toughest parts of learn-
ing from a demonstration has always been to figure out 
which aspects have more general and lasting relevance, 
or, as someone once said, “which lessons have legs.” We 
begin this final chapter by revisiting what we believe are 
the essential themes from the demonstration. These are 
themes that speak to the contemporary challenges of 
putting together community-based programs that are 
multifaceted and that seek to achieve results of scale 
leading to measurable quality of life improvements 
in troubled neighborhoods. We then highlight some 
examples of how ideas from the CCRP demonstration 
have already shaped other comprehensive initiatives, and 
show how those involved have drawn upon CCRP as a 
useful point of reference. We also restate the case for well 
designed and well managed neighborhood revitalization 
initiatives. They are, we argue, an indispensable part of 
any urban revitalization strategy that seeks to balance 
economic development and poverty alleviation goals.
CCRP’s More Durable Lessons
It is helpful to begin this section by examining what 
kinds of lessons would be useful, and to whom. We see at 
least four audiences. First, there continues to be interest 
among philanthropies and urban funding consortia in 
launching multi-faceted initiatives in their own communi-
ties. Second, there are those charged with actually man-
aging these initiatives on the ground. Third, there are the 
many CDCs and other types of community-based organi-
zations that have established themselves within narrower 
program areas, such as housing and physical develop-
ment, and that are now expanding and integrating their 
programs to achieve more comprehensive effects. Finally, 
there are the evaluators, researchers and policy-makers 
to whom CCRP offers guidance in thinking through how 
to change the way community rebuilding initiatives are 
designed and managed.
The five “how-to” chapters that form the heart of this 
book told the story of how CCRP actually happened. Each 
offered practical suggestions relating to one of the five 
key challenges that every comprehensive initiative even-
tually confronts:
• Making critical early design decisions that set the 
stage for what comes next;
• Finding, managing and spending the flexible dollars 
that stimulate and fuel the creative efforts of commu-
nity leaders;
• Nurturing new visioning and planning activities that 
set the initiative’s direction and are essential to engag-
ing the community;
• Assuming a bridge-building role to connect expert 
technical and programmatic resources with the work 
going on in the participating communities; and finally,
• Steering the effort with the entrepreneurial leadership 
needed to venture into new territory, solve problems, 
recover from mistakes and keep the initiative moving 
in the right direction.




These, we have said, are the details of implementation 
that matter most. Embedded within these practicalities 
are some broader words of advice for those contem-
plating how to introduce and frame a comprehensive 
community initiative. What follows is a summation of key 
questions and answers that speak to the most common 
design choices.
Can established CDCs move into broader 
intermediary roles in their neighborhoods?
We think CCRP has shown beyond doubt that well-
established and competently led CDCs can effectively 
diversify into new program areas when given access to 
new core staff, capacity-building resources, seed capital 
and expanded networks. With proper support they are 
able to expand their missions, diversify staff and pro-
grams, and effectively capture new, stable public and 
private resources to sustain new programs over time. We 
also believe that CCRP’s CDCs have demonstrated their 
capacity to move into a new kind of intermediary role in 
their neighborhoods, serving not simply as conduits for 
new program dollars but also as independent, but highly 
accountable, entities that help catalyze the interest and 
support needed to launch ventures and improve com-
munity well-being.
Do these new neighborhood intermediaries 
have to be CDCs?
We think CCRP has shown that CDCs well established 
and anchored in their communities have unique advan-
tages that position them for comprehensive community 
rebuilding. But could other types of community-based 
organizations also take on this difficult work? We think 
that large, place-based human service organizations can 
be good candidates, provided they have on board an 
entrepreneurial leader, the know-how to “do deals” and 
assemble resources for new projects, and a keen appre-
ciation of the value that community engagement adds. 
The key is openness to trying new things.
How important is capacity building to 
success?
Capacity building is critical prior to start-up in order to 
mitigate the inevitable growing pains that a comprehen-
sive initiative encounters. CCRP demonstrated the value of 
increased organizational capacity by first enabling its CDCs 
to hire project-dedicated staff. But as was discovered in 
other similar initiatives, CCRP learned this is not enough. To 
sustain broader agendas and the increased complexity that 
comes with an ambitious comprehensive approach, CDCs 
are more than likely to require concentrated and ongoing 
support to address their own management needs, particu-
larly at the senior staff and board levels.
How well can CDCs make the transition from 
their familiar physical development roles 
into new roles as catalysts for the social 
development of their neighborhoods?
CCRP has shown that an early investment in quality of 
life planning, with a strategic action emphasis, is needed 
to put in place “blueprints” to guide the CDC and its part-
ners in their revitalization efforts. The CCRP communities’ 
continued reliance on plans and strategies developed 
some years ago provides ample evidence of the last-
ing value of investments in broad plans that capture 
the shared vision of residents and other neighborhood 
stakeholders. The plans also played a key role in attracting 
large-scale public and private support.
What kind of staffing does a comprehensive 
initiative really need and what’s the best way 
to support it?
The CCRP model of investing in core funding for pro-
gram staff has been emulated by later initiatives. Paying 
for a few dedicated staff persons, typically an initiative 
manager and an “outreach worker” (CCRP’s version of the 
skilled community organizer), makes all the difference in 
ensuring that the CDC has the capacity needed for com-
munity outreach, planning and program implementation.
What kinds of technical assistance are 
needed and how can technical assistance 
best be provided?
CCRP opened new avenues for organizing and deliv-
ering technical assistance within a comprehensive com-
munity initiative. CCRP support for outside agency staff 
to work hands-on with the CDCs evolved into a model 
technical assistance strategy that proved to be a cost-
effective way of securing quality professional assistance 
that enabled the CDCs to venture into new program 
areas. Not only did the CDCs benefit from expertise they 
could not otherwise afford, but just as important, the staff 
of the TA-providing agencies broadened their own under-
standing of the CDCs’ needs. They honed their own skills 
in making their technical knowledge useful to the real 
world problems found within CCRP neighborhoods.
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What guidance can the CCRP demonstration 
provide about sustaining programs and 
activities launched during a comprehensive 
initiative?
Time after time, CCRP demonstrated the importance 
of putting funding in place for new programs prior to 
their being launched, rather than CCRP coming up with 
operating support or permanent financing. Finding such 
funding was not always easy and in a few instances the 
search was unsuccessful. But in general, CCRP’s invest-
ment on the front end – mostly for the technical assis-
tance needed to help CDCs solve feasibility, operating 
and funding issues – resulted in stable, continuing sup-
port from government agencies and/or philanthropies 
eager to fund sound programs targeted at community 
needs. In effect, CCRP provided the evidence we had 
hoped to see that strong CDCs, once they find their niche 
within a new program area, are able to replicate the 
entrepreneurial approach already proven in the housing 
and physical development arenas. Although much of the 
credit for finding continued funding goes to the CDCs, 
CCRP has shown the valuable role that the director of a 
comprehensive initiative can play in opening doors to 
new resources and encouraging CDCs to build their own 
capacity to do the same.
Given the new emphasis on outcome-oriented 
funding, what lessons can be learned from 
CCRP’s approach to balancing comprehensive 
community revitalization goals with a 
commitment to showing visible short-term 
results?
CCRP had no choice but to focus early on achieving 
tangible short-term results. Since it began with only some 
of its funding in place, it had to proceed with a strategy 
that would help to draw in additional funders along the 
way. But there is a bigger lesson to be drawn from CCRP’s 
emphasis on concrete “early action” projects. In fact, the 
momentum that derived from CCRP’s early wins did 
much more than help raise money. Visible results showed 
that CCRP was, indeed, outcome-oriented. They also 
established the credibility needed within and beyond the 
community to tackle the harder issues that require sus-
tained effort over many years.
Everyone associated with CCRP embraced very ambi-
tious change agendas for each of the South Bronx com-
munities. At the same time they also understood that the 
long, hard journey toward comprehensive betterment of 
a whole neighborhood would be both incremental and 
cumulative. Their commitment to go forward was fueled 
by many victories, both small and large, that sustained 
those doing the work and attracted new supporters to 
it. The continuing commitment that CCRP’s CDCs have 
made to the strategies they adopted during the demon-
stration is clear evidence of their having fully embraced 
this approach. Only now – more than a decade after 
CCRP was launched – are we beginning to see an equally 
strong response from funders of comprehensive com-
munity change. This response shifts from an emphasis on 
quantitative results within an artificially bounded time 
frame toward a better understanding of the cumulative 
effects of incremental gains on comprehensive commu-
nity outcomes.
What about finding the longer-term 
funding needed to continue the “softer” 
planning, community building and program 
development work that CRPP supported 
during the demonstration?
CCRP clearly demonstrated how early and flexible dol-
lars can help start new programs, while also showing that, 
with adequate time, CDCs are able to sustain many of the 
“softer” functions they value, like recreational or leader-
ship development programs for kids, and additional out-
reach staff to deepen connections with residents. Once 
the CCRP demonstration program ended in mid-1998, 
some merged the functions of CCRP staff into those of 
other funded positions, while others fine-tuned property 
and asset management operations to increase revenues 
from existing properties. Several allocated a larger por-
tion of the overhead received from new programs and 
projects to cover the costs of maintaining staff and func-
tions formerly covered by CCRP. But mostly, they have 
strengthened their fundraising capacities, in some cases 
parlaying their CCRP experience and exposure into new 
grants from private foundations to support their commu-
nity-building work.
How long is long enough? For what period of 
time does a comprehensive initiative need to 
be funded to assure that it will have lasting 
results?
CCRP demonstrates that dramatic results can be 
achieved with philanthropic dollars channeled through 
a well-designed and managed multi-year initiative. But 
the CCRP experience, along with those of kindred pro-
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grams, provides at least two more useful insights. First, 
the launching and managing of a comprehensive com-
munity change initiative is even more demanding than 
first thought. It involves a complex array of neighborhood 
planning, program development, organizational and 
community capacity-building activities, all of them sensi-
tively designed, integrated with one another, and allowed 
to be absorbed into the CDC organizations serving as 
neighborhood intermediaries. Second, these initiatives, 
targeted as they are to communities that have suffered 
from decades of disinvestment, should not be conceived 
as having clear ending points. Questions about how long 
it takes are therefore difficult to answer with certainty. 
The correct answer might be: “Long enough to allow 
time for everyone involved – CDCs, initiative managers 
and funders – to learn how to become effective in their 
respective roles. Long enough, also, to establish sufficient 
credibility and momentum through visible results and to 
ensure that the CDCs (or other CBOs) involved have suf-
ficient opportunity to develop the capacities needed to 
assume responsibility for sustaining the initiative on their 
own.” Although CCRP’s six-plus years seems like a long 
time, it was probably closer to the minimum time needed 
to ensure that the effort is sustainable.
CCRP’s Influences in Other Settings
Earlier we indicated that CCRP has already helped shape 
the thinking behind several other comprehensive initia-
tives. In an effort to understand better which aspects of 
CCRP’s design or implementation have proved most help-
ful to others, we looked more closely at three examples. 
We asked practitioners who were most closely involved 
which aspects of CCRP they chose to incorporate into 
their own thinking and why. Further, we asked them to 
reflect on what they found useful about CCRP as their 
own initiatives unfolded. Our aim here is not to provide a 
thorough account of each of these initiatives, but rather 
to highlight how features of CCRP played a part in their 
design or execution.
The three initiatives we chose were the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation’s Rebuilding Communities Initiative, 
the Targeted Neighborhood Initiative (TNI) funded 
by The Pew Charitable Trusts in Philadelphia, and 
the New Communities Initiative sponsored by LISC/
Chicago. In 2003 the latter was expanded from a three 
neighborhood program to one that encompasses 16 
Chicago neighborhoods. It is now known as the New 
Communities Program (NCP).
The Rebuilding Communities Initiative. The RCI 
program was launched in 1993, not long after CCRP 
began. The effort focused for nearly eight years on five 
neighborhoods in five cities. It initially drew considerable 
attention nationally because of the impressive commit-
ment – over $18 million – that a national foundation 
was prepared to make on what was then a still-untested 
approach. What a departure for a foundation that had 
previously focused almost entirely on improving the 
delivery of services to children and families though 
state-level, “top-down” system reforms. According to 
Sandra Jibrell, now Director of Community Initiatives at 
Casey and then the chief architect of the initiative, RCI 
provided an opportunity to gamble on a very different, 
but uncharted, approach. What if the Foundation were to 
experiment with a “bottom-up” strategy for improving the 
lives of children and families by changing the conditions 
of the neighborhoods in which they lived? Jibrell and 
others at the Foundation were convinced there was merit 
in the approach, but also recognized that they knew little 
about the worlds of community development, com-
prehensive community change and resident empower-
ment and capacity-building. All were relatively new to a 
Foundation that had concentrated so much of its energy 
I chose to become a funder of CCRP, and even agreed 
to head the committee overseeing the CCRP evaluation, 
because I saw this as one of the best ways of learn-
ing first hand about how a comprehensive neighbor-
hood approach is actually implemented. The Annie E. 
Casey Foundation’s experience was then mostly in the 
redesign of large-scale systems that touched the lives 
of kids. We knew little about the field of community 
development, but we had a strong hunch that efforts 
directed to improving the neighborhood environment 
could have a powerful effect on the lives of children and 
their families. As we began shaping our own Rebuilding 
Communities initiative, we knew we had to make some 
very basic design decisions about how we were going to 
work with the communities we selected. CCRP proved to 
be very helpful in making several key choices. Among 
these were the decision to go with established CBOs who 
could serve as the lead organizations for the initiative, 
the decision to invest early and heavily in a planning 
and visioning process that engaged the communities and 
set their directions, and the decision to find a skilled and 
experienced initiative manager to guide the initiative’s 
development both within the Foundation and in each of 
the five RCI communities.
- Sandra Jibrell, Consultant and former Director of 
Community Initiatives, Annie E. Casey Foundation
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and resources on the service delivery systems and agen-
cies of the governmental sector. As they began shaping 
the initiative in 1992, Jibrell set out to learn all she could 
about how to piece together a comprehensive commu-
nity change effort that would be focused on improving 
neighborhoods but with the ultimate goal of improving 
outcomes for the children and families living in them.10 
Looking back at the period prior to RCI’s launch, Jibrell is 
quick to acknowledge that her main reason for joining 
CCRP’s funders was to learn from an initiative with similar 
goals and that was already underway. She credits her 
exposure to CCRP as having provided the basis for several 
key decisions about RCI’s design and management.
The RCI initiative concluded in 2001, but many of its 
activities, especially those focusing on resident engage-
ment and leadership development, are being continued 
by the lead CBOs and governance structure in each of 
their communities. In each of the five sites, a centerpiece 
program or initiative emerged. There’s a community-based 
child welfare service delivery system in Washington DC; 
a grass roots education reform effort in Detroit; a more 
integrated mental health and substance abuse system in 
Denver; resident-guided physical revitalization planning 
and a new community facility in Boston; and a multi-
neighborhood governance collaborative in Philadelphia. 
As with the CDCs involved in CCRP, the lead organizations 
have joined to create a new alliance that will enable them 
to sustain their relationships with one another and serve 
as a resource to other communities entering the world of 
comprehensive community revitalization.
The Targeted Neighborhood Initiative. This four-
year initiative in Philadelphia was launched in 1996 
with a grant of $4.5 million from The Pew Charitable 
Trusts. TNI was intended to support the efforts of four 
CDCs to achieve significant, visible change in housing 
and physical conditions in neighborhoods hard-hit by 
decades of economic and social disinvestment. Michael 
Rubinger, formerly associate executive director at The 
Pew Charitable Trusts and now president of the Local 
Initiatives Support Corporation, was TNI’s creator and 
early champion. He viewed the demonstration as a par-
ticular response to the need in Philadelphia to produce 
tangible evidence that a more targeted approach to com-
munity development would get results. He hoped that 
TNI would show what established CDCs could accom-
plish when they had access to the resources needed to 
take on housing and physical development projects of 
scale in well-defined target areas within their neighbor-
hoods. He reasoned that if the CDCs could demonstrate 
that well-designed physical revitalization strategies, sup-
ported by other programs, could produce very tangible 
results over the four years; it would be easier for them to 
leverage additional public and private resources.
Although TNI emphasized physical revitalization, its 
overall strategy was broader and more comprehensive. 
In his original description of the initiative, Mike Rubinger 
referred to the CCRP experience as an important precedent 
for a more comprehensive but targeted approach to com-
munity development. Like Sandra Jibrell of Annie E. Casey, 
he provided funding to CCRP to learn first-hand how it 
operated and what outcomes it was actually producing.
To achieve this comprehensive effect, the Philadelphia 
CDCs were encouraged to think boldly, not only about 
how to advance housing projects that had scale and 
that reinforced one another, but also to plan strategically 
and with broader neighborhood participation. And, too, 
they were challenged to develop supportive programs 
such as commercial corridor improvements, residential 
“blockscaping” to unify the appearance of whole blocks 
of homes, better crime and security strategies, as well as 
other economic development and employment efforts. 
Over the years it operated, TNI enabled its participating 
CDCs to build nearly 500 units of affordable housing 
in their target areas, make commercial improvements 
(including a new 46,000 s.f. supermarket and shopping 
10 RCI’s stated goals were “to maximize the capacity and impact of neighborhood resources and institutions; to establish effective neighborhood-based 
service delivery systems for children, youth, and families; to develop capable and effective neighborhood collaboratives to which state and local 
resources and authority could gradually be devolved; to improve housing and social and physical infrastructure; and to increase public and private 
investment in the neighborhoods.” The five sites selected were in Denver, Washington DC, Boston, Detroit, and Philadelphia. Additional information on 
this initiative is available on the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s website: www.aecf.org.
As we got deeper and deeper into TNI, it was enormously 
helpful to be able to see another initiative in operation 
that was working well and that we could replicate. CCRP 
showed us the importance of being strategic and that suc-
cess depended not just on finding the essential resources 
but also on skilled project management. Most of all, CCRP 
gave us the courage to think big and take risks.
- Beverly Coleman, Director, Philadelphia Neighborhood 
Development Collaborative and former TNI Manager
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center in one neighborhood), landscape and beautify 
three entire blocks, build new parks and community 
gardens, undertake repairs in scores of owner-occupied 
homes and launch two new workforce development 
programs.
Like RCI, TNI’s design also drew on the CCRP experi-
ence. Like CCRP, TNI chose to work with established CDCs, 
four in all, who would receive a substantial commitment 
of grant dollars for their operations along with additional 
flexible project support and technical assistance. Like 
CCRP, it invested heavily in quality of life physical plans 
to engage residents, create a common framework and 
build momentum around key projects and programs. 
Like CCRP it sought to develop new relationships with 
established technical assistance organizations that had 
experience working with CDCs, and new funders and 
financing sources with the capacity to invest in the TNI 
communities.
Later on, when the need for mid-course adjustments 
arose, TNI looked to CCRP for the strategies it had used. 
These included strategies for managing money, as 
well as for developing cross-site projects and making 
connections to new funders and financing resources. 
Beverly Coleman, who managed TNI through its entire 
four years before moving to the position of direc-
tor of the Philadelphia Neighborhood Development 
Collaborative, also looked to CCRP for guidance at sev-
eral critical points in TNI’s development. One change 
inspired by CCRP involved committing resources to 
the CDCs on the basis of their progress, actual needs 
and proposed uses rather than providing them with a 
fixed sum annually. This shift allowed for the reprogram-
ming of unspent monies previously earmarked for CDC 
projects. As a result, funds became available for new 
ventures that took aim at increasing TNI’s impacts and 
capturing additional resources. With advice and some 
direct project assistance from Anita Miller, she took the 
lead in shaping and launching new TNI efforts. One such 
effort was to go after new state funding for homeown-
ership projects. Another was to launch the blockscape 
program that brought together Neighborhood Housing 
Services (now called NeighborWorks), experts in home 
repair and façade improvements, with Philadelphia 
Green, experts in partnering with communities around 
urban greening efforts, to achieve the dramatic block-
level improvements mentioned above. A third was to 
engage a highly regarded citywide employment organi-
zation to help a TNI participant to increase the effective-
ness of its jobs program, and to obtain public contracts 
to secure its future. Both were achieved.
LISC/Chicago’s New Communities Initiative. A 
third program, NCI, was designed from the outset by 
LISC/Chicago to closely replicate CCRP. It was launched 
in 1998 with LISC as the intermediary and became the 
New Communities Program (NCP) four years later. With 
support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, and from the national funding consortium 
Living Cities, the program expanded from three to 16 
Chicago neighborhoods. NCP, like NCI, is working with 
a lead agency in each neighborhood that functions as 
CCRP’s neighborhood-based intermediaries did. Here, 
too, each lead agency is charged with responsibility for 
bringing together its community to identify critical needs 
and develop and implement strategies to address them.
NCP, like NCI, is led by a LISC program officer. Until she 
stepped aside in early 2005, Amanda Carney adopted an 
entrepreneurial approach modeled on the one that Anita 
Miller employed in CCRP. With periodic input from Anita 
Miller, Carney worked closely with LISC/Chicago’s pro-
gram director, Andrew Mooney, to set the style for how 
the program operates. Working flexibly with each CDC, 
program staff offer the resources needed to advance 
specific neighborhood improvement goals, while at the 
same time devoting much time and energy to ensuring 
the success of initiative-wide efforts. Joel Bookman, a 
veteran Chicago CDC director, with Susana Vasquez, also 
a former CDC staff member, continue this approach since 
taking over from Carney.
Auguring well for NCP is the unique set of attributes 
that LISC brings to its work. These include previous expe-
rience with the smaller NCI effort; its own pool of funds 
available for packaging housing and economic develop-
ment ventures; staff expertise; and excellent bank and 
governmental relationships.
While LISC relied on CCRP’s selection criteria for NCI, 
with NCP it decided to deviate from the notion of choos-
ing only those neighborhoods with strong CDCs. Instead, 
it tackled some of Chicago’s most severely distressed 
communities – neighborhoods where there was no sea-
soned organization capable of leading the program. To 
overcome this limitation, LISC decided to support one 
new group led by a well-regarded city council member, 
and at least two limited-purpose organizations. Over time 
they hope to evolve strong lead agencies that can gain 
both the credibility and management skills required for 
successful results. This is a challenge made feasible by the 
projected ten-year life of the program.
NCP supports dedicated staff in each of the CDCs, 
and underwrites the costs associated with Quality of Life 
Planning. Thereafter, support such as technical assistance, 
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grants and/or loans, is made available for projects identi-
fied in the Plans. In addition to assisting the development 
of new housing strategies, program funds have been 
used to start a highly successful community newspaper 
in one neighborhood, to cover predevelopment costs for 
two supermarkets, and to assist a cooperative venture 
between the Chicago Park District and CDCs working 
on open space projects in their neighborhoods. Here, 
assistance is provided by the Trust for Public Land. A 
major component of NCI/NCP is its network of neighbor-
hood employment centers. LISC brings predevelopment 
financing, a funding agreement with the city and an alli-
ance with Project Match, a nationally recognized employ-
ment program. With the advent of NCP, the mission of 
the Centers has expanded to include a broad range of 
financial services – from income tax preparation to credit 
counseling – aimed at building the wealth of neighbor-
hood residents.
LISC’s NCP strategy, while still in its infancy, promises 
a program that will go far beyond those of previous 
comprehensive community initiatives, including CCRP’s 
Bronx initiative. The scope and depth of NCP and the 
likelihood of ten years of funding from MacArthur, cou-
pled with LISC/Chicago’s willingness to take on hard-
pressed neighborhoods with little or no organizational 
depth, promise that much will be learned from this 
important Chicago initiative.
The three above examples describe decidedly dif-
ferent programs, embodying goals and strategies that 
respond to circumstances that may differ from those 
of the South Bronx, each yielding impressive but varied 
results. Despite their differences, they have all looked to 
particular characteristics of the CCRP demonstration for 
inspiration and guidance. Leaders of these initiatives are 
able to articulate with clarity certain features of CCRP’s 
design and management that have been borrowed and 
adapted as needed at different stages in each initiative’s 
development. In all three cases, there is little doubt in the 
minds of those most involved of CCRP’s positive influence 
on the results that have been achieved.
We have chosen to highlight these specific examples, 
but we know of others that could easily be added. To be 
sure, the kind of anecdotal evidence we have cited has 
its limits. But it does suggest that there are features of the 
CCRP demonstration that have contributed significantly 
to the evolution of best practices in a field that may no 
longer be new but is still very much in flux. Our hope is 
that the advice and lessons offered in this volume con-
tinue to spur innovation in the practice of comprehensive 
community revitalization.
Where To Next?
The future of comprehensive community revitalization 
approaches and their role within the broader array of 
urban strategies, both place- and people-based, is very 
much on the minds of those who care about America’s cit-
ies. Our focus has been largely on the “how” of comprehen-
sive initiatives, not on the “why.” We have taken for granted 
that the arguments for place-based community change 
have been well articulated and that the melding of place- 
and people-based strategies makes the most sense as a 
response to the persistent poverty that affects so many 
urban neighborhoods. Nonetheless, we have a sense that, 
after many years of experimentation with comprehensive 
approaches, some difficult decisions need to be made 
about how best to focus future investments.
We concur with the authors of the Aspen Institute 
Roundtable’s publication, Voices from the Field II, which 
took stock of the accomplishments of the past decade 
and framed the challenges (see sidebar). However, to 
their assessment we would add at least two points that 
follow directly from the CCRP experience and that of 
parallel demonstrations. The first is that the expecta-
tions and assumptions made in early experiments 
about what might be possible, given the timeframes 
in which the demonstrations operated and the levels 
of resources available were often quite unrealistic, not 
nearly as grounded as they might have been in practical 
knowledge of the conditions of the neighborhoods and 
cities in which they were operating. Admittedly, some 
initial demonstrations had crippling design weaknesses. 
However, in more cases than not, we think, the amount of 
There’s little flash to the CCRP approach, just a lot of 
common sense. Select credible lead agencies, provide 
flexible dollars, do some community planning while act-
ing immediately on identified needs, fund on the basis of 
outcomes rather than ‘entitlement’, keep a healthy atti-
tude toward market forces and the private sector, act like 
a venture capitalist, look for ways to link agencies and 
people together, and don’t waste time on losers.... Most 
of all, do what a good intermediary should do: provide 
some discipline to what is usually a chaotic develop-
ment process... Our experience in Chicago with the New 
Communities Initiative, which is directly modeled on 
CCRP, demonstrates quite powerfully the effectiveness of 
the CCRP methodology in other urban contexts.
- Andrew Mooney, Senior Program Director, 
LISC/Chicago
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time needed to reap benefits is far greater than the dura-
tion of many of the original efforts. This is surely the les-
son that the CDCs involved in CCRP have drawn. It is also 
the principal reason they continue to sustain and build 
on their initial Quality of Life Plans long after the interests 
of many of their funders shifted elsewhere.
The second point is that, for a variety of reasons, the 
quality of execution of so many of the change strategies 
embodied in these early programs was far less than it 
might have been, or would need to be, to address the 
ambitious goals that were adopted. Now, however a 
great deal of practical experience is available about 
how to take on processes of community change – from 
CCRP certainly – but also from the whole array of dem-
onstrations that were undertaken. We’ve learned about 
the structuring of intermediaries and the handling of 
resources so they are applied flexibly and strategically 
to achieve the highest possible leverage. We’ve learned 
about the vision and practical skills needed among those 
who shape and guide these efforts. We’ve learned the 
myriad benefits of approaching comprehensive goals 
incrementally through activities that weave planning and 
action together to build capacity, broaden engagement 
and create momentum.
How worthwhile it would be to bring together the 
rich experience of the last dozen years and begin to think 
carefully about investing in another generation of com-
prehensive initiatives – initiatives that would capture and 
build on best practices, new capacities and the shared 
wisdom of those most involved. Imagine a proliferation of 
new experiments, some larger and more closely studied, 
others more modest and fitted to opportunities in places 
where comprehensive strategies have not yet been 
tried. Some might build on results already achieved in 
neighborhoods where substantial investments have been 
made. Others might begin in entirely new places where 
interest and conditions are right. Bringing these experi-
ences together and reaping the next level of learning 
from them would be the very same networks of funders, 
evaluators, practitioners and academics that have already 
taken shape around well established organizations such 
as the Aspen Roundtable, and forums such as the Council 
on Foundations.
What would be different about this next generation 
would be the way in which the initiatives were designed 
and managed. They would take full advantage of practi-
cal lessons from CCRP and other similar efforts about the 
kinds of leadership, flexibility and hands-on experience 
that truly make the difference.
This is how useable knowledge develops and this is 
the kind of knowledge that is sorely needed, not just in 
the field of comprehensive community building, but more 
generally in the field of urban and community develop-
ment. It is our sincere hope that the experience of CCRP 
will advance this larger and more enduring field of com-
munity renewal, a field that will yield benefits we can only 
imagine in communities of every kind across this country.
After a decade of experience, the record of [comprehen-
sive community initiatives] is mixed. Many initiatives did 
indeed produce valuable change in their communities: 
they increased the quality and quantity of social services, 
economic activity and physical improvements; they devel-
oped new capacities and relationships; and they brought 
new resources to the neighborhoods. But they were not 
the agents of community transformation that many hoped 
they would be. The neighborhoods in which they operate 
are still poor, and they still have critical socio-economic 
problems. In part, this is because the initiatives have not 
fully translated the principles of comprehensiveness and 
community building into action. It is also because the 
ways in which the core concepts were interpreted did not 
pay sufficient attention to the capacity needed within 
neighborhoods in order to implement a comprehensive 
community-building agenda. Nor was the need recognized 
for a sophisticated understanding of how to work with 
structures outside the community.
- From Voices from the Field II, Aspen Institute 
Roundtable on Comprehensive Community Initiatives 
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